Ex parte Mei
| Decision Date | 19 May 1937 |
| Docket Number | No. 240.,240. |
| Parties | Ex parte MEI. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. A person under the age of sixteen years may not be loosely charged with "juvenile delinquency"; he must be charged with the specific offense which, if he did it, makes him a juvenile delinquent.
2. Chapter 284, P.L.1935, N.J.St.Annual 1935, § 53—215b(2) ( section 2, c. 157, P.L.1929), and chapter 285, P.L.1935, N. J.St.Annual 1935, § 53—222(2), do not di vest grand juries or the courts of oyer and terminer of their respective jurisdictions over the finding and trial of indictments for murder against persons under sixteen years of age.
3. A commitment of a person fifteen years and four months of age at the time of the alleged crime, issued by the Hudson oyer and terminer, pursuant to an indictment for murder found by the grand jury, held to be valid.
Appeal from Court of Chancery.
Proceeding in the matter of the, application of Giro L. Mei, also known as Jerry May, by Josephine Mei, in his be-half, for a writ of habeas corpus. From a decree of the Court of Chancery (121 N.J.Eq. 123, 186 A. 577), as supplemented (121 N.J.Eq. 125, 186 A. 721), denying the application, the applicant appeals.
Affirmed.
Irving Eisenberg and Frederick M. Barnes, Jr., both of Jersey City, for appellant. Daniel O'Regan, of Jersey City, Pros. of the Pleas, and Frank G. Schlosser, Asst. Pros., of Hoboken, for the State. John J. Fallon, of Hoboken, and Charles E. Hughes, Jr., and Bernard Flexner, both of New York City, Reuben Oppenheimer, of Baltimore, Md., amici curi?.
On January 14, 1936, a grand jury returned to the Hudson oyer and terminer an indictment for murder against Giro L. Mei. Shortly thereafter the oyer committed the accused on that charge. The Court of Chancery, by writ of habeas corpus, commanded the sheriff and jailor to show the cause for the detention, and in response the commitment issued by the court of oyer and terminer was presented. Chancery found that the accused was lawfully committed and dismissed the writ of habeas corpus. The appeal is from the order of dismissal. The fundamental question is whether the order of commitment was valid, and to answer this we inquire whether the oyer and terminer had jurisdiction to entertain and retain the charge of murder against Mei. If the answer be in the affirmative, the Court of Chancery was right in its conclusion. Other questions are presented but are without controlling significance on such a disposition.
At the time of the alleged murder Mei was of the age of fifteen years and four months. From this it is argued on behalf of the appellant that Mei could commit no crime, that the court of oyer and terminer therefore had no power to apprehend or detain Mei's person, and that the order of incarceration which it undertook to make was void. It was held by this court, Ex parte Daniecki, 119 N.J.Eq. 359, 183 A. 298, in adopting the opinion of the late Vice Chancellor Backes printed in 117 N.J.Eq. 527, 177 A. 91, that the court of oyer and terminer had not been divested of its jurisdiction in cases of murder and that the juvenile court was not adequately established to try indictments for that enormous offense. It is argued that that determination was error. We think that it was not. But it is said further that the recent changes in the statutory law have outmoded the reasoning of that opinion and have made it of no value as a precedent for our present guidance. This assertion rests upon two statutory enactments, namely, chapters 284 and 285 of the Pamphlet Laws of 1935 (N.J.St.Annual 1935, §§ 53—215b(2) and 53—222(2). The latter act provides that a person under the age of sixteen is deemed incapable of committing a crime, and the former that "Juvenile delinquency is hereby defined as the commission by a child under sixteen years of age of any act which when committed by a person of the age of sixteen years or over would constitute: (a) A felony." Chapter 285 is clearly in complement of chapter 284 and is meant to go so far as, and no further than, the correlative features of the latter act.
Upon the basis of these statutes it is said that a lad under sixteen years of age may not commit murder because murder is a felony; therefore that Mei, being under age, could not commit that crime, may not be lawfully indicted for the offense, and may not be deprived of his liberty upon the basis thereof; that if Mei did that which, except for his age, would have been murder, he is chargeable with an act of juvenile delinquency and is subject only to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. But juvenile delinquency is a generic term, like crime. It embraces everything from murder to habitual truancy from school. A specific act may be a crime, but before a person may be put to his trial he must be charged, not just with committing crime, but with the specific act, so that he may defend against it and so that it may be known whether the act charged against him is indeed a crime. Likewise a boy may not be loosely charged with juvenile delinquency. He must be charged with the specific offense which, if he did it, makes him a juvenile delinquent. People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353, 355, 86 A.L.R. 1001. The lad, then, would be charged with being a juvenile delinquent in that he maliciously and unlawfully took the life of a human being. That leads us directly to the Constitution and to the inquiry whether the offense so charged is within the purview of the Constitution; and, if so, whether the statute gives to the accused person his constitutional guaranties, for if it does not, then the ancient legal machinery, which does so, is still operative.
Article 1 of our Constitution provides in part as follows: Par. 7, "The right of a trial by jury shall remain inviolate." Par. 8, "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to a * * * public trial by an impartial jury; to be informed of the nature and cause of the...
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