Ex parte Tomlinson
Decision Date | 26 October 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 3-93-654-CR,3-93-654-CR |
Citation | 886 S.W.2d 544 |
Parties | Ex parte Steve TOMLINSON, |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Phillip Scott McClure, San Angelo, for appellant.
Stephen H. Smith, Dist. Atty., Franklin D. Brown, Asst. Dist. Atty., San Angelo, for appellee.
Before ABOUSSIE, JONES and KIDD, JJ.
Steve Tomlinson, appellant, appeals from the district court's denial of a pretrial writ of habeas corpus. Appellant is currently under indictment for possession of marihuana. He contends that his criminal prosecution is barred by the double jeopardy protection of the United States and Texas Constitutions because he has already suffered a punitive civil forfeiture for the same offense. The district court denied the habeas relief. We will affirm.
On February 4, 1993, pursuant to a warrant, San Angelo police officers searched appellant's residence based on probable cause for marihuana possession. As a result of this search, officers seized $15,530 in currency, a small quantity of marihuana, scales, and assorted drug paraphernalia. While the officers were conducting the search, Wesley Clary arrived at the back door. After being identified, Clary was released and left the premises. Later, police discovered a red and white cooler near the back door where Clary had been standing. This cooler contained approximately one pound of marihuana. It too was seized.
Suspecting Clary may have placed the cooler there to avoid arrest, police later questioned him. Clary admitted that he had indeed placed the cooler there, and he consented to a search of his own residence. There he led police to a homemade audio speaker, inside of which officers discovered sixteen and one quarter pounds of marihuana. Clary told police that he and appellant owned the marihuana. He also told police that the speaker was part of a matching set and that the mate was at appellant's residence. Believing that the presence of the matching speaker at appellant's residence would tend to show that appellant "possessed" the marihuana discovered at Clary's residence, police obtained another search warrant to retrieve the matching speaker from appellant's residence. 1 The Tom Green County grand jury indicted appellant for possession of more than five, but less than fifty, pounds of marihuana. Controlled Substances Act, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 678, sec. 1, § 481.121, 1989 Tex.Gen.Laws 2230, 2939 (Tex.Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.121, since amended) (hereafter "former section 481.121").
In March 1993 the State initiated a civil forfeiture suit against the $15,530 found in the initial search of appellant's residence. Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. §§ 59.01-.06 (West Supp.1994). In that suit the State alleged that appellant and his father, Walter Tomlinson, were in possession of a felony quantity of marihuana on February 4, 1993, and that the currency was subject to forfeiture either as "proceeds gained from the commission of a felony offense" or alternatively because it was "used or intended for use in the commission of a felony offense" under former section 481. On July 28, 1993, the State and the Tomlinsons entered into an agreed judgment dividing the seized funds. Walter Tomlinson was to retain half, $7,565; the State received the other half. Appellant, who maintained that $4,000 of the seized money was his, received nothing. The judgment of forfeiture recited that appellant consented to the judgment, but did not recite the specific legal basis for the forfeiture.
Before trial on the marihuana-possession charge, appellant filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the trial court. He contended that the forfeiture of his $4,000 was a substantial punitive forfeiture for the same offense, thus barring subsequent criminal prosecution under the double jeopardy provisions of both the United States and Texas Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. V, XIV; Tex. Const. art. I, § 14. Following a hearing on the writ, the district court denied relief. The court did, however, stay the criminal prosecution pending appellant's appeal to this Court.
In this appeal, appellant strenuously argues that his forfeiture of $4,000 was "punitive" and bars his criminal prosecution for marihuana possession. He relies on United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989), and its progeny for the proposition that civil actions can be punitive for double jeopardy purposes. When applied to civil forfeiture of drug proceeds and criminal prosecution for the underlying drug offense, this is indeed a murky area of law that has left the federal courts of appeals seemingly at odds. Compare United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1220-21 (9th Cir.1994) ( ) with United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295, 299-300 (5th Cir.1994) ( ). Mirroring the division in federal authority, the two Houston courts of appeals have recently entered this fray. Compare Fant v. State, 881 S.W.2d 830 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, pet. granted) ( ) with Johnson v. State, 882 S.W.2d 17 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. granted) ( ). It is, however, unnecessary for us to grapple with this thorny issue, because the present appeal resolves at an analytically earlier stage.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V. It protects against three distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense. Halper, 490 U.S. at 440, 109 S.Ct. at 1897; Iglehart v. State, 837 S.W.2d 122, 127 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). Conceptually, the relevant provisions of both the United States and Texas constitutions are identical. Phillips v. State, 787 S.W.2d 391, 393 n. 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). Both speak of double jeopardy in terms of the "same offense." Id. at 393. In determining what constitutes an "offense," state legislatures are free to define crimes and fix punishments. Once they have acted, however, courts may not impose more than one punishment for the same offense. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 2225, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977).
Appellant argues that his civil forfeiture "punished" him for the same marihuana offense now charged in the criminal indictment. We disagree. In all of the authorities cited by appellant, there is no dispute that the state targeted exactly the same offense in both the civil and criminal actions. See Montana Dep't of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, ---- - ----, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 1942-43, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994) ( ); United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 2853, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993) ( ); Halper, 490 U.S. at 437-38, 109 S.Ct. at 1896-97 ( ); $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1216 ("[T]his civil forfeiture action and the claimants' criminal prosecution addressed the identical violations of the identical laws...."); Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297-98 ( ); United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 194-95 (5th Cir.1991) (), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 841, 113 S.Ct. 123, 121 L.Ed.2d 78 (1992); Fant, 881 S.W.2d at 831 ( ). In the present case, however, the civil forfeiture was based on a different offense from that charged in the criminal prosecution.
The Texas legislature has created two separate and distinct offenses: delivery of marihuana punishable under former section 481.120 and possession of marihuana punishable under former section 481.121. Double Jeopardy does not bar prosecution for distinct possession and delivery offenses where separate drug quantities are identified for each offense. See Smith v. State, 873 S.W.2d 773, 775 ...
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