Ex Parte Davidson

• Citation: 79 So. 727,76 Fla. 272
• Parties: Ex parte DAVIDSON.
• Decision Date: 13 August 1918
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida

79 So. 727

76 Fla. 272

Ex parte DAVIDSON.

Florida Supreme Court

August 13, 1918

Application by R. M. Davidson for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner discharged.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Habeas corpus is appropriate as a remedy to secure release where a person is held in custody on a warrant of arrest when the charge has no basis in a valid law or ordinance, or wholly fails to state an offense under the law, or the court is without jurisdiction of the matter.

A warrant of arrest issued by a municipality should definitely charge a violation of a valid ordinance.

Where there are valid local or special laws relating to the powers and government of particular municipalities that are in conflict with the general statutory law, such local or special laws prevail.

If reasonable doubt exists as to a particular power of a municipality, it should be resolved against the city.

A general clause conferring power upon a municipality can give no authority to abrogate the limitations contained in the special provisions.

When authority and powers with reference to a particular subject are expressly conferred in specific terms upon municipalities, other authority and powers that in their nature or extent would materially increase or be inconsistent with the powers that are expressly given in specific and limited terms are not to be implied, particularly when the powers expressly given do not include all the authority that may have been conferred with reference to the designated subjects.

Where a city may legally adopt ordinances prescribing the character of buildings that may be constructed and the character of repairs that may be made upon buildings only 'within the fire limits' of the city, a warrant of arrest, charging that the defendant 'covered a building within the city limits,' in violation of an ordinance of the city, is wholly insufficient as authority to detain the defendant in custody, and he may be discharged on habeas corpus.

COUNSEL J. L. Davidson, of Quincy, for petitioner.

J Baxter Campbell, of Quincy, for city of Quincy.

OPINION

WHITFIELD J.

A justice of this court issued a writ of habeas corpus returnable before the court upon a petition alleging an unlawful detention upon a warrant of arrest, charging that petitioner did 'cover or cause to be covered a building within the city limits of the city of Quincy with roof coverings other than that prescribed by' a designated ordinance in violation of the city ordinance. The return accords with the petition.

Habeas corpus is appropriate as a remedy to secure release where a person is held in custody on a warrant of arrest when the charge has no basis in a valid law or ordinance, or wholly fails to state an offense under the law, or the court is without jurisdiction of the matter. Ex parte Hays, 25 Fla 279, 6 So. 64; Sims v. State, 26 Fla 97, 7 So. 374; Ex parte Prince, 27 Fla. 196, 9 So. 659, 26 Am. St. Rep. 67; Ex parte Bailey, 39 Fla. 734, 23 So. 552; State ex rel. Worley v. Lewis, 55 Fla. 570, 46 So 630; Lewis v. Nelson, 62 Fla. 71, 56 So. 436.

Warrant of arrest issued by a municipality should definitely charge a violation of a valid ordinance. The warrant in this case states that the structure covered in violation of the ordinance is 'a building within the city limits.' Authority for municipal action should clearly appear.

Section 24 of article 3 of the state Constitution provides that:

'The Legislature shall establish a uniform system of * * * municipal government, which shall be applicable, except in cases where local or special laws are provided by the Legislature that may be inconsistent therewith.'

Where there are valid local or special laws relating to the powers and government of particular municipalities that are in conflict with the general statutory law, such local or special laws prevail. Sanders v. Howell, 73 Fla. 563, 74 So. 802.

By general law (section 1041, General Statutes of 1906; Compiled Laws of 1914) city councils have power 'to pass all necessary laws to guard against fires.' By special law (chapter 7694, Acts 1917), providing for the 'jurisdiction, powers, privileges and immunities' of the city of Quincy, it is enacted (section 6) that:

'The council may enact ordinances for the prevention and extinguishment of fires, may establish and maintain a city fire department, prescribe fire limits and the character of buildings that may be constructed within same, and regulate the character and extent of repairs that may be made to or upon any buildings within such limits; may declare and abate nuisances relating to buildings, either in the nature of construction, condition of repair or nonrepair, and use or occupancy, within the city limits.'

Section 10 of the Charter Act provides that:

'The council may provide by ordinance for the exercise of any other power, privilege or immunity granted by any express provision found elsewhere in this charter, or a power or immunity necessarily implied...