Ex parte Gnesoulis

Decision Date02 July 1975
Docket NumberNo. 1229,1229
PartiesEx parte Ioannis (John) GNESOULIS, Relator. (14th Dist.)
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Marvin Schulman, Houston, for appellant.

Gus J. Zgourides, Bryan Coleman, Houston, for appellee.

COULSON Justice.

A petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed with this Court by Ioannis (John) Gnesoulis (hereinafter relator). The relator complains that he has been illegally confined and restrained of his liberty by the Sheriff of Harris County, Texas, by virtue of an order of commitment issued by the Judge of the Court of Domestic Relations #4, Harris County, Texas.

Relator was held in contempt of court for failing to make payments under the terms of temporary orders of the court effective during the pendency of the divorce, and for breach of a restraining order enjoining the parties from harming one another in any manner during the pendency of the divorce. As punishment relator was fined $100 for his acts which were calculated to cause harm to his wife, Georgia Gnesoulis, and he was ordered confined in the Harris County Jail until he purges himself of contempt by making payments in the amount of $890.19 in compliance with the temporary orders together with all costs of court, the $100 fine, and attorney's fees in the amount of $200.

The court's first temporary order in the matter of the marriage of Georgia Gnesoulis and John Gnesoulis was entered on March 15, 1973, by agreement between the parties. During the pendency of the divorce, as temporary alimony and child support, John Gnesoulis was ordered to pay, make current, and keep current, the payments on the home, insurance, maintenance fund, taxes, utilities, telephone bills, hospitalization, car payments, auto insurance, doctor, dental and pharmacy bills, and $325 per month. Subsequently, on July 31, 1973, the court entered an order reducing the monthly payments to be made by relator from $325 per month to $250 per month. However, all other provisions of the March 15, 1973, order remained unchanged. The trial on the merits of the divorce was had on April 23, 1974. The attorneys, thereafter, presented briefs relating to property and made oral arguments. On February 28, 1975, the trial judge sent a letter to the attorneys representing both parties stating that:

I have concluded that Judgment should be entered in the above cause as follows:

1. The parties are granted a divorce and custody of the minor child is awarded to the mother. The father shall have visitation on the first and third weekends from 6:00 P.M. Friday to 6:00 P.M. Sunday, three weeks during the months of June, July or August with 30 days notice, December 25th at 1:00 P.M. to December 31st at 6:00 P.M., the eve of the child's birthday from 4:00 P.M. to 7:00 P.M. and Father's Day from 9:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M., if that day does not fall on one of the regular visitation periods. The father is ordered to contribute the sum of $450.00 per month for the support of his minor child, until the child shall attain 18 years of age or until further orders of the Court.

2. The wife is awarded as her separate property and estate the following:

A. The Homestead at 12362 Honeywood Trail, Houston, Texas, and she shall pay and hold the husband harmless therefrom.

B. The Cutlass automobile now in her possession. She is to pay the balance due, if any, thereon.

C. A Judgment in the sum of $75,000.00 to be secured specifically by husband's undivided one-third interest in the 2.9 acres on Spencer Highway and husband's Stock in JFA.

D. Attorneys for wife are awarded a Judgment in the sum of $10,000.00 against the husband, same representing the reasonable value of the legal services rendered by them in this cause.

3. The husband is awarded as his separate property and estate the following:

A. The balance of all the separate and community property which he ownes (sic) or claims, save and except that awarded to wife above .

4. The sum of $75,000.00 awarded to wife above shall be payable at the rate of $500.00 per month with the Judgment providing that in the event that any such installment is 30 days over due that execution shall issue for the then balance of said amount.

5. The husband shall be entitled to take the minor child as a dependent for Income Tax purposes.

6. The husband shall be responsible for and liable for all Income Tax for the year 1974, it being understood that those sums withheld from the wife's salary are not refundable to her, but is to be applied upon the community income liability for the year 1974. Each party to pay Income Tax on sums each earn for the year 1975.

7. All costs of Court are assessed against the husband.

If the parties are unable to agree upon the form of Judgment, I request that each party submit a proposed Judgment to the Court.

If either of you gentlemen care to argue about the substance of the Judgment, please be advised that I will not consider same until after the formal Judgment is entered. You will be given an opportunity to present your views upon Motion for New Trial.

An unsigned copy of the letter obtained from the court's file, but, without a file mark of the clerk of the court, was introduced into evidence at the contempt hearing.

After receipt of the letter, the relator terminated all payments under the temporary orders. He thereafter paid only the $450 per month child support payment as provided for in the letter of February 28, 1975, and disregarded all other provisions of said letter. A complaint in contempt was filed by Georgia Gnesoulis alleging that relator was in contempt of court for failure to make temporary alimony and child support payments during the pendency of the divorce and for failure to comply with the temporary orders to make mortgage payments on the parties' homestead, tax and utility bill payments, automobile payments, and premium payments on several insurance policies held by the parties. Georgia Gnesoulis also sought to have the relator held in contempt for abusing her physically and assaulting her person. A hearing was had on the contempt complaint on May 29, 1975. After hearing the evidence, the trial court issued its order of commitment pursuant to its determination that the relator was in contempt of court. The commitment order was executed and the relator was taken into custody and held until released on bond after this Court granted leave to file this petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The primary thrust of the relator's application for writ of habeas corpus is that the trial court's order holding him in contempt is void because the letter written by the trial judge on February 28, 1975, constituted a rendition of...

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26 cases
  • Jones v. Hubbard
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • November 16, 1999
    ...`entry of judgment,' which is a purely ministerial act by which the judgment is made of record and preserved. Ex parte Gnesoulis, Tex. Civ. App., 525 S.W.2d 205, 209 [(1975)]. A judgment is rendered as of date on which trial judge declares in open court his decision on matters submitted to ......
  • Drake v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • February 27, 1985
    ...According to Shepard's Texas Citations, the first case in which present Article 21.24 was noticed is Ex parte Gnesoulis, 525 S.W.2d 205 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [14th] 1975). Since it arose in the context of a contempt matter on the civil side, the precedental value is minimal; nevertheless, ......
  • Keim v. Anderson
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • April 3, 1997
    ...judgment is made of record and preserved. Arriaga v. Cavazos, 880 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1994, no writ); Ex parte Gnesoulis, 525 S.W.2d 205, 209 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ). The words used by the trial court must clearly indicate the intent to render j......
  • Ex parte McNemee, 7024
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • August 13, 1980
    ...the motion for contempt sets out specifically distinct and separate violations of the order violated. Ex parte Gnesoulis, 525 S.W.2d 205, 210 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston (14th Dist.) 1975); Ex parte Loreant, 464 S.W.2d 223, 224 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston (1st Dist.) 1971). This is because a contempt p......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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