Ex Parte Slaughter

• Decision Date: 31 May 1922
• Docket Number: (No. 6871.)
• Citation: 243 S.W. 478
• Parties: Ex parte SLAUGHTER.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

243 S.W. 478

Ex parte SLAUGHTER.

(No. 6871.)

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 31, 1922.

Appeal from Smith County Court; D. R. Pendleton, Judge.

Habeas corpus proceeding by L. L. Slaughter. From judgment of the court below, petitioner appeals. Petitioner discharged from custody.

Simpson, Lasseter & Simpson, of Tyler, for appellant.

R. G. Storey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

LATTIMORE, J.

The appellant herein was convicted in the county court of Smith county of a violation of that part of section 820o, Vernon's Texas Statutes 1920, wherein it is forbidden that any person shall operate or drive a motor vehicle on any public highway "where the territory contiguous thereto is closely built up, at a greater rate of speed than eighteen miles per hour." By habeas corpus an attack is made upon the validity of said statute. We have devoted much time to the consideration of this matter because of the fact that, while only entailing a small fine upon appellant, there is involved the grave question of the use of a public highway, with the concomitant question of the need for safeguards and restrictions for those who use and go upon them. Further than to decide the matter before us under well-settled rules of construction we are not allowed to go. The Constitution confides to another branch of government the expression by written statute of what may or may not be done by any person in a given case; and this court always approaches a review of the proposition that any law is not of legal sufficience with reluctance. The issue in the case before us resolves itself into whether one operating a car upon a public highway may with reasonable certainty know that the rate of speed at which he is moving at a given point on such highway is such as is forbidden by this law. If he can know this, the law should be upheld. If he cannot, then the law should not stand on the statutes, nor should any law whose language or effect is such that the citizen affected thereby cannot reasonably know when he is violating or about to violate same. Article 6 of our Penal Code is as follows:

"Whenever it appears that a provision of the penal law is so indefinitely framed or of such doubtful construction that it cannot be understood, either from the language in which it is expressed, or from some other written law of the state, such penal law shall be regarded as wholly inoperative."

Construing the language of article 820o, in the light of this general statute and of section 10 of article 1 of our Constitution, which guarantees to every citizen the right to know the nature and character of the accusation against him, we pass to an analysis of the language of the law which is attacked.

The expression "territory contiguous thereto," referring to a highway, might with reason be held to refer to the land lying immediately upon or adjacent to such highway but the other expression in said statute relating to such territory, i. e., "closely built up," seems to us unavoidably open to the objection that it is of such doubtful construction and is so indefinite as to make impossible any standard of construction which might be applied to his own acts by the operator of a motor vehicle, or to such acts by a judge or jury called upon to decide whether such operator has offended against this law. What definition should be given to the expression under discussion would likely be answered by as many different standards as might make up the number of those to whom such inquiry be...