Ex parte Sweet, Cr. 4886
| Decision Date | 30 September 1952 |
| Docket Number | Cr. 4886 |
| Citation | 113 Cal.App.2d 413,248 P.2d 94 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Ex parte SWEET. |
Richard A. Haley, Los Angeles, for appellant.
S. Ernest Roll, Dist. Atty., Jere J. Sullivan, Deputy Dist. Atty., Los Angeles, for respondent.
Ordinarily, where a petitioner for habeas corpus has an appeal pending or a right of appeal in which the grounds for release advanced in the petition for the writ could be urged as grounds for reversal of the judgment, the court would hold that habeas corpus is not an available remedy. But in this case it appears that petitioner was denied bail and although she has an appeal pending to the appellate department of the superior court, before that appeal can be determined in the natural course of that court's business she would have served the terms of her sentences. For that reason it appeared to the court that habeas corpus was her only effective remedy.
This petitioner was convicted of three misdemeanors in the municipal court of Compton judicial district, which were alleged to have been committed on the same day, the 3rd day of May. Prosecution was in two cases. In the first case, number M-9222, there were two counts. In the other case, M-9291, there was a single count. In the first case there was a single judgment which stated that the defendant was sentenced under count one to 30 days in the county jail, and under count two to 30 days in the county jail, the sentences to run consecutively with the sentence in M-9291. In M-9291 petitioner was sentenced to 30 days and the judgment provided that the sentence should run consecutively with the sentences in the other case. Petitioner served a term of 60 days. In her petition she alleged a single ground for her release, namely, that the third offense of which she was convicted was necessarily included in the other two. The judgments were not before the court at the time the writ was issued, but it appears from the return that the facts are as the court has just stated them. Petitioner has asked leave to raise an additional point and leae has been granted. The point is that the two sentences in the first case ran concurrently. We think this contention is sound, and it is therefore not necessary to pass upon her original contention that the third offense was included in the first two. We may regard the case as one in which the defendant has been convicted upon two counts under a single...
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People v. Hill
...thus defendant has not been prejudiced. (Pen.Code, § 669; People v. Chung, 207 Cal.App.2d 660, 661, 24 Cal.Rptr. 637; In re Sweet, 113 Cal.App.2d 413, 415, 248 P.2d 94.) Defendant also complains because the court failed to direct the Adult Authority to count the time served in county jail a......
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Ex parte Newbern
...in the appellate department of the superior court. Under these circumstances habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy. In re Sweet, 113 Cal.App.2d 413, 414, 248 P.2d 94. The petition is founded on alleged constitutional infirmities of the judgments of conviction, conditions of detention, and ......
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State v. Davis
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Calhoun, In re
...determination when the only 'prior' consists of another conviction in the same case. The Court of Appeal decision in In re Sweet (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d 413, 415, 248 P.2d 94, supports this interpretation of the section. In Sweet, the court construed section 669 as authorizing a deferred sent......