Ex parte Jones, 10-18-00387-CR
| Decision Date | 27 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 10-18-00387-CR,No. 10-18-00389-CR,No. 10-18-00388-CR,10-18-00387-CR,10-18-00388-CR,10-18-00389-CR |
| Parties | EX PARTE MICHAEL BLAKE JONES |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
From the 85th District Court Brazos County, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINIONMichael Blake Jones is charged with aggravated assault of a public servant, assault with bodily injury against a family or household member two or more times within a 12 month period, and criminal mischief. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.02(b)(2)(A); 25.11; 28.03(a), (b)(4)(A) (West 2019). Bail was set at $250,000 for each offense, totaling $750,000. Jones filed a writ of habeas corpus contesting the amount, and after a hearing, bail remained the same for the aggravated assault but was reduced to $150,000 for the assault, family violence and $100,000 for the criminal mischief. Jones again complained by writ of habeas corpus about the amount set. After a second hearing, the trial court denied the writ. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the second writ, we affirm the trial court's Order.
BAIL
In his sole issue in each of these appeals, Jones contends the trial court erred in denying Jones's request to reduce the bail amounts set in each case.
Generally, a writ applicant has the burden of proving the facts which would entitle the applicant to relief. Ex parte Kimes, 872 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The same holds true for an applicant in a bail reduction proceeding. See Ex parte Charlesworth, 600 S.W.2d 316, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Ex parte Plumb, 595 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). Consequently, the applicant in a habeas proceeding or on appeal has the burden to prove that bail is excessive. See ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848, 849 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); see also Ex parte Benefield, 403 S.W.3d 240, 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (Cochran, J., concurring).
When reviewing a trial court's determination regarding the amount of bail set, appellate courts apply an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d 848, 849-50 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, we are guided by Article 17.15 as to the rules for fixing bail. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15 (West 2015); see Ludwig v. State, 812 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). In addition, other factors to be considered include the applicant's work record, family ties, residency, criminal record, conformity with previous bail conditions, and aggravating factors involved in the offense. See Ex parte Rubac, 611 S.W.2d at 849-50; Ex parte Davis, 147 S.W.3d 546, 548 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004, no pet.)
Nature and Circumstances of the Offense
In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, the defendant's potential sentence and the nature of the crime are "primary factors" for us to consider. See Ex parte Hunt, 138 S.W.3d 503, 506 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref'd); see also Montalvo, 315 S.W.3d 588, 593 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) ( that consideration of nature and circumstances of offense requires us to consider range of punishment permitted in event of conviction). When the nature of the offense is serious and a lengthy sentence following trial is probable, bail should be "set sufficiently high to secure the presence of the accused at trial because the accused's reaction to the prospect of a lengthy prison sentence might be not to appear." See Ex parte Hulin, 31 S.W.3d 754, 761 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
Here, Jones is charged with three offenses: aggravated assault against a public servant, a first-degree felony, see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(b)(2)(A) (West 2019), subject to a punishment of 5 to 99 years or life in prison and a fine of up to a $10,000, id. § 12.32; assault with bodily injury against a family or household member two or more times within a 12-month period, a third-degree felony, id. § 25.11, subject to a punishment of 2 to 10 years and a fine of up to $10,000, id. § 12.34; and criminal mischief in the amount of $2,500 or more but less than $30,000, a state jail felony, id. § 28.03(a), (b)(4)(A), subject to a punishment of 180 days to 2 years in State Jail and a fine of up to $10,000. Id. § 12.35.
According to the testimony and evidence presented at both habeas hearings, Jones was intoxicated when he arrived very early in the morning of August 13, 2018 at the residence of his former girlfriend, Cari. She would not let him inside. At about 7:30 a.m.,Jones called Cari and asked to come in, which she allowed. While in the residence, they argued and Jones left. Jones then kicked in the front door, shoved Cari, grabbed her arm, and grabbed her breast which caused her pain. Jones then headed to Rockies Grill and Saloon where Cari and Jones worked. Later, Cari and Jones's dad went to Rockies to check on Jones. At Rockies, Jones and Cari argued. As she tried to enter the building, Jones shoved her away from the door and into a pillar which caused Cari pain.
These assaults became the precursor to a 16-hour, "unprecedented" standoff between Jones and the police at Rockies after Jones fired three shots from a gun in the bar and Cari called police. Numerous police officers, police crisis negotiators, and federal agents responded to the scene.
In an attempt to contact Jones, police used a robot to open lines of communication with him and establish a video link. As the robot approached the front of Rockies, Jones walked out into the parking lot, "grabbed the robot, and tipped it over." As a result of his actions, the camera mast on the center of the robot was snapped off, wires running from the camera to the rest of the robot were broken, and the video feed was damaged. The repairs to the robot were estimated to exceed $3,000.
During the standoff, Jones spoke off-and-on to police, mainly through profanity-laced statements, only to the extent of challenging officers, ignoring their requests, pleas, and attempts to peacefully resolve the situation. Jones barricaded himself inside the building and continued to fire indiscriminately during the course of the standoff. Jones was seen multiple times with either a handgun in his waistband or in his hand. After several hours, officers heard an additional shot from inside the building. Not long afterthat shot was heard, Jones emerged and could be seen holding a handgun upwards with his arm at a 90 degree angle. Jones then began to lower his arm and extend it towards the general vicinity of officers positioned in the parking lot. The officers felt that Jones's actions were an immediate threat to their lives. Reacting to Jones, an FBI agent fired a shot at Jones but missed.
During the standoff, several people endangered at nearby businesses, as well media representatives, had to be evacuated. One of the rounds fired by Jones passed through a wall of Rockies into a restaurant next door. That restaurant was occupied by employees and was about to open to the public as the situation began. Many surrounding businesses and homes were closed and evacuated. Busy roadways around the area were also closed.
Looking at the offenses individually, the criminal mischief and assault offenses do not appear to be serious and might not result in lengthy prison sentences. But because these offenses were tied to a lengthy standoff and the offense of aggravated assault of a peace officer, which is serious and would result in a lengthy prison sentence, the trial court could have determined that this factor weighed heavily against reducing bail in any of the cases.
Ability to Make Bail
The accused's ability to make bail is only a factor to be considered in determining the appropriate amount of bail. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15(4) (West 2015); Ex parte Scott, 122 S.W.3d 866, 870 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). "To show that he is unable to make bail, a defendant generally must show that his funds and his family'sfunds have been exhausted." Milner v. State, 263 S.W.3d 146, 149 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (internal citations omitted). Simply because a defendant cannot meet the bail set by the trial court does not automatically render it excessive. Ex parte Scott, 122 S.W.3d at 870. See also Ex parte Charlesworth, 600 S.W.2d 316, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). "If the ability to make [bail] in a specified amount controlled, then the role of the trial court in setting [bail] would be completely eliminated, and the accused would be in the unique posture of determining what his [bail] should be." Ex parte Scott, 122 S.W.3d at 870.
An investigator testified at the first hearing that Jones no longer worked at Rockies, had no checking or savings accounts, and had no land. Jones did have, however, a truck worth $10,000 to $12,000 and an RV worth $5,000. The investigator believed that Jones's family would loan Jones $10,000 for bail but would expect Jones to sell his assets to pay back the family rather than using the loan and the assets to post bail.
A letter from Jones's sister was introduced into evidence at the second hearing in which she explained that Jones previously had $60,000 in a 401K but had cashed it out and given it to Cari to move Rockies to its current location.1 Jones's sister also explained that Jones's parents were retired and lived on a fixed income. They had nothing to put up as collateral or liquidate to raise funds. As for Jones's sister, she explained that she and her husband had a mortgage, student loans, car payments, and a young child...
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