Ex parte Gaddy

• Decision Date: 18 April 1997
• Parties: Ex parte Richard Eugene GADDY. (Re Richard Eugene Gaddy v. State). 1950925.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 1150

698 So.2d 1150

Ex parte Richard Eugene GADDY.

(Re Richard Eugene Gaddy v. State).

1950925.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

April 18, 1997.

Rehearing Denied June 20, 1997.

William K. DelGrosso, Birmingham, for petitioner.

Bill Pryor, atty. gen., and P. David Bjurberg, asst. atty. gen., for respondent.

ALMON, Justice.

Richard Eugene Gaddy was convicted of capital murder, committed during the course of a robbery, and was sentenced to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence. Gaddy v. State, 698 So.2d 1100 (1995). We have granted his petition for certiorari review. The facts of this case are adequately stated in the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After reviewing the record, the briefs of the parties, and the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals, we affirm.

Gaddy argues that the State failed to establish a proper predicate for the admission of an extrajudicial confession. The rule is that " '[e]xtrajudicial confessions are prima facie involuntary and inadmissible, and [that] the burden is on the State to prove that the confession was made voluntarily.' " Ex parte Matthews, 601 So.2d 52, 53 (Ala.1992) (quoting from Ex parte Callahan, 471 So.2d 463, 464 (Ala.1985)). To have the confession admitted into evidence, the State had to establish that the statement was made voluntarily. Ex parte Singleton, 465 So.2d 443, 445 (Ala.1985).

Gaddy claims that the State failed to make a prima facie showing that the confession was voluntarily made, and thus that it did not overcome the general presumption against the admissibility of confessions. Gaddy correctly notes that the State had to prove that no one present at the interrogation improperly induced or coerced him into giving a confession. Ex parte Weeks, 531 So.2d 643, 645 (Ala.1988); Bennefield v. State, 281 Ala. 283, 287, 202 So.2d 55, 59 (1967). In Weeks, the Court described the predicate the State must lay for the admission of a confession:

"The burden is on the State to show proper predicates for the admission of an extra-judicial inculpatory statement, specifically, here, a lack of coercion or inducements. It is necessary for the State to show that neither Monley, Jones, nor Hall offered any inducement or coercion in soliciting the statement. Although Monley's admission to offering an inducement for the statement is sufficient to exclude it, the fact that the State did not offer proof that neither Hall nor Jones offered any inducement or coercion is likewise grounds for excluding it for lack of voluntariness."

531 So.2d at 645. However, the Court did not hold in Weeks that the only ways to lay the necessary predicate are as Gaddy suggests--namely, that the State either have one of the participants in the interrogation testify that no one in the room coerced or induced the confession or have all of the persons present in the room testify in court (although these ways are clearly the better practice). Rather, the State may meet its burden of proving lack of coercion or inducement by a variety of means, depending on the facts of the case. Griffin v. State, 500 So.2d 83, 90-91 (Ala.Crim.App.1986); see Butler v. State, 646 So.2d 689, 690 (Ala.Crim.App.1993) (to meet the burden of proof, "it is not necessary that every person who was present when a statement was made testify that it was made voluntarily").

In this case, the State met its burden in two ways: through questions to the lead interrogating officer and through its introduction of the signed and initialed Miranda statements. Gaddy claims that the prosecutor failed to specifically ask the lead interrogator, Officer George Booth, of the Saluda Law Enforcement Division (SLED), if the other participants in the interrogation coerced or induced Gaddy into confessing. However, this argument elevates form over substance, in light of Officer Booth's testimony:

"Q. ... [D]id you promise him anything or use any threats or force or violence or anything to get him to make this statement?

"A. No, sir, we didn't. There was no coercion, no threats, no promises of reward or hope for reward."

(Emphasis added.) Booth's use of the plural "we" and his use of the phrase "there was no coercion, no threats, no promises of reward, or hope for reward," were sufficient to allow the court to conclude that no one present at the interrogation had attempted to induce or intimidate Gaddy into confessing.

As further support for its position, the State introduced forms containing Gaddy's sworn written confessions and a waiver of rights form, all of which were signed and initialed by Gaddy. The waiver-of-rights form contained the following statements:

"I understand my rights as explained to me by Officer _____________. I now state that I DO wish to answer questions at this time and that I DO NOT wish to have a lawyer here before or during questioning.

"My decision to answer questions now, without a lawyer, is made freely and is my own choice. No one has threatened me or coerced me in any way or promised me special treatment to show my decision. To show my decision, I am signing my name in the space below."

(Emphasis added.) The last paragraph of Gaddy's first written confession, which was specifically initialed by Gaddy, stated the following:

"I make this statement in the presence of Lieutenant George Booth of SLED [Saluda Law Enforcement Division], Chief Charles Johnson of the Johnston Police Department, Sergeant Larry Chapman of the Saluda County Sheriff's Department. I make this statement of my own free will and accord without reward or hope of reward. I have not been mistreated or threatened in any way. All of the above is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth so help me God."

The second signed statement, made by Gaddy the day following his arrest, included the following statement, which was also specifically initialed by Gaddy:

"I declare that the following voluntary statement is made of my own free will without promise or hope of reward, without fear or threat of physical harm, without coercion, favor or offer of favor, without leniency or offer of leniency, by any person or persons whomever."

Through these waiver forms, the State made a prima facie showing that Gaddy agreed, when making the confession, that none of the persons involved in taking the confession had induced him to make it. In fact, the statement in the first confession specifically lists all three of the persons present at the interrogation.

When the confession was offered into evidence, Gaddy did not object on the basis that the State had not laid a proper predicate; however, we must still review the circuit court's ruling admitting the confession, for plain error. Rule 39(k), Ala.R.App.P.; Ex parte Coral, 628 So.2d 1004, 1006 (Ala.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1012, 114 S.Ct. 1387, 128 L.Ed.2d 61 (1994). Booth's answer to the State's question ("No sir, we didn't [promise him anything]"), buttressed by the signed waiver forms and confessions, presented the circuit court with sufficient evidence from which it could conclude that the prosecution had made a prima facie showing that no one involved in the interrogation had induced or coerced Gaddy into confessing. We therefore hold that the circuit court did not err to reversal in concluding that the State had made an adequate initial showing that the extrajudicial confession was made voluntarily.

As a further challenge to the circuit court's holding that the the State made a showing of voluntariness sufficient to support the admission of the confession into evidence, Gaddy argues that the lead interrogating officer, Officer Booth, induced him to confess. Officer Booth told Gaddy, before Gaddy confessed, that he would tell the court of Gaddy's cooperation if he confessed to the murder. Gaddy contends that this statement alone was enough to render the subsequent confession involuntary.

This Court, in Ex parte Weeks, stated the test for determining whether a confession is voluntary:

"The true test of voluntariness of extra-judicial confessions is whether, under all the surrounding circumstances, they have been induced by a threat or a promise, express or implied, operating to produce in the mind of the prisoner apprehension of harm or hope of favor; and if so, whether true or false, such confessions must be excluded from the consideration of the jury as having been procured by undue influence."

531 So.2d 643, 644 (Ala.1988) (quoting an earlier case of this Court). To make a confession involuntary, an interrogator's statement must be stronger than one that just "convey[s] the idea to [a suspect] that it would be best or better to tell the truth if he made a statement." Wallace v. State, 290 Ala. 201, 206, 275 So.2d 634, 638 (1973).

However, when reviewing statements made by police officers, the court does not review them in a vacuum; in each case, the court must analyze the confession by looking at the totality of the circumstances. Ex parte Matthews, 601 So.2d 52, 54 (Ala.1992), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1206, 112 S.Ct. 2996, 120 L.Ed.2d 872 (1992). Taken by itself, Officer Booth's statement could be interpreted as an inducement. Officer Booth stated the following to the court, in a sworn statement given by telephone:

"Q. ... [D]id you promise him anything or use any threats or force or violence or anything to get him to make this statement?

"A. No, sir, we didn't. There was no coercion, no threats, no promises of reward or hope for reward.

"Mr. Gaddy and I talked at great length about the other crimes. And we got to this one, we had kind of--he had a feeling for how I did business, and I understood him. He was--I found him to be truthful, and I didn't--you know, there was no promises made.

"I told him that when this case--when and if this case came to court, that I would not have any problem relating to the Judge or a jury that he was cooperative, and found him to be truthful."

While a statement that taken literally appears to make a...