Ex Parte Tucker

Citation164 Miss. 20,143 So. 700
Decision Date10 October 1932
Docket Number30128
CourtMississippi Supreme Court
PartiesEX PARTE TUCKER

(Division B.)

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Constitution must be construed as if intended to stand for great length of time.

2 COURTS.

Legislature may create court exercising same jurisdiction as circuit court so long as circuit court is superior thereto (Const 1890, section 172).

3 COURTS.

Legislature may create inferior court having jurisdiction of felonies and have indictments originating in circuit court transferable to inferior court (Const. 1890, section 172; Code 1930, section 694).

4 COURTS.

Legislature could authorize circuit courts to transfer to county courts such indictments originating in circuit court as Legislature should deem expedient, leaving to circuit courts' discretion determination of how many indictments should be in fact transferred (Const. 1890, section 172; Code 1930 section 694).

5. CRIMINAL LAW.

Defendant being in court, no notice of order transferring indictment from circuit court to county court other than entry of order on minutes was necessary (Code 1930, section 694).

6. CRIMINAL LAW.

Word for "trial," in statute respecting transfer of cases from circuit court to county court, includes everything circuit court could have done had case not been transferred (Code 1930, section 694).

7. CRIMINAL LAW.

Cases transferred from circuit courts to county courts are appealable to circuit courts (Code 1930, section 694).

Division B

APPEAL from chancery court of Lauderdale county.

HON. A. B. AMIS, SR., Chancellor.

Petition for writ of habeas corpus by Bruce Tucker. The writ was denied, and petitioner appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Reversed and remanded.

W. D. Conn, Jr., Assistant Attorney-General, for the state.

That part of section 694 of the Code of 1930 is involved in misdemeanor cases, and in felony cases not capital, wherein indictments have been returned by the grand jury the circuit court may transfer with full jurisdiction all or any of the same, in its discretion, to the county court for trial.

The legislature shall, from time to time, establish such other inferior courts as may be necessary, and abolish the same whenever deemed expedient.

Sec. 172, Constitution of 1890.

The legislature was acting within its constitutional limitations when it provided for the creation and establishment of county courts.

State ex rel. Knox v. Speakes et al., 144 Miss. 125, 109 So. 129.

Giving the legislature the constitutional right to create other and inferior courts, carries with it, by necessary implication, the right to assign it jurisdiction over certain classes of cases, which are not exclusively assigned to other court or courts.

The county court does not have original jurisdiction of felonies less than capital, because before it can try or otherwise dispose of a felony, it must have been transferred to it by the circuit court. This transfer is not a matter of right, because the statute provides that the circuit court may transfer, in its discretion, any and all of such cases.

The legislature had the right to confer concurrent jurisdiction of felonies less than capital on the county courts.

Houston v. Roystun, 7 How, 543; State v. Speakes, 144 Miss. 125, 109 So. 129.

It will be noticed that the order recites that the case is transferred to the county court for disposition. The word "disposition" is a very comprehensive term and includes everything that may be done with a case, and every possible turn that may take place until the case is finally terminated one way or the other. Under the statute, when such case is transferred, the county court has the right and power to dispose of such case as fully and completely as the circuit court had, and this includes the right of the court to enter a nolle prosequi and discharge the defendant from custody.

The legislature, has no power to abridge the original jurisdiction of the circuit court. If it had attempted to do so by providing that county courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all criminal cases, etc., and by requiring that the circuit courts shall send all indictment for offenses, of which the county courts have cognizance, to the latter courts for trial, the act would be unconstitutional; but as it conferred only concurrent jurisdiction in the cases specified, upon county courts, and made the sending of the indictments to the latter courts, not mandatory but directory or permissive, it is constitutional.

Myers v. The People, 67 Ill. 503.

Gilbert & Cameron and J. Thomas Dunn, all of Meridian, for appellee.

The circuit court is a constitutionally created court with original jurisdiction of felony cases, and it is beyond the power and authority of the legislature to undertake to confer upon this constitutional court the right and power in its discretion to vest full jurisdiction in an inferior court of the right to try felony cases not capital.

The legislature therefore, by the section 694, Code of 1930, left the matter entirely optional with the circuit judge as to what cases would be transferred to the county court and what cases to be retained and tried in his own court. As to the felony cases not capital thus retained by the circuit judge for trial in the circuit court the county court has absolutely no jurisdiction under this act, but as to the felony cases, not capital, in which the circuit judge exercises his discretion to transfer, the act then undertakes to clothe the county court with full jurisdiction to try the same, or at least delegates this right to the circuit judge, who in turn may pass this jurisdiction on to the county court.

This statute only authorizes transfer of this character of cases to the county court for trial, nothing more nor less.

The word "trial" in a statute means nothing more or less than the things judicially happening from the time of the beginning of impaneling the jury up to the time of the reception of the verdict by the court.

Lipscomb v. State, 76 Miss. 254.

The county court could do nothing more nor less than enter upon trial of the case and then its jurisdiction ended; no authority is given to the county court to pass sentence, and thus the matter would end; no authority is given by this statute to the county court to certify the result of said trial back to the circuit court thus the matter would end.

The act provides for no appeal upon a conviction, if one had in the county court. The general statutes on appeal provided by the legislature and which govern the county court do not apply. All appeals from judgments in county court go directly to circuit court, and if you undertake to apply this general statute to convictions had in the county court in felony cases transferred to it from the circuit court you would then have the anomalous situation of the circuit court acting as an appellate court for the trial on record of a case appealed from the county court, and in which the circuit court as a constitutional court had the original and exclusive jurisdiction to try this case.

The statute does not provide for any notice to a defendant indicted in the circuit court by a grand jury of the fact that his case will be or has been transferred to the county court for any purpose, and notice being jurisdictional it goes without saying that the county court can in no wise under this act retain jurisdiction of one indicted for a felony not capital in the circuit court.

The constitution having conferred original jurisdiction upon the circuit courts of the state in all criminal matters, said jurisdiction cannot be withdrawn by the legislative department of the government and left to the discretion of a trial judge, as to whether he will transfer the case to another court or not.

Montross v. State, 61 Miss. 429.

Rule of court cannot confer jurisdiction on another court.

Bell v. O'Rourke, 11 La. 124.

A ratification of an invalid judgment of one court by another will be inoperative as one court cannot enlarge the powers of another.

Housley v. Lindsay, 10 Heisk. (Tenn.); Allen v. Von Rosenberg, 16 S.W. 1096.

Court cannot refuse jurisdiction because rights might be more conveniently and completely determined in another forum.

Kemball v. Neal, 44 Vt. 567.

Since all of the jurisdiction in all matters to be judicially noticed in this state has been vested in one of the courts created by the constitution, the legislature cannot divest the constitutional courts of any jurisdiction vested in them, and vest in it the inferior court of their own creation--it can only give to the inferior court concurrent jurisdiction with the superior court.

Houston v. Royston, 7 How. 543; State v. Speaks, 109 So. 129.

The phrase concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction.

State v. Sinnot, 35 A. 1007.

Concurrent jurisdiction is that jurisdiction exercised by different courts at the same time over the same subject matter, and within the same territory, and wherein litigants may, in the first instance resort to either court indifferently.

Hercules Iron Works v. Elgin J. & E. Co., 30 N.E. 1051.

The inferior courts established under section 172 of the constitution are, in their jurisdiction independent of the courts erected under section 171.

Hughes v. State, 29 So. 786.

It is a fundamental truth that no branch can delegate powers belonging to it, to the other department.

Alcorn v. Hamer, 28 Miss. 652.

Section 694 of the Code of 1930 conferred on the circuit court, a part of the judicial branch of our government, the sole power of saying whether or not the county court would ever try a felony case, not capital. No limitations were outlined on that discretion. If the circuit court does not see fit to transfer under this statute, the...

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  • Albritton v. City of Winona
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • February 7, 1938
    ... ... R. v. Thomas, Tax Collector, 33 L.Ed. 303; ... Jacobson v. Maas., 49 L.Ed. 643; Schechter v ... U.S. 79 L.Ed. 888, 97 A.L.R. 947; Ex parte Milligan, 4 ... Wall. 2, 18 L.Ed. 281; Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v ... Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398; Hill v. Woodward, 100 Miss ... 879, 57 So. 294 ... 588, 42 Am. Rep. 118; 44 C. J., page 1116, sec. 4043; 43 C ... J., page 176, secs. 173 and 179; 14 A.L.R. 1157; Miller ... v. Tucker, 105 So. 774; Clark v. Miller, 142 Miss. 123, ... 105 So. 502. [181 Miss. 84] ... W. E ... Gore, of Jackson, Amicus Curiae ... ...
  • Drummond v. State
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • December 12, 1938
    ...here unless it has been overruled expressly or by implication by a later case. Houston v. Royston, supra, and Ex Parte Tucker, 164 Miss. 20, 143 So. 700, are necessary to be considered in determining whether this has been done. The Constitution of 1832 contains a section which appears in ou......
  • Marshall v. State
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • September 28, 1995
    ...whether we apply Thomas or Houston, either case would sanction the legislative scheme creating the Court of Appeals. In Ex parte Tucker, 164 Miss. 20, 143 So. 700 (1932), the Court explained exactly why a legislatively created court is "inferior." Tucker filed a petition for writ of habeas ......
  • In Interest of T.L.C.
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • July 25, 1990
    ...given the chancery courts and the youth courts are in no way made "inferior" to the chancery courts. Cf. Ex Parte Tucker, 164 Miss. 20, 29, 143 So. 700, 701 (1932). Without doubt, our constitutional scheme contemplates the power of judicial review of legislative enactments, Alexander v. Sta......
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