Ex parte Moon
Citation | 649 S.W.3d 700 |
Decision Date | 12 May 2022 |
Docket Number | 01-18-01014-CR |
Parties | EX PARTE Cameron Michael MOON |
Court | Court of Appeals of Texas |
Jack G. Carnegie, 909 Fannin St., Ste. 2300, Houston, Texas 77010, John L. Hagan, Kelley Drye & Warren LLP, 515 Post Oak Blvd., Ste. 900, Houston, Texas 77027, David Cunningham, 2814 Hamilton Street, Houston, Texas 77004-1232, David Adler, 6750 West Loop South, Ste. 120, Bellaire, Texas 77401, D. Christene Wood, 909 Fannin St., Ste. 2500, Houston, Texas 77010, for Appellant.
Kim Ogg, District Attorney, Harris County, Texas, Jessica A. Caird, 500 Jefferson, Ste. 600, Houston, Texas 77002, for State.
Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Hightower, and Rivas-Molloy.
A juvenile court waived jurisdiction over 16-year-old Cameron Michael Moon ("Moon") and certified him to stand trial as an adult in criminal district court for the charged offense of murder. After a jury convicted him and assessed his punishment at 30 years’ imprisonment in criminal district court, Moon appealed. This Court held the juvenile court abused its discretion in waiving jurisdiction over Moon, vacated the criminal district court's judgment, and dismissed the case. See Moon v. State , 410 S.W.3d 366, 378 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff'd , 451 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). On the State's petition for discretionary review, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed this Court's judgment. See Moon v. State , 451 S.W.3d 28, 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
On remand, the juvenile court again waived jurisdiction over Moon, who was then over the age of 18, and recertified him to stand trial as an adult in criminal district court for the same charged offense of murder. Moon filed a motion to dismiss and an application for a pretrial writ of habeas corpus with the criminal district court, both of which the district court denied.
Moon now appeals the district court's denial of his pretrial writ of habeas corpus. In eight points of error, he contends (1) the State presented legally and factually insufficient evidence to prove the elements required under Section 54.02(j) of the Texas Family Code ("Family Code") for waiver of juvenile jurisdiction; (2) the juvenile court's findings under Section 54.02(j) of the Family Code were insufficient to allow it to waive jurisdiction; (3) the criminal district court had jurisdiction when it originally adjudicated Moon on the charged offense of murder; (4) the State introduced legally and factually insufficient evidence, and did not obtain the necessary findings, to establish that reversal of the original transfer order made it impracticable for the State to proceed in juvenile court before Moon turned 18; (5) the State introduced legally and factually insufficient evidence, and did not obtain the necessary findings, to establish that it exercised due diligence; (6) application of Section 54.02(j) of the Family Code to recertify Moon deprived him of the process to which he was originally due under Sections 54.02(a), (d), and (f) of the Family Code in violation of the United States and Texas Constitutions; (7) application of the standards for certification under Section 54.02(j) of the Family Code violated the ex post facto doctrine; and (8) the recertification of Moon under Section 54.02(j) of the Family Code violated the Equal Protection clause and the prohibition against double jeopardy.
Because we conclude there was an adjudication or an adjudication hearing concerning the alleged offense, the juvenile court erred in transferring Moon's case to criminal district court. We reverse the criminal district court's order denying Moon's application for a pretrial writ of habeas corpus and we remand this matter to the criminal district court with instructions to enter an order granting Moon's writ of habeas corpus and dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Moon was arrested when he was 16 years old and detained in the Harris County Juvenile Justice Center starting on July 20, 2008. On November 19, 2008, the State filed a petition in the 313th Juvenile Court alleging that Moon engaged in delinquent conduct by committing murder. On the same date, the State filed a motion under Sections 54.02(a) and (f) of the Family Code, asking the juvenile court to waive its exclusive original jurisdiction over Moon and transfer him to criminal district court to be tried as an adult. The State alleged that given the seriousness of the offense alleged, the welfare of the community required waiver of the juvenile court's jurisdiction.
The juvenile court granted the State's request for a hearing on its motion for waiver of jurisdiction. At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court granted the State's motion for waiver of jurisdiction. The next day, on December 18, 2008, the juvenile court signed and entered an "Order to Waive Jurisdiction" transferring Moon's case to the 178th District Court for Moon to be tried as an adult ("Original Transfer Order"). The order stated the juvenile court had determined "that there is probable cause to believe that the child committed the OFFENSE alleged and that because of the seriousness of the OFFENSE, the welfare of the community requires criminal proceeding." The order further stated that "[i]n making that determination, the Court considered among other matters:
The juvenile court also found that (1) Moon "is of sufficient sophistication and maturity to have intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily waived all constitutional rights heretofore waived[,] ... to have aided in the preparation of HIS defense and to be responsible for HIS conduct"; (2) the offense alleged "WAS against the person of another"; and (3) "there is little, if any, prospect of adequate protection of the public and likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of" Moon "by use of procedures, services, and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court."
Following transfer of Moon's case to criminal district court, Moon stood trial for the first-degree felony charge of murder. In 2010, a jury convicted Moon and assessed his punishment at 30 years’ imprisonment. Moon appealed arguing the juvenile court had abused its discretion in waiving its jurisdiction and certifying him to stand trial as an adult.3
On direct appeal, when Moon was 21 years old, this Court found the evidence insufficient to support the juvenile court's findings under Sections 54.02(a) and (f) of the Family Code related to Moon's sophistication and maturity, the prospect of adequate protection of the public, and the likelihood of Moon's rehabilitation, and that only one factor—whether the offense was against person or property—weighed in favor of Moon's certification as an adult. See Moon v. State , 410 S.W.3d 366, 378 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), aff'd , 451 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (" Moon I "). We held the juvenile court abused its discretion in waiving its jurisdiction over Moon, certifying him for trial as an adult, and transferring his case to criminal district court. Id. We held the criminal district court lacked jurisdiction over the case. Id. We vacated the criminal district court's judgment and dismissed the case, noting "[t]he case remains pending in the juvenile court." Id.
On the State's petition for discretionary review, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed this Court's judgment, holding the juvenile court, in an order waiving its original jurisdiction, must both state the reasons for waiving its jurisdiction and expressly set out the findings of fact that support those reasons. See Moon v. State , 451 S.W.3d 28, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). It stated that a failure to do so may result in a finding that there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's waiver of jurisdiction. See id. at 51–52. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the only reason specifically set out in the Original Transfer Order justifying the juvenile court's waiver of jurisdiction was that the offense Moon was alleged to have committed was a serious one, and that the only fact specified in support of such a finding was that the charged offense was an offense against the person of another. See id. at 50. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that "a waiver of juvenile jurisdiction based on this particular reason, fortified only by this fact, constitutes an abuse of discretion." Id.
In a footnote, the Court of Criminal Appeals noted that neither party had challenged this Court's statement that the case remained "pending in the juvenile court." Id. at 52 n.90. Although it left the question "[p]ending for what?" to the juvenile court, the Court of Criminal Appeals noted that "at least one legislatively provided alternative would seem to be for the juvenile court to conduct a new transfer hearing and enter another order transferring the appellant to the jurisdiction of the criminal court, assuming that the State can satisfy the criteria under Section 54.02(j) of the Juvenile Justice Code." Id. As to the juvenile court's authority to cure a deficient transfer order, the Court explained:
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Ex parte Moon
...court's transfer order, including whether the court of appeals erred to hold that such a challenge is even cognizable in pretrial habeas. Id. at 716-17. However, we now conclude that, if Appellant's claims were cognizable in a pretrial habeas proceeding, the court of appeals lacked the auth......