Ex parte Langston, 48610
| Decision Date | 19 June 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 48610,48610 |
| Citation | 510 S.W.2d 603 |
| Parties | Ex parte Joe Wayne LANGSTON. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Richard A. Beacom, Jr., Greenville, for appellant.
Jerry Spencer Davis, Dist. Atty., Greenville, and Jim D. Vollers, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
Petitioner was convicted on December 8, 1958, of the offense of forgery, but his five-year sentence was probated. On January 12, 1962, probation was revoked, and petitioner was committed to the Texas Department of Corrections, from which he was released on parole in 1963. In 1967, he was convicted in Dallas of the offense of murder with malice and sentenced to life imprisonment.
Petitioner now contends that he was not represented by counsel at the 1962 probation revocation. The State urges that the question is moot since petitioner is no longer confined under the 1958 conviction, and although it was stipulated that there was no evidence that petitioner was represented by counsel at the revocation proceeding, the trial court found that the writ should be denied based on mootness.
It is well established that one convicted of a crime and granted probation is entitled to the assistance of counsel at a proceeding brought to revoke that probation. See Ex Parte Bird, 457 S.W.2d 559 (Tex.Cr.App.1970) and Ex Parte Shivers, 501 S.W.2d 898 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) and cases there cited. The cases establishing this proposition have retroactive effect. See the opinion on appellant's motion for rehearing in Crawford v. State, 435 S.W.2d 148, at 155 (Tex.Cr.App.1968).
We have also held that the cessation of confinement under a void conviction does not render moot a challenge to that conviction. See Ex Parte Burt, 499 S.W.2d 109 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). The fact that a new confinement has intervened, so that if the relief requested is granted an immediate release from confinement will not occur, does not render this matter moot. The United States Supreme Court has only recently observed that habeas corpus is a proper device by which to reduce the length of confinement. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973).
Under our holding in Ex Parte Burt, supra, the basis for determination of whether a challenge to a conviction is moot is whether collateral legal consequences will be imposed because of the conviction.
In the instant case, if the conviction remains on the petitioner's records, he will continue to be subject to the imposition of those...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Ex parte Renier
...that Judge Douglas had not distinguished an apposite decision. See note 1, p. 389. 4 However, Judge Douglas did point out that in Ex parte Langston, supra, applicant was confined when he filed his application, thereby invoking habeas jurisdiction. He said similarly situated was applicant in......
-
Ex parte Ali
...may be collaterally attacked, whether or not a term of probation was successfully served out.” (emphasis added)); Ex parte Langston, 510 S.W.2d 603, 604 (Tex.Crim.App.1974) (holding that trial court had jurisdiction to consider habeas application despite applicant having completed his sente......
-
Ex parte Canada
...Ex parte Guzman, 551 S.W.2d 387 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Ex parte Crosley, 548 S.W.2d 409 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Ex parte Langston, 510 S.W.2d 603 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). The applicant is not challenging his conviction, but is instead challenging the time necessary to fulfill his sentence, and this Court ......
-
Ex parte Guzman
...attack. See Ex parte Burt, 499 S.W.2d 109 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Ex parte Jentsch, 510 S.W.2d 320 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Ex parte Langston, 510 S.W.2d 603 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). On remand, the trial court found that petitioner was not represented by counsel at the time of this probation revocation proc......