EX PARTE EMERALD MOUNTAIN EXPRESSWAY BRIDGE

• Decision Date: 14 March 2003
• Citation: 856 So.2d 834
• Parties: Ex parte EMERALD MOUNTAIN EXPRESSWAY BRIDGE, L.L.C., et al. (In re Michael Patterson, Commissioner of the State Department of Revenue; et al. v. Emerald Mountain Expressway Bridge, L.L.C., et al.)
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

856 So.2d 834

Ex parte EMERALD MOUNTAIN EXPRESSWAY BRIDGE, L.L.C., et al.

(In re Michael Patterson, Commissioner of the State Department of Revenue; et al. v. Emerald Mountain Expressway Bridge, L.L.C., et al.)

1012135.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

March 14, 2003.

James N. Walter., Jr., D. Kyle Johnson, M. Courtney Williams, and Richard H. Allen of Capell & Howard, P.C., Montgomery, for petitioners.

William H. Pryor, Jr., atty. gen.; and Ron Bowden, chief counsel and asst. atty. gen., and Keith Maddox, asst. counsel and asst. atty. gen., Alabama Department of Revenue.

Thomas T. Gallion III and Constance C. Walker of Haskell, Slaughter, Young & Gallion, L.L.C., Montgomery, for respondentSarah G. Spear, Revenue Commissioner of Montgomery County.

PER CURIAM.

Emerald Mountain Expressway Bridge, L.L.C., Alabama River Parkway, L.L.C., and Black Warrior Parkway, L.L.C.(hereinafter referred to collectively as "the taxpayers"), petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals reversing the trial court's judgment declaring that § 23-1-81(d),Ala.Code 1975, exempted the taxpayers from the payment of ad valorem taxes.SeePatterson v. Emerald Mountain Expressway Bridge, L.L.C.,856 So.2d 826(Ala.Civ.App.2002).We granted the taxpayers' petition, and we affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals.

Factual & Procedural History

The facts are undisputed.The taxpayers operate toll bridges in Elmore, Montgomery, and Tuscaloosa Counties and own real property used in connection with the operation of the toll bridges.The taxpayers are licensed to operate the toll bridges pursuant to § 23-1-81,Ala.Code 1975, which authorizes the county commission of each county in the State or the Alabama Department of Transportation to issue licenses to private individuals or entities to operate toll bridges and toll roads.

The dispute in this case involves the interpretation of § 23-1-81(d), specifically whether the statute provides the taxpayers an exemption from ad valorem taxes.Effective April 11, 2000, the Legislature amended § 23-1-81 by enacting ActNo. 2000-216, Ala. Acts 2000.The purpose of ActNo. 2000-216, as it appears in the title of the act, is expressed as follows:

"To amend Section 23-1-81,Code of Alabama 1975, to allow the Department of Transportation or a county commission to issue licenses for the establishment and operation of toll roads, toll bridges, ferries or causeways; and to provide that no further tax or fees shall be imposed upon any of the toll roads, toll bridges, ferries or causeways after licensure."

(Emphasis added.)As amended, § 23-1-81(d) provides:

"After a license is issued pursuant to subsection (b) or (c) by a county commission or the State Department of Transportation, no further license of any type from any governmental body or agency, including, but not limited to, a business license, shall be required to construct, own, or operate the toll road or the toll bridge, ferry or causeway and no further license, tax, or fee may be imposed by any governmental body or agency."

Pursuant to § 23-1-81(d), the taxpayers sought exemptions from the payment of ad valorem taxes on the real property used in connection with the operation of the toll bridges.The exemptions were denied, and on February 9, 2001, the taxpayers sued Michael Patterson, commissioner of the Alabama Department of Revenue; William M. Harper, revenue commissioner of Elmore County; Sarah G. Spear, revenue commissioner of Montgomery County; and Doster L. McMullen, tax assessor of Tuscaloosa County(hereinafter referred to collectively as "the revenue commissioners").The taxpayers claimed that under § 23-1-81(d)they were exempt from the payment of ad valorem taxes and that they were entitled to a refund for the ad valorem taxes previously paid for the tax year beginning on October 1, 1999, and ending on September 30, 2000.

Both the taxpayers and the revenue commissioners filed motions for a summary judgment.The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the taxpayers and stated that the language of § 23-1-81(d) was clear and unambiguous.The trial court concluded that the language "manifest[ed]the Legislature's intention to encourage the establishment and operation of private toll bridges by exempting them from further tax."The trial court held that because the Legislature chose to use the language, "further license, tax, or fee," it did not intend to limit the tax exemption to new or additional license taxes as the revenue commissioners argued.The trial court ordered the revenue commissioners to refund the taxes paid for the previous tax year, prorated from April 11, 2000, the effective date of § 23-1-81(d).

The revenue commissioners appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals; that court reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that § 23-1-81(d) did not provide the taxpayers with an exemption from ad valorem taxation.The Court of Civil Appeals agreed with the revenue commissioners that § 23-1-81(d)"does not express a clear intention by the Legislature to exempt the taxpayers' real property from ad valorem taxation."Patterson,supra, 856 So.2d at 828-29.The Court of Civil Appeals stated:

"First, we agree with the revenue commissioners that § 23-1-81 is a statute that regulates the licensing of operators of toll roads and bridges.The word `tax' appears in § 23-1-81(d) in the phrase `no further license, tax, or fee may be imposed by any governmental body or agency.'... [Section]23-1-81(c) grants the State Department of Transportation the authority to license a private entity to operate a toll road or a toll bridge.We interpret § 23-1-81(d) as providing that the license issued by the State Department of Transportation in this case for the operation of a toll bridge is the only license needed for the operation of the toll bridge, and the phrase containing the word `tax' prohibits any other governmental entity from requiring any further `license, tax, or fee' for the operation of the toll bridge.Furthermore, the word `ad valorem' is not used at all in Title 23—'Highways, Roads, Bridges, and Ferries.'Therefore, we conclude that § 23-1-81(d) does not express a clear legislative intent to exempt the taxpayers' property from ad valorem taxation.

"Our conclusion is further buttressed by § 40-9-1,Ala.Code 1975, which states: `The following property and persons shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation and none other ...'(emphasis added).The property and persons subsequently listed in subsection (1) through (26) do not include the taxpayers' or their real property.The taxpayers counter this reasoning by pointing out in their brief that Code sections other than § 40-9-1 provide for exemptions from ad valorem taxation.

"The taxpayers are correct that other provisions of Alabama law provide exemptions from ad valorem taxation; however, all those provisions contain an express exemption from ad valorem taxation."

Patterson,856 So.2d at 829.

Standard of Review

We review a summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party while applying "the same standard as that of the trial court in determining whether the evidence before the court made out a genuine issue of material fact."Bussey v. John Deere Co.,531 So.2d 860, 862(Ala.1988).A summary-judgment motion is to be granted only when the evidence demonstrates that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P;Oliver v. Woodward,824 So.2d 693, 697(Ala.2001);Slay v. Keller Indus., Inc.,823 So.2d 623, 624-25(Ala.2001).

To defeat a properly supported summary-judgment motion, the nonmoving party must present substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact."[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved."West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida,547 So.2d 870, 871(Ala.1989).

Analysis

We first address the taxpayers' argument that because the plain language of § 23-1-81(d)"clearly and unambiguously" grants those licensed to operate toll roads and toll bridges an exemption from ad valorem taxation, this Court should not look beyond the words used in the statute; they argue that it is not necessary to resort to secondary rules of statutory construction in interpreting the statute.The taxpayers contend that the revenue commissioners' interpretation of § 23-1-81(d)—that no additional license, tax, or fee may be imposed on the taxpayers for the purpose of licensing—impermissibly asks this Court to rewrite the statute and thus violates the separation-of-powers doctrine.

The revenue commissioners argue that the Court of Civil Appeals applied the appropriate rules of statutory construction by holding that § 23-1-81(d) did not express a clear intent to exempt the operators of toll roads and toll bridges from ad valorem taxation.In their brief to this Court, the revenue commissioners argue that a reasonable interpretation of the statute is "that once a license is issued allowing owners to construct, operate and own toll bridges, governmental entities are prohibited from imposing any further or additional license, tax or fee as a condition before one may construct, own or operate a toll bridge."They contend that this Court should avoid adhering to strict definitions and should approach the issue of legislative intent by examining the statute as a whole.

All real property in this State is subject to ad valorem tax unless it is specifically exempt by a statute or a constitutional provision.§ 40-11-1,Ala.Code 1975(enumerating real property as a subject of ad valorem taxation);§ 40-9-1,Ala.Code 1975(enumerating the property and persons that are exempt from ad valorem taxation);Crim v. Phipps,...