Ex parte MacCallum
| Decision Date | 01 May 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. D-0749,D-0749 |
| Citation | 807 S.W.2d 729 |
| Parties | Ex parte Peter Stuart MacCALLUM, Jr., Relator |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Pat Morris, Corpus Christi, for relator.
Michael P. O'Reilly, Corpus Christi, for respondent.
This is an original habeas corpus proceeding. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found relator Peter Stuart MacCallum, Jr. in contempt for failure to surrender possession of his two sons to his former wife on weekends during relator's extended period of summer possession. Because we find the court orders which relator is charged with violating to be lacking in the specificity required to support a judgment of contempt, relator's petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted.
Relator and his former wife, Mary Sue MacCallum, were divorced in October 1987. Mary Sue was appointed managing conservator of the MacCallums' two sons. Relator was appointed possessory conservator of the children and the decree provided for specific periods of possession. The original decree provided for extended summer visitation for a period of "45 days each year commencing on July 6 and ending on August 20." The decree further provided that Mary Sue surrender the children at the beginning of each period of possession at her home and required relator to return the children to Mary Sue at her home at the end of each period of possession. The decree also granted Mary Sue a "superior right" to possession of the children on the first and third weekends of each month during relator's summer possession, "except for one 21-day uninterrupted period."
Approximately one and one-half years later, the court entered an order clarifying the earlier decree. This order replaced the paragraph granting Mary Sue possession of the children during relator's extended period of summer possession in its entirety. It continued to provide Mary Sue with possession on the first and third weekends of each month during relator's extended period summer possession. The language providing relator a 21-day uninterrupted period from Mary Sue's weekend possession was replaced with language granting Mary Sue a 21-day uninterrupted period of possession commencing on the first Friday of June and ending on the twenty-first day thereafter.
To support a judgment of contempt, the underlying decree must set forth the terms of compliance in clear, specific and unambiguous terms so that the person charged with obeying the decree will readily know exactly what duties and obligations are imposed upon him. Ex Parte Blasingame, 748 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex.1988); Ex Parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43, 44 (Tex.1967). A court order is insufficient to support a judgment of contempt if its interpretation requires inferences or conclusions about which reasonable persons might differ. Id. The orders which form the basis for the judgment of contempt in this case are far from clear and unambiguous.
Both the original divorce decree and clarifying order are silent regarding relator's obligation to surrender the children at any particular place at the beginning of Mary Sue's weekend possessions during relator's extended summer possession. The divorce decree requires relator to "return" the children to Mary Sue at her home at the "end" of each period of possession. The period of summer possession granted relator in the divorce decree "ends" on August 20th of each year. It is undisputed that relator returned the children to Mary Sue at her home on August 20th.
Mary Sue urges us to interpret the language granting her weekend possession "commencing" on the first and third Friday of each month during relator's extended summer possession as in effect providing that relator's period of possession has come to an "end." Thus, Mary Sue contends relator had a clear obligation to deliver the children to her at her home at the beginning of her weekend possession. Under the circumstances we are unable to state that relator clearly had a duty to act in this manner. 1
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Ex parte Chambers
...the person charged with obeying the decree will readily know exactly what duties and obligations are imposed upon him. Ex parte MacCallum, 807 S.W.2d 729, 730 (Tex.1991); Ex parte Hodges, 625 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex.1981); Ex parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43, 44 (Tex.1967). Chambers argues that non......
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...requires inferences or conclusions about which reasonable persons might differ.") (emphasis in original) (citing Ex parte MacCallum, 807 S.W.2d 729, 730 (Tex. 1991)). This is fatal to the commitment order because Fountain lacked the requisite notification of how to purge her contempt and ho......
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