Ex parte Lynn, 84-617

• Decision Date: 03 July 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-617,84-617
• Citation: 477 So.2d 1385
• Parties: Ex parte Frederick LYNN. (In re: Frederick LYNN v. STATE of Alabama).
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 1385

477 So.2d 1385

Ex parte Frederick LYNN (In re: Frederick LYNN v. STATE of Alabama).

No. 84-617.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

July 3, 1985.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 23, 1985.

Donald J. McKinnon, Eufaula, for petitioner.

Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and William D. Little and P. David Bjurberg, Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondent.

JONES, Justice.

Because of our reversal of the judgment of conviction and remand of this cause for a new trial, we address at length only one of the multiple issues presented in this death penalty case. The issue on which our reversal is based is addressed under Part V of the Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion, Lynn v. State, 477 So.2d 1365 (Ala.Cr.App.1984). We quote the following extract therefrom:

"Prior to calling Garrett Marcus Strong [an admitted accomplice to the crime] to testify, the prosecution made an oral motion in limine which was argued in chambers, outside the presence of the jury. The motion requested that Counsel for the defendant be precluded from any inquiry into Strong's juvenile record. The trial court granted the motion, stating that such evidence was not admissible for impeachment purposes and instructing Lynn's lawyers not to mention Strong's juvenile record in any way. ...

"....

"Appellant construes [Code 1975, § 12-15-72] and the remainder of the Juvenile Code as containing nothing 'which specifically states that a juvenile conviction cannot later be utilized for purposes of impeaching a juvenile's testimony in a case where he is not a party.' "There is no express statutory proscription of the use of prior juvenile adjudications for impeachment of a non-party witness. The construction that Lynn urges upon the court, however, flies in the face of the philosophy underlying the juvenile adjudication process. The legislature intended the Juvenile Code to be a means of rehabilitation for those within its coverage, while protecting them from some of the penalties of the adult criminal justice system. Section 12-15-72 states that juvenile adjudications are not considered criminal convictions in the traditional sense. Children adjudicated under the Juvenile Code do not incur civil disabilities inherent with adult criminal convictions. Furthermore, and most importantly in this context, evidence of a juvenile adjudication is available for character proof only under the limited scope of post-conviction sentencing hearings or probationers' reports. To insist, therefore, that a juvenile record is admissible to impeach the testimony of a non-party juvenile witness is entirely inconsistitent with the juvenile adjudication process.

"....

"Lynn further seeks reversal of his conviction on constitutional grounds allegedly arising from the trial court's grant of the prosecution's motion in limine. Appellant contends that under the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Davis v. Alaska, [415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) ], the present construction of the Alabama Juvenile Code which precludes cross-examination of a witness relative to his juvenile record violates both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 6, of the Alabama Constitution of 1901.

"Both of these constitutional provisions guarantee a criminal defendant's right to confront witnesses against him [including the right to cross-examine]. ... Lynn's reliance on Davis for the proposition that defendants should be permitted to cross-examine witnesses against them as to their juvenile records for impeachment purposes, however, is misplaced. The Davis decision simply does not so hold.

"In Davis, the trial court granted the State's motion in limine precluding the defendant from attempting to show a State witness's bias by questioning him regarding his juvenile record. In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court distinguished efforts to impeach generally from efforts to prove a witness's bias:

" 'Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested. Subject always to the broad discretion of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation, the cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve into the witness' story to test the witness' perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness. One way of discrediting the witness is to introduce evidence of a prior criminal conviction of that witness. By so doing, the cross-examiner intends to afford the jury a basis to infer that the witness' character is such that he would be less likely than the average trustworthy citizen to be truthful...