Oliver v. Woodward
Decision Date | 14 December 2001 |
Parties | Karen OLIVER v. Dr. Bryan WOODWARD III. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
G. Whit Drake and Elizabeth H. Shaw of Drake & Shaw, Birmingham, for appellant.
Crawford S. McGivaren, Jr., and Melanie M. Bass of Cabaniss, Johnston, Gardner, Dumas & O'Neal, Birmingham, for appellee.
On Application for Rehearing
The opinion of September 28, 2001, is withdrawn and the following is substituted therefor.
Karen Oliver appeals the summary judgment entered in favor of Dr. Bryan Woodward III. We reverse and remand.
On March 23, 1995, suffering from bilateral pneumonia, Karen Oliver was admitted to the intensive care unit of Medical Center East, Inc. (MCE). On March 25, 1995, at the direction of Oliver's treating physician, Dr. Greg Sullivan, an anaesthesiologist Dr. Barry Martin inserted a central venous catheter into a vein on the left side of Oliver's neck for the purpose of infusing medications and fluids. Dr. Martin ordered a chest X-ray to verify the placement of the central venous catheter. Because no radiologist was available, an emergency-room doctor, following hospital policy, read Oliver's X-ray to verify placement of the catheter. The emergency-room doctor verified placement of the catheter. In Oliver's medical chart, Oliver's nurse noted that an emergency-room doctor had cleared the central venous catheter for use. The nurse did not note the name of the emergency-room doctor or note the time that the emergency-room doctor cleared the catheter for use. Later that night, Dr. Suzanne Vaughan, a radiologist, read Oliver's X-ray and noted that the catheter "is a little more to the left than is usually seen in when it is in the superior vena cava." The next day, Oliver developed thrombosis in her right arm, and the thrombosis eventually required the amputation of Oliver's right arm below the elbow.
The material procedural facts follow.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., and Dobbs v. Shelby County Econ. & Indus. Dev. Auth., 749 So.2d 425 (Ala.1999). The court must accept the tendencies of the evidence most favorable to the nonmoving party and must resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the nonmoving party. System Dynamics Int'l, Inc. v. Boykin, 683 So.2d 419 (Ala.1996). In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court, de novo, applies the same standard as the trial court. Dobbs, supra.
Oliver contends that, because at the time she filed her...
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