Exxon Corp. v. Choo

• Decision Date: 08 June 1994
• Docket Number: No. D-1693,D-1693
• Citation: 881 S.W.2d 301
• Parties: EXXON CORPORATION et al., Petitioners, v. Chick Kam CHOO et al., Respondents.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 301

881 S.W.2d 301

1995 A.M.C. 1792

EXXON CORPORATION et al., Petitioners, v. Chick Kam CHOO et al., Respondents.

No. D-1693.

Supreme Court of Texas.

June 8, 1994.

Rehearing Overruled Sept. 8, 1994.

James Patrick Cooney and Craig V. Depew, Houston, for petitioners.

John M. O'Quinn, Gary M. Riebschlager, and Kendall C. Montgomery, Houston, for respondents.

ON APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE FOURTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

Justice HIGHTOWER delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all Justices join.

We grant Respondents' motion for rehearing, withdraw our prior opinions and judgment, and substitute the following in its place.

Leong Chong, a Singapore resident employed in Singapore, was killed while working on board a berthed tanker. Chong's widow, Chick Kam Choo, ¹ sued Exxon Corporation and others in Texas state district court. Exxon Corporation and Esso Tankers, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss based upon the federal maritime law doctrine of forum non conveniens. ² The trial court granted the motion to dismiss "because the state law of Texas is preempted by federal maritime law and this case should be dismissed on the basis of forum non conveniens." The court of appeals reversed and remanded. 821 S.W.2d 190. We hold that the federal maritime doctrine of forum non conveniens does not preempt the application of Texas "forum non conveniens law." For the reasons explained herein, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

I.

In 1977, Leong Chong was killed while working on board a tanker berthed in the Singapore harbor. The tanker was owned by Esso Tankers, Inc., a Liberian corporation. Under a vessel management agreement, the maintenance of the tanker was the responsibility of Exxon International Co., an unincorporated division of Exxon Corporation, a Delaware corporation headquartered in Houston, Texas (hereinafter collectively "Exxon"). In 1978, Chong's widow, Chick Kam Choo, also a Singapore resident, sued Exxon in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas ("federal district court"). She asserted claims under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.App. § 688, the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 46 U.S.C.App. §§ 761-67, the general maritime law of the United States, and the Texas wrongful death and survival statutes. In 1980, the federal district court granted Exxon's motion for summary judgment, holding that the Jones Act, DOHSA and the general maritime law of the United States were inapplicable and the Texas wrongful death and survival claims were dismissed on the basis of forum non conveniens.

Subsequently in January 1984, Mrs. Choo filed suit in Texas in state district court in Harris County, asserting substantially the same claims that she brought in federal district court. Subsequently, however, Mrs. Choo voluntarily dismissed her federal law claims and the federal district court prohibited Mrs. Choo from prosecuting her claims under the Texas wrongful death and survival statutes, ³ leaving only her claim under the substantive law of Singapore. In April 1990, Exxon moved for summary judgment, arguing that federal maritime law preempted Texas "forum non conveniens law" in this case and that the application of the federal maritime forum non conveniens doctrine warranted dismissal of the case. The trial court granted Exxon's motion and dismissed the case. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that "the trial court erred in dismissing [Mrs.] Choo's Singapore law claim on the basis of federal forum non conveniens and its conclusion that the 'open courts' provision in state law is preempted by federal maritime law." 821 S.W.2d at 192.

II.

Exxon argues that the federal maritime doctrine of forum non conveniens preempts the application of Texas "forum non conveniens law." ⁴ We disagree. ⁵

Texas recognizes that substantive federal maritime law has preemptive force over state law. Mandell & Wright v. Thomas, 441 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Tex.1969) (Jones Act and DOHSA preempt Texas wrongful death statute); Texaco Refining & Marketing, Inc. v. Estate of Dau Van Tran, 808 S.W.2d 61, 64 (Tex.1991) (federal maritime law preempts state remedies). It is uncertain in Texas, however, whether federal maritime forum non conveniens has similar preemptive effect. See Couch v. Chevron Int'l Oil Co., 672 S.W.2d 16 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] ), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 682 S.W.2d 534, 535 (Tex.1984).

On February 23, 1994, the United States Supreme Court, in American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 114 S.Ct. 981, 127 L.Ed.2d 285 (1994), determined that in admiralty cases filed in a state court under the Jones Act and the "saving to suitors clause," federal law does not preempt state law regarding the doctrine of forum non conveniens. ⁶ The Court stated:

In exercising in personam jurisdiction ... [as opposed to in rem jurisdiction] a state court may " 'adopt such remedies, and ... attach to them such incidents, as it sees fit' so long as it does not attempt to make changes in the 'substantive maritime law.' " Madruga v. Superior Court of California, 346 U.S. 556, 561 [74 S.Ct. 298, 301, 98 L.Ed. 290] (1954) (quoting Red Cross Line [v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109], supra, at 124 [44 S.Ct. 274, at 277, 68 L.Ed. 582 (1924) ] ). That proviso is violated when the state remedy "works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations." Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 [37 S.Ct. 524, 529, 61 L.Ed. 1086] (1917). The issue before us here is whether the doctrine of forum non conveniens is either a "characteristic feature" of admiralty or a doctrine whose uniform application is necessary to maintain the "proper harmony" of maritime law. We think it is neither.

Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 983 (footnote omitted).

In determining that forum non conveniens is not a characteristic feature of general maritime law, the Court explained:

Although the origins of the doctrine [of forum non conveniens ] in Anglo-American law are murky, most authorities agree that forum non conveniens had its earliest expression not in admiralty but in Scottish estate cases.

* * * * * *

Even within the United States alone, there is no basis for regarding forum non conveniens as a doctrine that originated in admiralty. To be sure, within federal courts it may have been given its earliest and most frequent expression in admiralty cases.... But the doctrine's application has not been unique to admiralty.... Our most recent opinion dealing with forum non conveniens, Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 [102 S.Ct. 252, 70 L.Ed.2d 419] (1981), recognized that the doctrine "originated in Scotland, and became part of the common law of many States," id., at 248, n. 13 (citation omitted), and treated the forum no conveniens analysis of Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413 [52 S.Ct. 413, 76 L.Ed. 837] (1932), an admiralty case, as binding precedent in the nonadmiralty context.

In sum, the doctrine of forum non conveniens neither originated in admiralty nor has exclusive application there. To the contrary, it is and has long been a doctrine of general application.

Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 987. ⁷ Consequently, the Court held that "Louisiana's refusal to apply forum non conveniens does not, therefore, work 'material prejudice to [a] characteristic featur[e] of the general maritime law.' " Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 983 (quoting Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216, 37 S.Ct. at 529). Because forum non conveniens is not a "characteristic feature" of general maritime law, the application of Texas "forum non conveniens law" would not prejudice a characteristic feature of general maritime law.

In concluding that the uniform application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens is not necessary to maintain the "proper harmony" of maritime law, the Court stated:

The discretionary nature of the doctrine [of forum non conveniens], combined with the multifariousness of the factors relevant to its application, see the quotation from Gilbert [Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 [67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055] (1947) (describing the factors of private and public interest which are considered in the federal forum non conveniens analysis) ], supra, at 4-5, make uniformity and predictability of outcome almost impossible. "The forum non conveniens determination," we have said, "is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. It may be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion; where the court has considered all relevant public and private interest factors, and where its balancing of these factors is reasonable, its decision deserves substantial deference." Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S., at 257 . We have emphasized that " '[e]ach case turns on its facts' " and have repeatedly rejected the use of per se rules in applying the doctrine. Id., at 249 .

Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 989. ⁸ The Court explained that "[w]herever the boundaries of permissible state regulation may lie [in relation to the needs of uniformity in federal maritime law], they do not invalidate state rejection of forum non conveniens, which is in two respects quite dissimilar from any other matter that our opinions have held to be governed by federal admiralty law: it is procedural rather than substantive, ⁹ and it is most unlikely to produce uniform results." Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 988 (footnote added). Consequently, the application of Texas "forum non conveniens" law would not disrupt the proper harmony and uniformity of maritime law.

III.

We are also mindful that the federal maritime doctrine of forum non conveniens implicates international accommodation and comity. The impact on international and interstate maritime commerce is an important consideration when determining whether the essential features of...