Ex parte Martin

• Citation: 6 S.W.3d 524
• Parties: (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) EX PARTE EDIE DIONE MARTIN NO. 0073-98
• Decision Date: 24 November 1999
• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

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6 S.W.3d 524 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) EX PARTE EDIE DIONE MARTIN NO. 0073-98 IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS November 24, 1999

ON APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW FROM THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS CALDWELL COUNTY

Before the court en banc.

WOMACK, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which MEYERS, PRICE, HOLLAND and JOHNSON joined. MCCORMICK, P.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MANSFIELD, KELLER, and KEASLER, JJ., joined.

Code of Criminal Procedure Article 32.01 requires the State to indict a defendant by the next term of the grand jury after the one in which the defendant was arrested or show good cause for the failure to do so. The State argues that delay in receiving offense reports from the police department constitutes good cause. Today we adopt a totality-of-circumstances test to determine whether the State has shown good cause.

Officers of the Luling Police Department arrested the appellant for forgery on June 24, 1996. She was released on bail on July 12, 1996. The appellant was not indicted during the grand jury term in which she was arrested, which in the 22nd

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Judicial District Court in Caldwell County was scheduled to begin on the first Monday in June, 1996.¹ She was not indicted during the following term of the same court, which was scheduled to begin on the first Monday of September and to end when the next term began on the first Monday in December.²

The appellant filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus on January 21, 1997, seeking to have the case dismissed under former Code of Criminal Procedure articles 32.01³ and 28.061.⁴ The Caldwell County Grand Jury presented an indictment against the appellant on February 5, 1997. The habeas court conducted a hearing on the appellant's application for a writ of habeas corpus on February 20, 1997, at which time the State claimed that it had good cause for failing to indict the appellant by the end of the next term of court after the term in which the appellant was arrested.

To support its claim of good cause, the State produced an affidavit of the senior patrol officer of the Luling Police Department. He stated that the offense reports were not referred to the District Attorney until December 9, 1996, because the police department had little or no clerical help from the summer of 1996 until November, 1996. The habeas court denied relief to the appellant.

In her brief to the Court of Appeals, the appellant claimed that the habeas court erred because a lack of public resources is not justification for unreasonable delay and the District Attorney did not need the police reports in order to seek an indictment from the grand jury. The Third Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of relief, holding that the standard of review is abuse of discretion and that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in finding good cause. Ex parte Martin, 956 S.W.2d 843, 845 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997). We granted review.⁵

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Standard of Review

The Third Court of Appeals, relying on its decision in Ex parte Mallares, 953 S.W.2d 759, 764-65 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, no pet.), reviewed the habeas court's decision using an abuse of discretion standard. In Mallares, the Court of Appeals relied upon Dubose v. State, 915 S.W.2d 493, 497-98 (Tex. Cr. App. 1996), for an expression of the abuse of discretion standard of review. When the Court of Appeals decided Mallares, it did not have the benefit of our decision in Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Cr. App. 1997). In Guzman, this Court expressly overruled Dubose and held that an abuse of discretion review of trial court decisions is not necessarily appropriate in the context of the application of law to facts when the decision does not turn on the credibility or demeanor of witnesses. Id. at 90. When "the trial judge is not in an appreciably better position than the reviewing court to make that determination," a de novo review by the appellate court is appropriate. Id. at 87.

That is the situation with which we are confronted in this case. The facts are uncontested. The only evidence submitted was an affidavit from the State setting out its reasons for not indicting the appellant within the time required by article 32.01. Under these circumstances, the habeas court is not in an appreciably better position than a reviewing court to determine whether the State has satisfied the good cause requirement of article 32.01. There are no questions of fact; the only issue before the habeas and reviewing courts was whether the facts amounted to good cause. As a result a de novo review is appropriate.

Good Cause

Next we must determine what "good cause" means in this context. The term is not defined in article 32.01. Good cause "generally means a substantial reason amounting in law to a legal excuse for failing to perform an act required by law." Black's Law Dictionary 692 (6th ed. 1990).

This Court has addressed a finding of good cause only once during the article's existence. In Ex parte Lerma, 167 Tex. Cr. 5, 317 S.W.2d 751 (1958), this Court held that good cause had been shown, though the basis for finding good cause was not discussed in the Court's opinion. Id. at 5, 317 S.W.2d at 752. The State offered two reasons for the delay:

First, the State indicated that the complaint had been filed...