Exel Transp. Services v. Sigma Vita, Inc.

• Citation: 288 Ga. App. 527,654 S.E.2d 665
• Decision Date: 21 November 2007
• Docket Number: No. A07A1516.,A07A1516.
• Parties: EXEL TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, INC. v. SIGMA VITA, INC.
• Court: United States Court of Appeals (Georgia)

654 S.E.2d 665

288 Ga. App. 527

EXEL TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, INC. v. SIGMA VITA, INC.

No. A07A1516.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

November 21, 2007.

Hall, Booth, Smith & Slover, Mark A. Barber, W. Scott Henwood, Atlanta, Annette Felice Simelaro, Marietta, for appellant.

Hall & Kirkland, Joseph M. Hall, DuAnn C. Davis, Reidsville, for appellee.

BERNES, Judge.

In this suit to recover on an open account, Sigma Vita, Inc., a motor carrier, sued Exel Transportation Services, Inc., a shipment broker. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted Sigma's motion and denied Exel's. Exel contends that the trial court's rulings were erroneous because Sigma's claim was barred by the expiration of the 18-month statute of limitation set forth in 49 U.S.C. § 14705(a). We agree and reverse.

34;[T]he statute of limitation goes to the merits of a recovery and is a proper issue for disposition by motion for summary judgment." (Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Dept. of Human Resources v. Nation, 265 Ga.App. 434, 439(3), 594 S.E.2d 383 (2004). "Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Footnote omitted.) Hamburger v. PFM Capital Mgmt., 286 Ga.App. 382, 649 S.E.2d 779 (2007). See also OCGA § 9-11-56(c). On appeal, we review the trial court's summary judgment decision de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Hamburger, 286 Ga. App. at 382, 649 S.E.2d 779.

So viewed, the evidence shows that from June 80, 2004 to October 14, 2004, Sigma provided transportation services for a shipment that originated in Shanghai, China; arrived in the United States at a port in Savannah, Georgia; and was delivered, as intended, to final destinations in Stone Mountain, Georgia, Tampa, Florida, and Blythwood, South Carolina. The total amount due for Sigma's services was $35,181.60. On April 19, 2006, after Exel allegedly failed to pay the invoiced amounts, Sigma filed the instant action.

Exel filed a motion for summary judgment contending that Sigma's claim was barred by the expiration of the 18-month statute of limitation established by 49 U.S.C. § 14705(a). Sigma filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, contending that the action presented state law claims that had been filed prior to the expiration of the relevant statute of limitation. Sigma argued that the action was governed by the statute of limitation provisions of OCGA § 9-3-25 which require that actions on an open account be brought within four years after the cause of action accrues, and OCGA § 46-9-5, which require that actions by common carriers for charges accruing in connection with intrastate shipments be initiated within three years after the cause of action accrues. The trial court decided in favor of Sigma as to both motions. In reaching its decision, the trial court erroneously relied upon 49 U.S.C. § 14706, a statute we find inapposite, as will be explained more fully below.

a. The Interstate Commerce Act ("ICA") provides federal jurisdiction "over transportation by motor carrier and the procurement of that transportation ... between a place in ... a State and a place in another State" or "the United States and a place in a foreign country to the extent the transportation is in the United States." 49 U.S.C. § 13501(1)(A), (E). 49 U.S.C. § 14705(a) specifically sets forth the statute of limitation for actions brought by motor carriers subject to its jurisdiction. It provides: "A carrier providing transportation or service subject to jurisdiction under chapter 135 [49 U.S.C. §§ 13501 et seq.] must begin a civil action to recover charges for transportation or service provided by the carrier within 18 months after the claim accrues." The claim accrues upon delivery or tender of delivery by the carrier. 49 U.S.C. § 14705(g).

It is undisputed that Sigma is a motor carrier that brought this action to recover for its transportation charges. It is further undisputed that Sigma's services transporting the shipment from the Savannah port to the Florida and South Carolina destinations constituted interstate transportation covered by the ICA under 49 U.S.C. § 13501(1)(A). Sigma argues, however, that the majority of its services constituted intrastate transportation from the Savannah port to the Stone Mountain destination and since those shipments did not cross the Georgia border, they were not covered by the ICA. We disagree. In determining whether shipments constitute interstate or foreign commerce,

the critical inquiry is not whether the domestic leg of the shipment crossed a state border but rather it is whether the domestic leg of the shipment was intended to be part of a larger shipment originating in a foreign country. If it is part of such a larger shipment, then it is a shipment "between a place in ... the United States and a place in a foreign country to the extent the transportation is in the United States."

(Citation omitted.) Swift Textiles v. Watkins Motor Lines, 799 F.2d 697, 701 (11th Cir. 1986). See also Taylor v. Central of Ga. R. Co., 31 Ga.App. 374, 377, 121 S.E. 348 (1923) ("Even though the bill of lading may call for a shipment from one point to another in the same [s]tate, it may be shown that an interstate or foreign movement was contemplated or reasonably to be anticipated by the parties, and thus that the shipment was in fact interstate. This is the true test.") (Citations omitted).

Here, the undisputed evidence establishes that the shipments were part of a larger foreign shipment from China with intended final destinations of Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina. The arrival of the goods at the Savannah port was "but a mere link in the chain of foreign commerce that continue[d] until the goods ... arrived at their intended destination[s]." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Swift Textiles, 799 F.2d at 700. As such, all of the shipments in this case constituted a continuation of foreign commerce by a motor carrier, to which the ICA applies. See id.; 49 U.S.C. § 13501(1)(E).

Having concluded that the ICA applies in this case, we turn to the more specific question of whether the statute of limitation set forth in 49 U.S.C. § 14705(a) applies. We conclude that it does. Sigma is a motor carrier that has filed "a civil action to recover charges for transportation or service [that it] provided," which is a circumstance governed by 49 U.S.C. § 14705(a). Sigma seeks to recover its transportation charges for services provided from June 30, 2004 to October 14, 2004. The instant action was not filed until April 19, 2006 — five days beyond the federal prescribed 18-month limitation period. Sigma's suit, therefore, is time barred and Exel's motion for summary judgment based upon this affirmative defense should have been granted. See generally Emmert Indus. Corp. v. Artisan Assoc., 497 F.3d 982, 986-990 (9th Cir.2007) (carrier's suit seeking recovery for transportation charges against a transportation broker was barred by 18-month statute of limitation of 49 U.S.C. § 14705(a)).

49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1), upon which the trial court relied, applies only to "the liability of a carrier" for "actual loss or injury to ... property." (Emphasis supplied.) Indeed, the statute is entitled "Liability of carriers under receipts and bills of lading." Accordingly, 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1) may only be applied in actions brought against a carrier.¹ In contrast, 49 U.S.C. § 14705(a) applies to claims, like those of Sigma in this case, which are brought by a carrier to recover for transportation charges. Thus, the trial court erred in applying 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1) to this case.

Sigma nonetheless contends that 49 U.S.C. § 14705 does not preempt its state law causes of action for breach of contract or suit on an open account and, therefore, the state limitation periods apply.² Again, we disagree. The federal statute of limitation of "[49 U.S.C.] § 14705(a) necessarily preempts any state law providing for a longer limitations period." Emmert Indus. Corp., 497 F.3d at 989-990.³ See also J.F. Barton Contracting Co. v. Southern R. Co., 191 Ga.App. 13, 380 S.E.2d 724 (1989) (holding that former 49 U.S.C. § 11706 (1993), predecessor to 49 U.S.C. § 14705(a), preempted Georgia renewal statute). Moreover, "nothing in the text or context of § 14705(a) indicates that the eighteen-month limitations period is restricted to ... claims arising under federal law." Emmert Indus. Corp., 497 F.3d at 988. See also CGH Transport v. Quebecor World, Case No. 05-209-JBC, 2006 WL 1117659, at *2 (E.D.Ky. April 24, 2006) ("That [a party's] claims are not preempted by federal law does not preclude the defendants from relying on federal law to provide an affirmative defense."). Accordingly, Sigma's state law claims for breach of contract and recovery on an open account are nonetheless subject to the federal statute of limitation affirmative defense. See Emmert Indus. Corp., 497 F.3d at 988-990; Barber Auto Sales v. United Parcel Svcs., 494 F.Supp.2d 1290, 1294-1295(C)(1) (N.D.Ala. 2007); CGH Transport, 2006 WL 1117659 at *2; Arctic Express v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, 366 B.R. 786, 790-793(IV)(A) (S.D.Ohio 2007).⁴

Finally, we find no merit in Sigma's further contention that 49 U.S.C. § 14705(a) does not apply since Exel is a broker, not a shipper. The statutory provisions of 49 U.S.C. § 14705(a) do not limit recovery for transportation charges against any particular type of defendant. See 49 U.S.C. § 14705(a). The parties do not urge that 49 U.S.C. § 14705(a) is ambiguous, and "[a] court cannot by construction add to, take from, or vary the meaning of unambiguous words in a statute." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) City of Atlanta v. Clayton County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 271 Ga.App. 84, 86(1), 608 S.E.2d 710 (2004). As such, we do not read into the statute the additional limitation that Sigma seeks to impose. See generally Emmert Indus....