Ex parte State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.

• Decision Date: 11 July 1988
• Docket Number: AUTO-OWNERS
• Citation: 529 So.2d 975
• Parties: Ex parte STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY and Auto-Owners Insurance Company. (In re STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY CO. v. UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY CO., et al.) (In reINSURANCE CO. v. UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY CO., et al.) (In re Jeffrey Lynn HOLLYHAND and John Christopher Turner). 87-701 to 87-703.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 975

529 So.2d 975

Ex parte STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY and Auto-Owners Insurance Company.

(In re STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY CO. v. UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY CO., et al.)

(In re AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE CO. v. UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY CO., et al.)

(In re Jeffrey Lynn HOLLYHAND and John Christopher Turner).

87-701 to 87-703.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

July 11, 1988.

William J. Donald III of Donald, Randall, Donald & Hamner, Tuscaloosa, for petitioners.

Kathryn McC. Harwood of Rosen, Harwood, Cook & Sledge, and Jon M. Turner, Jr., of Prince, McGuire & Coogler, Christopher Lyle McIlwain of Hubbard, Waldrop, Reynolds, Davis & McIlwain, Tuscaloosa, for respondent United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.

Robert A. Morgan of McElvy & Ford, Tuscaloosa, for respondent All Trans Transmissions.

JONES, Justice.

State Farm Fire and Casualty Company and Auto-Owners Insurance Company petition for writs of mandamus to the Honorable Jerry B. Baird, Circuit Judge, and to the Honorable Paul S. Conger, Jr., Juvenile Judge, seeking orders to compel the trial courts to permit the petitioners access to and use of certain law enforcement records and testimony of certain investigating officers relating to a fire loss in which the two juvenile respondents were allegedly involved. Petitioners are the plaintiffs in a civil action against the two juvenile defendants and others, requesting a declaration of their rights and obligations under policies of liability insurance in which the children are insureds. The policies exclude coverage for property damage that is caused intentionally by an insured who is over 13 years of age.

This petition presents the issue whether the respondent judges abused their discretion, or erred as a matter of law, in denying the insurers access to and use of law enforcement records and testimony of police and fire department investigators regarding a fire loss in which the two 17-year-old insureds were adjudicated by the juvenile court as delinquent for the commission of the offense of third-degree arson.

We hold that the judges did err, as a matter of law, in denying the petitioners' request for an inspection relating to the juvenile court proceedings. Accordingly, we instruct the juvenile judge to deliver all requested court records and files to the trial court judge in the civil action, for disposition pursuant to the guidelines set out in this opinion, and to grant the petitioners' request for use at trial in the civil case of the live testimony of the investigating officers, as may be appropriate.

The respondents maintain, and we agree, that access to juvenile court records and law enforcement records concerning a child is controlled by Ala.Code 1975, §§ 12-15-100, -101. Section 12-15-101(b) prescribes five classes of persons or agencies that shall be permitted, without an order of the court, to inspect juvenile court files. Section 12-15-101(b)(3) adds: "Any other person, agency or institution, by order of the court, having a legitimate interest in the case...." Further, the respondents rely heavily on § 12-15-72(b), which provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he disposition of a child and evidence given in a hearing in the [juvenile] court shall not be admissible as evidence against him in any case or proceeding in any other court...."

Initially, we point out that the petitioners (the insurers) seek only the right to inspect and use for trial purposes law enforcement records independently prepared and maintained by the police and fire department investigators and the investigators' live testimony. The petitioners contend that they, as insurers with contractual rights, have "a legitimate interest in the case" and should be entitled to such relief notwithstanding the provisions of § 12-15-72(b). Conversely, the respondents contend, consistent with the "privacy," "confidentiality," and "protection" goals of the juvenile statutes, that those "having a legitimate interest in the case" include only those persons and agencies with an interest in the rehabilitation and treatment of the child.

Clearly, then, we are faced with two competing public policies: on the one hand, the need to protect the child from public disclosure of juvenile court records and proceedings; and, on the other hand, the right of a liability insurer of a child in a civil action to prosecute its defense of the child's claim through the use of those records and proceedings that are essential and material to its case. We hold, however, that when these two public interests are brought face to face, it is not imperative that either of them should totally succumb to the absolutism of the other. ¹

That the right of "confidentiality" on behalf of the child is a "qualified" and not an "absolute" privilege was addressed by this Court in Ex parte Guerdon Industries, Inc., 373 So.2d 322 (Ala.1979) (denying the writ where the petitioner was found not to have a legitimate interest, because the child there involved was not a litigant in the civil action). Here, the civil litigants' constitutionally protected rights to a full and fair trial can be preserved without totally eroding the child's concomitant right of privacy. A carefully tailored order of discovery can accommodate one to the other, so that each can yield, to the degree necessary, without unduly compromising the underlying reasons for each of these competing public interests. Indeed, this Court has already recognized exceptions to the application of § 12-15-72(b) in criminal cases where the defendant's constitutional rights...