Ex parte Martin

• Decision Date: 04 December 1997
• Docket Number: No. 03-97-00113-CR,03-97-00113-CR
• Citation: 956 S.W.2d 843
• Parties: Ex parte Edie Dione MARTIN, Appellant.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 843

956 S.W.2d 843

Ex parte Edie Dione MARTIN, Appellant.

No. 03-97-00113-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas,

Austin.

Dec. 4, 1997.

Cliff McCormack, San Marcos, for Appellant.

Charles R. Kimbrough, Criminal District Attorney, Lockhart, for State.

Before CARROLL, C.J., and JONES and KIDD, JJ.

KIDD, Justice.

By application for writ of habeas corpus, appellant, Edie Dione Martin, sought the dismissal of a charge of forgery on the ground that she was not timely indicted. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 32.01 (West 1989). The writ issued and, after a hearing, relief was denied. We will affirm.

BACKGROUND

Article 32.01 provides:

When a defendant has been detained in custody or held to bail for his appearance to answer any criminal accusation before the district court, the prosecution, unless otherwise ordered by the court, for good cause shown, supported by affidavit, shall be dismissed and the bail discharged, if indictment or information be not presented against such defendant at the next term of the court which is held after his commitment or admission to bail.

Id. (emphasis added). With an exception not applicable here, a discharge under this article is a bar to any further prosecution for the offense discharged or for any other offense arising out of the same transaction. Id. art. 28.061.

Appellant was arrested for forgery on June 24, 1996, and subsequently released on bail on July 12, 1996. The terms of the 22nd Judicial District Court in Caldwell County begin on the first Mondays of March, June, September and December. Tex. Gov't Code Appellant filed a writ of habeas corpus on January 21, 1997, and a hearing was held on February 20, 1997. ² Prior to the hearing, the State filed a Response to Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus, claiming good cause for not obtaining an indictment by the September 1996 term of court, as required by article 32.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

                Ann. § 24.123(c)(1) (West 1988). 1  Appellant was not indicted during the June 1996 term of court, nor during the following September 1996 term of court
                

The State's response incorporated the affidavit of Jerry Williams, Senior Patrol Officer with the Luling Police Department. The affidavit stated that the City of Luling Police Department had experienced a clerical labor shortage during the summer months of 1996, and that the forgery offenses alleged against appellant "were a part of the backlog which resulted from the shortage of clerical staff of the Luling Police Department...." The affidavit states that this administrative shortfall prevented the police reports on appellant's case from getting to the District Attorney's office until December 9, 1996. It is the State's position that without the police reports, the prosecutor could not proceed to bring the case to the grand jury.

At the conclusion of the hearing on February 20, 1997, the trial court found good cause for the failure to indict appellant as required by article 32.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, and appellant's writ of habeas corpus was denied. Appellant was indicted on February 20, 1997.

DISCUSSION

In her only point of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying her habeas corpus relief because she was not indicted by the next term of court as required by article 32.01. Appellant contends that the State failed to demonstrate good cause for the indictment's delay under article 32.01 because (1) a lack of public resources is no justification for an unreasonable delay, and (2) the District Attorney did not need the police reports in order to present appellant's case to the grand jury.

Appellant argues that the prosecutor's delay in taking her case to the grand jury was not justified by the lack of public resources which caused the clerical shortage and backlog of work at the Luling Police Department. As authority for this proposition, appellant cites a Speedy Trial Act case in which Justice White stated that "unreasonable delay in run-of-the-mill criminal cases cannot be justified by simply asserting that the public resources provided the State's criminal justice system are limited and that each must await its turn." Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 538, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2196, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) (White, J., concurring). However, Justice White left open the possibility that "special circumstances presenting a more pressing public need with respect to the case itself should suffice to justify delay." Id. at 537, 92 S.Ct. at 2195. In the instant case, we think it was within the trial court's discretion to determine that the failure of the Luling Police Department to provide the requisite police reports in a timely manner constituted such special circumstances which justified the delay.

Appellant further contends that the State did not need the police reports to present her case to the grand jury because the State has complete control over the submission of the evidence. We find this contention unconvincing and are persuaded by the State's argument that, as a matter of policy, the State never seeks an indictment until the case investigation,...