Ex Parte Cristian Dragomir.(in Re James Pike v. Crst Malone Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 December 2010
• Docket Number: 1091504.
• Citation: 65 So.3d 388
• Parties: Ex parte Cristian DRAGOMIR.(In re James Pikev.CRST Malone, Inc., and Cristian Dragomir).
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

65 So.3d 388

Ex parte Cristian DRAGOMIR.(In re James Pike

v.CRST Malone, Inc., and Cristian Dragomir).

1091504.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Dec. 17, 2010.

J. Mitchell Frost, Jr., and Bradley L. Hendrix of Ferguson, Frost & Dodson, LLP, Birmingham, for petitioner.

W. Lee Pittman and J. Chris Cochran of Pittman, Dutton & Hellums, P.C., Birmingham; and Timothy B. Davis of Davis & Davis, LLC, Alexander City, for respondent.SMITH, Justice.

Cristian Dragomir, one of the defendants in an action filed by James Pike in the Tallapoosa Circuit Court, petitions for the writ of mandamus requesting this Court to direct the trial court to vacate its order denying Dragomir's motion to dismiss the claims against him for lack of personal jurisdiction. We grant the petition and issue the writ.

Factual Background and Procedural History

The underlying case arose from an accident that occurred in December 2008 on Interstate 80 near Iowa City, Iowa. The accident involved a tractor-trailer driven by Pike and a tractor-trailer driven by Dragomir. At the time of the accident, Pike, an Alabama resident, was employed by Mount Vernon Mills, Inc., d/b/a Avondale Trucking (“Avondale”), and was driving a tractor-trailer belonging to Avondale. Dragomir, a resident of Michigan, was employed by CRST Malone, Inc. (“CRST”), and was driving a tractor-trailer he had leased to CRST.

In May 2009, Pike sued Avondale, Dragomir, and CRST, among others, in the Tallapoosa Circuit Court seeking damages for various injuries he sustained in the accident. In August 2009, Dragomir moved to dismiss the claims against him under Rule 12(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., asserting that the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over him. Pike filed a written response to the motion, and the trial court held a hearing in August 2009 on the motion. The trial court, however, postponed ruling on the motion until the parties could conduct limited discovery on the issue of personal jurisdiction and until a further hearing could be held.

On May 4, 2010, the trial court entered an order setting the matter for trial on August 2, 2010. The trial court's order also required Dragomir to appear on June 8, 2010, for a deposition limited to the issue of personal jurisdiction. After the deposition, Dragomir renewed his motion to dismiss.

The trial court held a hearing on Dragomir's motion to dismiss on June 25 and then gave the parties additional time to submit evidence on the issue of personal jurisdiction. On July 22, 2010, the trial court denied Dragomir's motion. The trial court's order denying the motion states that Dragomir's contacts with Alabama “were continuous and systematic and were purposefully directed toward Alabama” and that “Dragomir could reasonably anticipate being haled into an Alabama court.”

Dragomir petitioned this Court for the writ of mandamus and moved for a stay of the trial of the matter pending this Court's resolution of his petition. We granted Dragomir's motion for a stay and ordered Pike to file an answer and brief.

Standard of Review

“ ‘ “ ‘The writ of mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ, to be “issued only when there is: 1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; 3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and 4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.” Ex parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So.2d 501, 503 (Ala.1993); see also Ex parte Ziglar, 669 So.2d 133, 134 (Ala.1995).’ Ex parte Carter, [807 So.2d 534,] 536 [ (Ala.2001) ].” “ ‘ Ex parte McWilliams, 812 So.2d 318, 321 (Ala.2001). “An appellate court considers de novo a trial court's judgment on a party's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.” Elliott v. Van Kleef, 830 So.2d 726, 729 (Ala.2002).’ ”

Ex parte Excelsior Fin., Inc., 42 So.3d 96, 100 (Ala.2010) (quoting Ex parte Bufkin, 936 So.2d 1042, 1044–45 (Ala.2006)).

Discussion

In Excelsior Financial, 42 So.3d at 100–02, this Court provided the following summary of the law in Alabama regarding personal jurisdiction:

“ ‘The extent of an Alabama court's personal jurisdiction over a person or corporation is governed by Rule 4.2, Ala. R. Civ. P., Alabama's “long-arm rule,” bounded by the limits of due process under the federal and state constitutions. Sieber v. Campbell, 810 So.2d 641 (Ala.2001). Rule 4.2(b), as amended in 2004, states:

“ ‘ “(b) Basis for Out–of–State Service. An appropriate basis exists for service of process outside of this state upon a person or entity in any action in this state when the person or entity has such contacts with this state that the prosecution of the action against the person or entity in this state is not inconsistent with the constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States....”

“ ‘In accordance with the plain language of Rule 4.2, both before and after the 2004 amendment, Alabama's long-arm rule consistently has been interpreted by this Court to extend the jurisdiction of Alabama courts to the permissible limits of due process. Duke v. Young, 496 So.2d 37 (Ala.1986); DeSotacho, Inc. v. Valnit Indus., Inc., 350 So.2d 447 (Ala.1977). As this Court reiterated in Ex parte McInnis, 820 So.2d 795, 802 (Ala.2001) (quoting Sudduth v. Howard, 646 So.2d 664, 667 (Ala.1994)), and even more recently in Hiller Investments Inc. v. Insultech Group, Inc., 957 So.2d 1111, 1115 (Ala.2006): “Rule 4.2, Ala. R. Civ. P., extends the personal jurisdiction of the Alabama courts to the limit of due process under the federal and state constitutions.” (Emphasis added.)

“ ‘This Court discussed the extent of the personal jurisdiction of Alabama courts in Elliott v. Van Kleef, 830 So.2d 726, 730 (Ala.2002):

“ ‘ “This Court has interpreted the due process guaranteed under the Alabama Constitution to be coextensive with the due process guaranteed under the United States Constitution. See Alabama Waterproofing Co. v. Hanby, 431 So.2d 141, 145 (Ala.1983), and DeSotacho, Inc. v. Valnit Indus., Inc., 350 So.2d 447, 449 (Ala.1977). See also Rule 4.2, Ala. R. Civ. P., Committee Comments on 1977 Complete Revision following Rule 4.4, under the heading ‘ARCP 4.2.’ (‘Subparagraph (I) was included by the Committee to insure that a basis of jurisdiction was included in Alabama procedure that was coextensive with the scope of the federal due process clause....’).

“ ‘ “The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits a forum state to subject a nonresident defendant to its courts only when that defendant has sufficient ‘minimum contacts' with the forum state. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). The critical question with regard to the nonresident defendant's contacts is whether the contacts are such that the nonresident defendant ‘ “should reasonably anticipate being haled into court” ’ in the forum state. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985), quoting World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980).” '

“ Ex parte DBI, Inc., 23 So.3d 635, 643–44 (Ala.2009) (footnote omitted).

“ ‘Furthermore, this Court has explained:

“ ‘ “... The sufficiency of a party's contacts are assessed as follows:

“ ‘ “ ‘Two types of contacts can form a basis for personal jurisdiction: general contacts and specific contacts. General contacts, which give rise to general personal jurisdiction, consist of the defendant's contacts with the forum state that are unrelated to the cause of action and that are both “continuous and systematic.” Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n. 9, 415, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984); [citations omitted]. Specific contacts, which give rise to specific jurisdiction, consist of the defendant's contacts with the forum state that are related to the cause of action. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472–75, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). Although the related contacts need not be continuous and systematic, they must rise to such a level as to cause the defendant to anticipate being haled into court in the forum state. Id.’

“ “ ‘ Ex parte Phase III Constr., Inc., 723 So.2d 1263, 1266 (Ala.1998) (Lyons, J., concurring in the result)....

“ ‘ “In the case of either general in personam jurisdiction or specific in personam jurisdiction, ‘[t]he “substantial connection” between the defendant and the forum state necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must come about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.’ Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 112, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987).”

“ ‘ Elliott [ v. Van Kleef ], 830 So.2d [726,] 730–31 [ (Ala.2002) ] (emphasis added).’

“ Sverdrup Tech., Inc. v. Robinson, 36 So.3d 34, 42–43 (Ala.2009).”

Because the underlying accident occurred in Iowa and Dragomir is a resident of Michigan, Pike acknowledges that the trial court could not find personal jurisdiction over Dragomir under a specific-jurisdiction analysis. See, e.g., Ex parte Gregory, 947 So.2d 385 (Ala.2006). Pike contends, however, that Dragomir's contacts with Alabama were “continuous and systematic” and that the trial court therefore could find personal jurisdiction over Dragomir on a general-jurisdiction basis.

In Excelsior Financial, this Court quoted the following regarding the “appropriate analysis and the parties' respective burdens on a personal-jurisdiction issue”:

“ ‘The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the trial court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So.2d 226 (Ala.2004).’ J.C. Duke & Assocs. Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. West, 991 So.2d 194, 196 (Ala.2008).

“ ‘ “ ‘In considering a Rule 12(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction,a court must consider as true the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint...