Ex parte Taft v. Shaw

• Citation: 225 S.W. 457,284 Mo. 531
• Parties: EX PARTE PHILLIP TAFT v. ALBERT L. SHAW, Superintendent of Municipal Farm of Kansas City
• Decision Date: 20 November 1920
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

225 S.W. 457

284 Mo. 531

EX PARTE PHILLIP TAFT v. ALBERT L. SHAW, Superintendent of Municipal Farm of Kansas City

Supreme Court of Missouri

November 20, 1920

Petitioner Discharged.

Harold L. Mulks and Charles Owsley for petitioner.

(1) Any court possessing the power and authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus has the power by means of such writ to investigate the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance upon which a judgment resulting in the imprisonment of the petitioner was obtained; and where the same is unconstitutional, the petitioner will be as much entitled to be discharged as if the judgment was based upon no apparent legal enactment. Ex parte Lucas, 160 Mo. 218; Ex parte Meet 157 Mo. 527; Ex parte Walter Smith, 135 Mo. 224; Ex parte Knight, 41 So. 786; In re Smith, 143 Cal. 368; Stoutenberg v. Frazier, 16 App. D. C. 229, 48 L. R A. 220; International Harvester Co. v. Commonwealth, 170 Ky. 41, L. R. A. 1918 D. 1004; Lewis v. Nelson, 26 Fla. 71; Moore v. Wheeler, 109 Ga. 62. (2) The police power of the State to punish vagrancy rests upon a combination of three elements: (a) The absence of lawful means of support; (b) the wilful failure to secure lawful employment; and (c) the public exhibition of the same. The gist of the offence consists in the demoralizing influence of the public and notorious exhibition of habits of idleness shiftlessness or immorality. Ex parte Branch, 234 Mo. 466; Freund on "Police Power," sec. 99; In re Jordan, 90 Mich. 3. (3) If an act is so uncertain and indefinite as not to indicate the matter or thing to which it relates, it is invalid. When the Legislature undertakes to define by statute a new offense and provides for its punishment, it must express its will in language tat need not deceive the common mind. A man should be able to know with certainty when he is committing a crime and if an act is so uncertain as not to indicate the matter or thing to which it relates, it is unconstitutional and invalid as being in violation of the constitutional provision that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be entitled to know the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and as being in violation of the constitional provision that the legislature power shall be vested in the Legislature, and as being in violation of the provision that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. People v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280; Detroit Creamery Co. v. Kinnane, 264 F. 845; State v. Ashbrook, 154 Mo. 375; State v. Rumberg, 88 Minn. 399; State v. St. Rys. Co., 146 Mo. 155; People v. Briggs, 193 Ill. 457; State v. Pattlaw, 91 N.C. 550; Johnson v. State, 100 La. 32; State v. Wentler, 76 Wis. 89; Tozer v. United States, 52 F. 917; Hewitt v. Board of Examiners, 148 Cal. 590; Ex parte Jackson, 45 Ark. 158; Cook v. State, 26 Ind.App. 278; United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214; Augustine v. State, 49 Tex. Crim. 59; State v. Mann, 2 Ore. 238; Czorra v. Board of Supervisors, 23 D. C. App. Cases, 443; 8 R. C. L. 58. (4) The courts of the United States have exclusive jurisdiction of all crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of the United States, except where the acts of Congress provide otherwise. In other words, if Congress in the exercise of its constitutional power enacts a law making a particular act a crime and does not in the particular statute confer jurisdiction upon the courts of the State to punish the particular offense, the jurisdiction of the Federal courts is exclusive, and state courts have no power to punish the particular offense or the acts or conduct which is embraced within the particular offense. Sec. 133, U. S. Compiled Statutes 1916, p. 841; Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220; Priggs v. Comm., 16 Pet. (41 U.S.) 539; Comm. v. Felton, 101 Mass. 204; In re Ino, 54 F. 669; U. S. v. Buskey, 38 F. 99; In re Looney, 38 F. 101. (5) The constitutional provision authorizing certain cites to adopt certain charters for their own government expressly limits the power to the requirements that the charter adopted must be consistent with and subject to the Constitution and laws of this State. State ex rel. v. Police Commissioner, 184 Mo. 109.

E. M. Harber, I. M. Lee, Geo. W. Meyer and B. N. Mosman for respondent.

(1) The action being one in habeas corpus, the only question before the court is one of jurisdiction. State ex rel. v. Dobson, 135 Mo. 12. (2) The rights conferred by Sec. 4, Art. II, Constitution of Missouri, are subordinate to the rights of society and to the police power of the State. State v. Addington, 77 Mo. 110; State ex rel. v. Beattie, 16 Mo.App. 131; St. Louis v. McCann, 157 Mo. 301; Kansas City v. Holmes, 247 Mo. 163; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 136; McQuillan, Muncp. Corp. secs. 890. 891. (3) Kansas City had the power to pass the ordinance in question and to define vagrancy. Clause 26, Sec. 1, Art. III, Charter of Kansas City; Kansas City v. Neal, 49 Mo.App. 98. (4) What constitutes vagrancy? See 39 Cyc. 1108-1109; Gavin v. State, 96 Miss. 377; Freund, Police Power, sec. 99; Ex parte Branch, 234 Mo. 471; Hartman v. State, 119 Ga. 427; Lewis v. State, 3 Ga.App. 322; Morton v. Nelms, 118 Ga. 786. (5) Where different provisions of an ordinance are severable from and not dependent upon each other, part may be sustained and part held invalid. St. Louis v. Leissing, 190 Mo. 464; St. Louis v. Dairy Co., 190 Mo. 492; Water Co. v. Neosho, 136 Mo. 498; St. Louis v. Railway, 89 Mo. 44; Quinnette v. St. Louis, 76 Mo. 402; Rockville v. Merchant, 60 Mo.App. 365; State v. McFarland, 105 N.W. 187; Cody v. State, 118 Ga. 784. (6) Kansas City had power to compel prisoners in the workhouse to labor, and to fix an allowance to such prisoners of fifty cents per day for such work. Clause 42, Sec. 1, Art. III, Charter of Kansas City, 1908; Sec. 16, Art. IX, Const. Mo.

GRAVES, J. Blair, J., concurs in the result.

OPINION

In Banc

Habeas Corpus.

GRAVES J.

In this court Philip Taft sued out a writ of habeas corpus, the purpose of which is to test the legality of his imprisonment under a judgment of the Criminal Court of Jackson County, rendered May 27, 1920. By such judgment he was fined $ 500 and committed, by a commitment in usual form, to imprisonment at the Municipal Farm of Kansas City for the non-payment of such fine.

The action began in the Municipal Court of Kansas City, and by defendant's appeal reached the criminal court. The basis of the prosecution was Ordinance No. 33205 of Kansas City, the first section of which reads:

"Section 1. -- Any person who, in this city, lives idly, has no visible means of support, who is physically able to perform mental or manual labor, and who has no regular employment, and is not able to show reasonable effort and in good faith to secure some lawful employment, and who neglects or refuses to accept and engage in some lawful trade or occupation to support himself; or who shall become a member of any organization or association of individuals who are opposed to the United States prosecuting the present war; or who shall circulate or aid and abet in circulating literature directly intended to hinder the United States Government in the exercise of its war powers; or who utters seditious sentiments against the United States Government; or who aids or abets any person in the circulation of any writing, posters or circulars of any kind, intended to promote sedition, disloyalty to the Government, or sabotage or incendiarism, is hereby declared to be a vagrant, and upon conviction thereof shall be subject to a fine of not less than one dollar, nor more than five hundred dollars, or by an imprisonment of not less than one day, nor more than twelve months, or by both such fine and imprisonment."

The information in the Municipal Court becomes material, and that document reads:

"State of Missouri, County of Jackson -- ss.

"On information, Daniel O'Byrne, Assistant City Counselor, within and for Kansas City, County of Jackson, State of Missouri, complains that on or about the 4th day of May, A. D. 1920, one Phillip Taft, within the corporate limits of Kansas City, and within the territorial limits of Division 1 of the Municipal Court of Kansas City, on Main Street near Sixth, did then and there, unlawfully live idly, had no visible means of support, although physically able to perform mental or manual labor.

"Said person had no regular employment and was not able to show reasonable effort and good faith to secure some lawful employment.

"Said person did then and there neglect or refuse to accept and engage in some lawful trade or occupation to support himself.

"Said person was then and there a member of an organization or association of individuals who are opposed to the United States prosecuting the present war.

"Said person did then and there circulate or aid and abet in circulating literature directly intended to hinder the United States Government in the exercise of its war powers.

"Said person did then and there utter seditious sentiments against the United States Government.

"Said person did then and there aid or abet another person in the circulation of writings, posters, or circulars intended to promote sedition, disloyalty to the Government or sabotage or incendiarism.

"Said person was then and there a vagrant.

"All in violation of Section 1, of Ordinance of Kansas City, Missouri, No. 33205, approved June 12, 1918.

"Daniel O'Byrne,

"Assistant City Counselor."

The petitioner not only charges that the ordinance under which he was prosecuted and convicted is unconstitutional, but he also challenges that provision of the city charter which authorizes the imprisonment for failure to pay the fine, and which allows the prisoner but fifty cents per day credit for the time he worked.

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