Ex parte Owens
| Decision Date | 05 July 1927 |
| Docket Number | A-6581.[a1] |
| Citation | 258 P. 758,37 Okla.Crim. 118 |
| Parties | Ex parte OWENS. |
| Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma |
Syllabus by the Court.
Under the declaration of article 2, § 6, Bill of Rights, that "Right and justice shall be administered without sale denial, delay, or prejudice," as well as by the unwritten dictates of natural justice, the courts of this state are commanded to administer justice without prejudice.
Such provision of the Oklahoma Constitution makes the prejudice of a judge a ground for his disqualification, and the provision of the statute (Comp. St. 1921, § 2632), "and the same qualifications shall apply to the members of the Supreme Court and the Criminal Court of Appeals, as to other courts of record," refers to section 2629, providing: "No judge of any court of record shall sit in any cause or proceeding in which he may be interested, or in the result of which he may be interested. * * * or in which is called in question the validity of any judgment or proceeding in which he was of counsel or interested, * * * provided, that the disqualifications herein imposed shall not exclude the disqualifications at common law."
Public confidence in the judicial system and courts of justice of the state demands that cases shall be tried by unprejudiced and unbiased judges, and a denial of a change of judge applied for on the ground of prejudice, will be presumed to be a denial of justice.
The maxim, that "A person ought not to be a judge in his own cause, because he cannot act both as judge and party," applies in all cases where judicial functions are to be exercised, whether in proceedings of inferior tribunals or in courts of last resort.
An accused is unconstitutionally deprived of due process of law if his liberty and property are subjected to the judgment of a court, the judge of which has a direct and substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him.
The Constitution of this state confers the power to issue, hear and determine the writ of habeas corpus upon the Supreme and district courts, and though the Legislature cannot inhibit or restrict these courts in the exercise of this power, it may confer the power upon other courts of record and the judges thereof.
The statutes of this state provide: "Every person restrained of his liberty, under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of the restraint, and shall be delivered therefrom when illegal." Section 421, Comp. St. 1921.
"Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by any court of record in term time, or by a judge of any such court either in term or vacation; and upon application the writ shall be granted without delay." Section 423.
"No sheriff or other officer shall be liable to a civil action for obeying any writ of habeas corpus or order of discharge made thereon." Section 437.
"The Criminal Court of Appeals and judges thereof shall have the right to issue writs of habeas corpus." Section 3048.
This court, the Supreme Court, and district courts, and the justices and judges thereof have concurrent original jurisdiction in habeas corpus.
The judge, in vacation, to whom the application is made for a writ of habeas corpus, is compelled to grant the same, unless it is clearly apparent from the petition or the papers annexed that the petitioner is not entitled to it.
In a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, verified by the petitioner's oath, facts duly alleged may be taken to be true unless denied by the return, and, when not denied by the return, they are considered as admitted.
The sheriff or other officer to whom the writ of habeas corpus is directed is bound to obey the same, no matter by what authority or warrant, by whomsoever issued, he may hold the prisoner. It is enough for him to know that the state demands of him to show by what authority he restrains the prisoner.
Section 10 of the Bill of Rights provides: "The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall never be suspended by the authorities of this state." The writ of habeas corpus is an ancient prerogative writ. It is a writ of right, granted to inquire into all cases of illegal imprisonment. The writ cannot be abrogated or its efficiency impaired by legislative action. And under the constitutional guaranty the cases within the relief afforded by the writ at common law cannot be placed beyond its reach and remedial action by statute.
The provisions of the Habeas Corpus Act (section 432, C. S 1921), which provides: "No court or judge shall inquire into the legality of any judgment or process, whereby the party is in custody, or discharge him when the term of commitment has not expired in either of the cases following: * * * Second, upon any process issued on any final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction; or, third, for any contempt of any court, officer or body having authority to commit, * * *" only apply when the court has jurisdiction to render the particular judgment. A court of competent jurisdiction is one having power and authority of law at the time of acting to do the particular act. Jurisdiction of the person of the prisoner, and of the subject-matter, is not alone conclusive, but the jurisdiction of the court to render the particular judgment is a proper subject of inquiry. If there was no legal power to render the judgment or issue the process, there was no court of competent jurisdiction, and consequently no judgment or process. All is coram non judice and void.
When a person is held in custody under a void order of commitment, or is imprisoned without due process of law under the sentence of any court of the state, it is not only within the authority of this court, but it is its duty upon habeas corpus to inquire into the illegality of the commitment when the matter is properly brought before it by petition, and if it be adjudged that the order of commitment was made without authority of law, the person will be entitled to a discharge from custody in order to preserve the constitutional right of all persons not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law.
Section 25 of the Bill of Rights abrogates the doctrine that proceedings to punish for contempts are sui generis.
Under the first clause of section 25, Bill of Rights, prescribing that "the Legislature shall pass laws defining contempts and regulating the proceedings and punishment in matters of contempt," the power to define contempts and to regulate the proceedings and punishment in matters of contempt in the courts of this state are not the exercise of an inherent power.
A criminal contempt is a crime. If the contemnor is found guilty, the punishment imposed is a "sentence" in a criminal case. Such adjudication is a "conviction," and commitment in consequence thereof is in execution of sentence for a criminal offense.
In criminal contempts, as in criminal cases, the presumption of innocence obtains, and proof of guilt must be beyond reasonable doubt.
The first clause of section 25 of the Bill of Rights, and the statute defining contempts and specifically enumerating what acts shall constitute contempts, limits the power of the courts to the punishment of contempts of the character defined in the statute, and in the mode and to the extent provided by other provisions of the Penal Code.
In the Constitution of Oklahoma the utmost pains have been taken to preserve all the securities of individual liberty, and all provisions of the Constitution designed to safeguard the liberty and security of the citizen should be liberally construed by the courts.
Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.
In view of Const. art. 7, §§ 1-3, 8, 10, article 9, § 20, and article 5, § 36, Laws 1909, c. 14, and § 21 thereof, and Comp. St. 1921, §§ 3047, 3048, 3053, Supreme Court has no jurisdiction, original or otherwise, to issue writs of prohibition to Criminal Courts of Appeals, even to prevent hearing application on habeas corpus for release of one imprisoned for contempt of Supreme Court.
Under Const. art. 2, § 25, and Comp. St. 1921, § 1697, defining direct and indirect contempts, summarily punishing for contempt through allegations in document filed in Supreme Court, asking leave to file petition for rehearing without informations being verified and supporting facts alleged by affidavit or other proof, in view of Const. art. 2, §§ 17, 19, and 20, relating to criminal prosecutions and trial by jury, was denial of due process of law contrary to section 7 and Const. U.S. Amend. 14.
Sentence of twelve months' imprisonment and $5,000 fine for contempt of Supreme Court through allegations in instrument asking leave to file petition for rehearing was "cruel and unusual punishment," forbidden by Const. art. 2, § 9, in view of Comp. St. 1921, § 6332, relating to imprisonment on failure to pay fine, and sections 1508, 1698, 2306, relating to punishments.
Original application by O. O. Owens for a writ of habeas corpus to be directed Ben B. Dancy, Sheriff of Oklahoma County. Judgment discharging the petitioner.
See, also, 256 P. 340, 256 P. 704.
Among the pleadings herein are set forth the following:
"In the Criminal Court of Appeals of the State of Oklahoma.
O. O. Owens, Petitioner, v. Ben B. Dancy, Sheriff of Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, Respondent. No. A-6581.
Amended and Supplemental Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Your petitioner respectfully shows to the court that he is restrained of his liberty in the custody of the above-named respondent at the city of Oklahoma City, in the state of Oklahoma, under a pretended commitment issued by the order and judgment of the Supreme Court of the state of Oklahoma in a certain cause numbered upon the dockets of said Supreme Court No. 18081. A true, full, and complete copy...
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