Ex parte Tuan Van Truong, 70672
Decision Date | 10 May 1989 |
Docket Number | No. 70672,70672 |
Citation | 770 S.W.2d 810 |
Parties | Ex parte TUAN VAN TRUONG. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
This is a postconviction petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to Article 11.07, V.A.C.C.P. The claim we ordered filed and set is that in the punishment phase the trial court "committed error" in giving the jury an improper instruction.
More particularly, Applicant contends he is entitled to relief from consequences of a sentence imposed in accordance with punishment assessed by a jury unconstitutionally charged on the parole law mandated by Article 37.07, § 4, V.A.C.C.P. See Rose v. State, 752 S.W.2d 529 (Tex.Cr.App.1987, 1988).
At the outset, however, the Court is confronted with the threshold question of whether the contention may be raised and pursued under authority of Article 11.07. Regardless of a prior direct appeal presenting a point of error challenging validity of the sentence, we will hold his "Rose claim" is not cognizable in a postconviction habeas proceeding under Article 11.07.
First we emphasize that this Court decided the issues in Rose "solely on the Constitution and laws of the State of Texas," id., at 531. Accordingly, the instant opinion is likewise founded on that same basis, and we do not intend to implicate a federal question, substantial or otherwise.
Article I, § 12 of the Bill of Rights provides:
When any person is restrained in his liberty, the writ of habeas corpus is the remedy to seek. Article 11.01, V.A.C.C.P. To make it speedy and effectual the Legislature has enacted, inter alia, the several provisions of Chapter Eleven, C.C.P.
Generally, once preliminary procedures have been accomplished and the matter is ripe for decision, the habeas judge or court shall determine whether "legal cause be shown for the imprisonment or restraint," and if none, to discharge the applicant. Article 11.40. See Ex parte Coupland, 28 Tex. 387, at 390, 391 (1862). Chapter Eleven "applies to all cases of habeas corpus for the enlargement of persons illegally held in custody or in any manner restrained in their personal liberty[.]" Article 11.64. 1
Pursuant to Article 11.07, V.A.C.C.P., after final conviction in felony cases the writ will lie to challenge "legality of the applicant's confinement," resulting in a judgment of this Court either "remanding the petitioner [sic] to custody or ordering his release, as the law and facts may justify." Id., § 2(c) and (d), and § 3.
Early on, first the Supreme Court and then this Court recognized that for purposes of habeas corpus the common law distinguished proceedings and their results according to the character and effect of error claimed to warrant relief. See generally Ex parte Banks, 769 S.W.2d 539 (Tex.Cr.App.1989) ( ).
Thus, in Perry v. The State, 41 Tex. 488 (1874), the Supreme Court pithily pointed out:
When this Court was named the Court of Appeals, in Ex parte Scwartz, 2 Tex.App. 74 (1877), it drew heavily from works of learned commentators to explain:
Id., at 80-81 (emphasis in original). To compare Ex parte Scwartz, supra, with Ex parte Slaren, 3 Tex.App. 662 (1878), is illuminating and illustrative of application of these common law propositions.
Common law procedural rules governed and were applied in any particular state of case where the code of criminal procedure failed to provide a rule. Article 1.27, V.A.C.C.P. Until 1943 predecessors to Chapter Eleven did not provide specific procedures designed solely for handling postconvition writs of habeas corpus. See Historical Note to Article 11.07.
Acts 1943, 48th Leg., Ch. 233, p. 354, proposed to fill the void in felony cases by authorizing any district judge presented with a petition to set the same for hearing, to ascertain the facts and to order issuance of the writ returnable to this Court along with the record thus made, and as well by a supplementary proceeding whereby this Court might have the facts determined; this Court would then hear the matter and "enter its judgment remanding the petitioner to custody or ordering his release, as the law and facts may justify." That procedure was to be "exclusive" in discharging the prisoner. Its justification is stated in § 2, viz:
"[P]resent statutes governing the writ of habeas corpus are inadequate to fully cover cases arising after final conviction, and [a] necessity exist[s] for prompt and adequate relief for deserving petitioners as well as the rights of the state in such cases[.]"
Except "as the law and facts may justify," the Legislature failed to identify "deserving" prisoners. However, at first opportunity, Ex parte Ricketts, 148 Tex.Cr.R. 569, 189 S.W.2d 872 (1945), the Court firmly preserved the status quo ante. 2
Thus common law rules prescribing issues cognizable on post-conviction habeas corpus prevailed, and those limitations remained in force--that is, until advent of The Substantial Federal Question. 3
Because the 1943 enactment and ensuing judicial treatment failed to meet needs of increased federal habeas corpus litigation and concomitant demands of the Supreme Court on petitioners and state courts, respectively, in such cases as Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), and Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963), in Acts 1967, 60th Leg., Ch. 659, p. 1732, § 7, at 1734-1735 (Act), the Legislature reworked and expanded procedural requisites to produce revised Article 11.07.
Unlike its earlier effort in behalf of "deserving petitioners," the Legislature provided some standards for seeking and obtaining relief, viz: pleadings which "would render petitioner's confinement under the felony conviction illegal; " proof going to issues material to "whether the petitioner is illegally restrained," and this Court was still to "enter its judgment remanding the petitioner to custody or ordering his release, as the law and facts may justify." Acts 1967, ante, at 1734-1735.
In Ex parte Young, 418 S.W.2d 824 (Tex.Cr.App.1967), the Court construed amended Article 11.07 in light of several developments, including "[n]ew concepts of the meaning of due process announced by the Supreme Court of the United States," recognizing, "A judgment of conviction obtained in violation of due process of law is void for want of jurisdiction of the court to enter such judgment." Id., at 826. Accordingly, the Court determined that in a postconviction habeas proceeding "the question is not why [applicant] is confined in the Texas Department of Corrections but whether the judgment of conviction under which he is so confined is void." Id., at 827.
In sum, in 1967 the Legislature devised and the Court sanctioned by construction a system to render the remedy via habeas corpus "speedy and effectual," consonant with the admonition and mandate of Article I, § 12, Bill of Rights. Thus the constitutional provisions guarantee availability of the Great Writ pursuant to legislative enactments designed to enable an applicant to make a collateral attack and to obtain relief against a final judgment of conviction rendered void not only for reasons under common law but also for want of jurisdiction in the convicting court to enter it where conviction was had in violation of due process.
However, the issue here is not validity of that part of the judgment reflecting that applicant is adjudged guilty of the offense as found by verdict of the jury; rather, the claim is directed to that part of the judgment reflecting that applicant be punished in accordance with verdict of the jury assessing punishment. See Article 42.01, § 1, subdivision 8, V.A.C.C.P. And the contention is that because the jury had been unconstitutionally instructed on the parole law, its verdict assessing punishment is invalid, and by extension the resultant judgment is void. We reject the contention.
In Rose v. State, supra, the Court held that Article 37.07, 4, along with the instruction it mandates, is unconstitutional in that it violates the separation of powers doctrine of Article II, § 1, and also violates the Due Course Clauses of Article 1, §§ 13 and 19, Bill of Rights.
Addressing the first holding the Court distinguished "[t]his type of statutory error ... from charging error as envisioned by Article 36.19, V.A.C.C.P," id., at 553; it did not remotely suggest that providing the jury with an unconstitutional instruction pertaining solely to considerations of punishment voided the verdict rendered by the jury. The only consequence is that a harm analysis must be conducted under Tex.R.Pro.App. 81(b)(2) instead of Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Cr.App.1985), "to determine whether it calls for reversal of...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Ex Parte Graves
...as "void vs. voidable" and "illegal procedure vs. irregular procedure" without further explanation. See also Ex parte Tuan Van Truong, 770 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex.Crim. App.1989) (discussing procedural framework and bases for habeas corpus review, but failing to address precisely what issues a......
-
State ex rel. Holmes v. Honorable Court of Appeals for Third Dist.
...on habeas corpus. 20 Indeed, he does not claim his capital murder conviction is even voidable, much less void. See Ex parte Truong, 770 S.W.2d 810 (Tex.Cr.App.1989). 21 This question of whether a habeas corpus applicant is raising a claim that, if decided in his favor, will result in his di......
-
Smith v. Texas
...grounds is borne out. Immediately following Almanza, the TCCA applied it in state habeas proceedings. See Ex parte Tuan Van Truong, 770 S.W.2d 810, 813 (1989) (en banc) (per curiam);Ex parte Patterson, 740 S.W.2d 766, 776–777 (1987) (en banc); Ex parte White, 726 S.W.2d 149, 150 (1987) (en ......
-
Ex parte Davis
...relief in very limited situations--those where illegalities rendered an inferior court's judgment "void." See Ex parte Tuan Van Truong, 770 S.W.2d 810, 812 fn. 2 (Tex.Cr.App.1989) (at common law judgment of inferior courts could only be attacked by writ of habeas corpus for such illegalitie......
-
Punishment Phase
...is reversible error rendering the conviction voidable, and is not a claim cognizable on a habeas corpus writ. Ex parte Tuan van Truong, 770 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). §20:22 Victim Impact Evidence Victim impact evidence is generally recognized as evidence concerning the effect that ......
-
Punishment Phase
...is reversible error rendering the conviction voidable, and is not a claim cognizable on a habeas corpus writ. Ex parte Tuan van Truong, 770 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). Where a defendant accepts the benefit of a lenity in a judgment (here release from the penitentiary before the statu......
-
Punishment Phase
...is reversible error rendering the conviction voidable, and is not a claim cognizable on a habeas corpus writ. Ex parte Tuan van Truong, 770 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). §20:22 Victim Impact Evidence Victim impact evidence is generally recognized as evidence concerning the effect that ......
-
Punishment Phase
...is reversible error rendering the conviction voidable, and is not a claim cognizable on a habeas corpus writ. Ex parte Tuan van Truong, 770 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). Where a defendant accepts the benefit of a lenity in a judgment (here release from the penitentiary before the statu......