Ex Parte Troy University
Decision Date | 22 December 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 1051318.,1051318. |
Citation | 961 So.2d 105 |
Parties | Ex parte TROY UNIVERSITY and Dr. Cameron J. Martindale. (In re The Rosa and Raymond Parks Institute for Self Development, in its own right and as the successor to the Rosa Parks Legacy; the estate of Rosa Parks, by and through its personal representatives, Adam Shakoor and Elaine Steele; and the Rosa Parks Living Trust, by and through its trustees, Adam Shakoor and Elaine Steele v. Troy University et al.) |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
H. Lewis Gillis, Christopher K. Whitehead, Afrika C. Parchman, and Ramadnah M. Salaam of Thomas, Means, Gillis & Seay, P.C., Montgomery, for petitioners.
Glenn D. Zimmerman and Gwendolyn Thomas Kennedy, Montgomery, for respondents.
The Rosa and Raymond Parks Institute for Self Development, in its own right and as the successor to the Rosa Parks Legacy, sued Troy University1 and fictitiously named defendants on September 26, 2005, asserting claims of breach of contract and tortious interference with contractual rights. The complaint alleged that the University was acting in violation of a memorandum agreement entered into on January 15, 1998, between the Rosa Parks Legacy and the University, doing business as Troy State University of Montgomery which related to the University's use of Rosa Parks's name and image and to its operation on its Montgomery campus of the Rosa Parks Library and Museum ("the museum").
The complaint sought compensatory and punitive damages and a restraining order prohibiting the University from using Rosa Parks's name or image and from making a movie for use in the museum that was to feature Rosa Parks's image and a facsimile of her voice. On September 29, 2005, the circuit court denied the Institute's request for a restraining order. On October 28, 2005, the University moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing, in part, that it was immune from suit under Art. I, § 14, of the Alabama Constitution of 1901.
The Institute amended its complaint in November 2005 to add as plaintiffs the estate of Rosa Parks and the Rosa Parks Living Trust (all the plaintiffs are hereinafter referred to collectively as "the Institute"); to correct its designation of the University (see note 1); to assert additional counts of theft of intellectual property and fraudulent inducement to contract; to seek an injunction prohibiting the University from engaging in various activities related to its use of Rosa Parks's name and image; and to substitute Glenda Curry, former vice chancellor of the University, and Cameron J. Martindale, current vice chancellor of the University, for two of the fictitiously named defendants. The original complaint did not describe the fictitiously named defendants other than as "Fictitious A, B, and C, as yet unknown individuals, corporations, or entities." The amended complaint did not specify whether Martindale was being sued in her personal or official capacity; it stated simply that the Institute was amending its complaint "to rename Fictitious Party C, Cameron Martindale, current president of Troy State University Montgomery and Vice Chancellor of Troy State."2 The following statement in the count alleging fraudulent inducement is the only specific reference in the amended complaint to Martindale: "Troy State's current Vice Chancellor ratified the Memorandum by treating the Institute as the successor [to the Rosa Parks Legacy] after receiving notice from the Institute in 2001." (Amended complaint at ¶ 48.)
The University and Martindale filed motions to dismiss the claims asserted against them in the amended complaint, asserting immunity as a ground for dismissal. On May 12, 2006, and August 4, 2006, the circuit court entered orders denying the motions.3 The University and Martindale jointly filed a petition for the writ of mandamus asking this Court to direct the circuit court to vacate its order and to dismiss the Institute's claims against them on the basis of immunity.
Ex parte Davis, 930 So.2d 497, 499 (Ala. 2005). A "petition for a writ of mandamus is an appropriate means for seeking review of an order denying a claim of immunity." Ex parte Butts, 775 So.2d 173, 176 (Ala. 2000).
"In reviewing the denial of a motion to dismiss by means of a mandamus petition, we do not change our standard of review." Ex parte Haralson, 853 So.2d 928, 931 (Ala.2003).
Knox v. Western World Ins. Co., 893 So.2d 321, 322 (Ala.2004).
Ex parte Davis, 930 So.2d at 500 (quoting Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So.2d 137, 142-43 (Ala.2002)(footnotes omitted)). "The State's immunity bars suits for relief by way of mandamus or injunction, no less than suits for any other remedy." Taylor v. Troy State Univ., 437 So.2d 472, 474 (Ala.1983).
The fourth category of claims identified in the above statement from Davis refers to claims against State officials or employees in their individual capacity which are, in effect, claims against the State. Ex parte Walley, 950 So.2d 1172, 1178-79 (Ala.2006); Davis, 930 So.2d at 500 (); Phillips v. Thomas, 555 So.2d 81, 83 (Ala.1989) (). This form of immunity is distinct from the discretionary or State-agent immunity discussed in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala.2000), which dealt with claims against State agents sued in their personal, or individual, capacities, which were not, in effect, claims against the State.
The University argues that it is absolutely immune from suit and that the circuit court thus should have dismissed the Institute's claims against it. This Court has extended the restriction on suits against the State found in § 14 "to the state's institutions of higher learning" and has held those institutions absolutely immune from suit as agencies of the State. Taylor, 437 So.2d at 474 ( ). See also Stark v. Troy State Univ., 514 So.2d 46, 50 (Ala.1987)( Troy State University constitutionally immune from suit); Matthews v. Alabama Agric. & Mech. Univ., 787 So.2d 691, 696 (Ala.2000)("Alabama A & M University is an instrumentality of the State of Alabama and, thus, is absolutely immune from suit under § 14"); Ex parte Craft, 727 So.2d 55, 58 (Ala.1999)("Ayers State Technical College is a state institution of higher learning and is entitled to absolute immunity...."). The University is an institution of higher learning under the authority of the governor and the superintendent of education. See Ala.Code 1975, § 16-56-1; Taylor, supra; Stark, 514 So.2d at 50 (). Under these precedents, the University was entitled to dismissal of the Institute's claims against it by virtue of § 14.
The Institute argues that the University is not protected by the prohibition of suits against the State in § 14 because, according to the Institute, the University has received funds for the operation of the museum in the form of grants from the United States government, museum ticket and other sales, and private donations. The Institute reasons that because the University is not wholly funded by the State with respect to the museum and related projects, any judgment against the University may be paid out of non-State funds and thus not affect the State treasury so as to bring the University within the prohibition of § 14. At the foundation of this argument is the erroneous proposition that this Court's extension of the prohibition of § 14 to State agencies is based solely on the effect actions against such agencies have on the State treasury. The...
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