Ex parte Watkins

• Decision Date: 07 June 2001
• Docket Number: 2-00-063-CR,Nos. 2-00-062-C,s. 2-00-062-C
• Citation: 52 S.W.3d 858
• Parties: (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001) EX PARTE JIMMY DEAN WATKINS
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 858

52 S.W.3d 858 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001)

EX PARTE JIMMY DEAN WATKINS

Nos. 2-00-062-CR, 2-00-063-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth

June 7, 2001.

FROM THE 213TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

PANEL B: DAY, LIVINGSTON, and GARDNER, JJ.

OPINION

DAY, JUSTICE

I. Introduction

This is an appeal following the trial court's denial of Appellant Jimmy Dean Watkins's request for habeas relief pending his trial for attempted capital murder or attempted murder. Appellant argues that a trial on attempted capital murder or attempted murder is precluded by collateral estoppel and double jeopardy due to his previous conviction for the murder of his wife. We reverse the trial court's order.

II. Background

On December 22, 1998, Appellant drove to his home and shot his estranged wife and her lover Keith Fontenot. His wife died, but Fontenot survived. A jury convicted Appellant of the intentional and knowing murder of his wife. However, during the sentencing phase of the trial, the jury found that the murder occurred in sudden passion and assessed punishment at ten years' community supervision.¹

After Appellant's murder trial, the State indicted Appellant for the attempted capital murder or attempted murder of Fontenot. Appellant filed a pretrial writ of habeas corpus alleging that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred relitigation of the issue of his mental state and that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred his prosecution for the attempted capital murder of Fontenot. See U.S. Const. amend. V. The trial court denied habeas relief.

III. Collateral Estoppel

In his first issue, Appellant contends that the State is barred by collateral estoppel from prosecuting him for attempted capital murder or attempted murder of Fontenot because the jury that convicted him of the murder of his wife already decided Appellant's state of mind at the time of the crime. The doctrine of collateral estoppel is derivative of the Double Jeopardy Clause and provides that if an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, the issue cannot be relitigated between the same parties in a subsequent lawsuit. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S. Ct. 1189, 1194 (1970); Sorola v. State, 769 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1005 (1989).

The jury in Appellant's murder trial decided that he intentionally and knowingly shot and killed his wife, but committed the crime in the heat of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause. Therefore, Appellant contends that because the jury determined that he had the mental state necessary only for second degree murder, the State is precluded from trying him for attempted capital murder or attempted first degree murder of Fontenot requiring a higher mental state. According to Appellant, in finding that he acted out of sudden passion, the jury determined his mental state at the time of the crime, and the State is collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue in a future trial. See, e.g., Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190-91, 78 S. Ct. 221, 225 (1957); De La Rosa v. Lynaugh, 817 F.2d 259, 268 (5th Cir. 1987); Green v. Estelle, 601 F.2d 877, 878-79 (5th Cir. 1979); Garcia v. Garza, 729 F. Supp. 553, 554-55 (S.D. Tex. 1989).

On the other hand, the State argues that a favorable finding on the issue of sudden passion in Appellant's first trial did not "acquit" him of acting intentionally or knowingly the requisite culpable mental state for capital murder or murder. It urges that this fact compounded with the fact that sudden passion "no longer constitutes a separate homicide" and is no longer a guilt/innocence issue, but is instead a matter of punishment, removes "the issue of whether 'sudden passion' is a less-culpable mental state." See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(d) (Vernon 1994). We agree.

First, we find no support, and Appellant cites us to none, for his argument that the capital murder statute "excludes second degree murder as applicable to a capital murder charge." See id. § 19.03(a). Secondly, the fact that the jury found Appellant acted with sudden passion in killing his wife does not negate the fact that he intentionally or knowingly killed his wife. "Sudden passion" is no longer a guilt/innocence issue; instead, it is a mitigating circumstance at the punishment phase for defendants found guilty of murder. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1407 (2001). Accordingly, we conclude that a finding of sudden passion in Appellant's first trial does not preclude his prosecution for the attempted capital murder or attempted murder of Fontenot.

We are, however, constrained to hold that the State is precluded from relitigating the issue of sudden passion during the punishment phase in the second trial if Appellant is found guilty of attempted murder or attempted capital murder of Fontenot. See Ex parte Mathes, 830 S.W.2d 596, 598-99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). The court of criminal appeals has held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel is applicable to the punishment phase in a criminal prosecution. Id. at 598. Thus, after the jury in Appellant's first trial determined that he acted in sudden passion, an ultimate issue on punishment, the State may not "hale" him before a new jury to relitigate that issue again. See Ashe, 397 U.S. at 446, 90 S. Ct. at 1195. To this extent, we sustain Appellant's first issue.

IV. Double Jeopardy

In his second issue, Appellant complains that the State is barred by double jeopardy from indicting him for the attempted capital murder of Fontenot. Specifically, Appellant argues that because he has already been convicted and punished for the murder of his wife, the State cannot use that offense "as an essential element" of attempted capital murder. We disagree.

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that no person shall be subjected to twice having life or limb in jeopardy for the same offense. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This clause protects against: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 695-96, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2855-56 (1993); Ex parte Herron, 790 S.W.2d 623, 624 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on reh'g).

In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180 (1932), the Supreme Court established the test for determining whether a "second" statutorily defined offense is the "same" for purposes of double jeopardy. The Supreme Court held, "[t]he applicable rule is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a...