Faline v. Guido & Francis DeAscanis & Sons

Decision Date13 June 1963
Citation56 Del. 202,192 A.2d 921,6 Storey 202
Parties, 56 Del. 202 Albert J. FALINE, Claimant, Appellant, v. GUIDO AND FRANCIS DeASCANIS & SONS, Employer, Appellee.
CourtSupreme Court of Delaware

Appeal from the Superior Court in and for New Castle County.

James J. Walsh, Wilmington, for appellant.

William Prickett, Jr., Wilmington, for appellee.

TERRY, C. J., and WOLCOTT and CAREY, JJ., sitting.

WOLCOTT, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court reversing an award of the Industrial Accident Board to Faline by reason of a heart attack. The reversal by the Superior Court was upon the ground that there was no substantial evidence of a causal connection between Faline's work and his heart attack which fell within the category of an idiopathic disease unrelated to injury by accident.

We state the facts briefly.

Faline was employed as a carpenter. Gradually his responsibilities were increased until by 1958 he was employed not solely as a carpenter but, also, as foreman in charge of particular construction jobs. He was then called upon, on occasion, to deal with complaints by the owner and to authorize changes in the work.

In the summer of 1958 Faline's employer undertook to construct a house for DiMondi. This particular job was a difficult one from its inception due to the changing demands of the DiMondis. The resulting bickering and arguments put Faline under an emotional stress. In addition, as an economy, the house was being constructed with undressed used lumber which was of greater weight than the type ordinarily used, and required a greater than ordinary amount of dressing by the carpenter. It was difficult to work with.

On the day on which he suffered the heart attack for which he claims compensation, Faline was engaged in installing the framing for a lower ceiling in the kitchen of the DiMondi house. This was a change insisted upon by the DiMondis which had angered Faline. In the course of performing this work, Faline was required to mount and get down from scaffolding laid across trestles. He did this frequently.

While upon the scaffolding and while using a bar to draw out previously driven nails, he felt a severe pain in his chest, nausea and shortness of breath. His condition was such that he could not continue work. He went home and was hospitalized that night where his condition was diagnosed as a myocardial infarction. He has been unable to resume his former employment since his attack. For about a week prior to this attack Faline on occasion had been experiencing pain in his chest.

Faline, about two years prior to the heart attack for which he seeks compensation, had experienced chest pains. His family doctor to whom he described the pains considered them symptomatic of angina pectoris, and prescribed nitroglycerin tablets to relieve them. In addition, at various times Faline had been treated by his family doctor for nerves and a stomach ulcer.

At the hearing Faline called as witnesses his family doctor and a cardiac specialist who had been called into the case as consultant. These doctors gave the only medical testimony in the case.

We think the doctors are in fundamental agreement. They agree that Faline suffered from coronary disease which culminated in the myocardial infarction suffered by him on October 25, 1958. Coronary disease is the hardening of the coronary arteries with the consequent result that ultimately the flow of blood through one or more of the blood vessels will cease. When that occurs a heart attack takes place with resulting damage to the heart, itself. This, the doctors agreed, is what happened to Faline.

Both doctors agreed that Faline, irrespective of his physical exertions, as a result of the coronary disease from which he suffered would have had a heart attack within a short period of time. Faline's heart attack, in their opinion, was inevitable at or about the time it actually happened.

The only point of disagreement between the doctors, if indeed there was any real disagreement, was as to whether or not Faline's work was a precipitating factor of the heart attack. The cardiac specialist testified flatly that it was not, while the general practitioner testified that unusual physical exertion could be a possible triggering factor of a heart attack which was bound to occur within a short space of time by reason of the patient's coronary disease. However, there was no testimony whatsoever that any specific physical act of Faline was the trigger which set off his heart attack.

We have this case on appeal from the Superior Court sitting in review of the award of the Industrial Accident Board. We therefore are limited to a review of the record made before the Board, and to an inquiry as to whether or not there is evidence in the record to sustain the findings of the Board. If there is such evidence we are bound to affirm the award. Belber Trunk & Bag Co. v. Menesy, 8 Terry 595, 96 A.2d 341.

19 Del.C. § 2304, requires every covered employer to pay and every covered employee to accept 'compensation for personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.' Injury for which compensation must be paid and accepted is defined by 19 Del.C. § 2301, as follows:

"Injury' and 'Personal injury' mean violence to the physical structure of the body, such disease or infection as...

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21 cases
  • Duvall v. Charles Connell Roofing
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Delaware
    • April 26, 1988
    ...This stems from the Court's narrow interpretation of the term "accident" under 19 Del.C. § 2304. Thus, in Faline v. Guido and Francis DeAscanis & Sons, 56 Del. 202, 192 A.2d 921 (1963), compensation was denied to a heart attack victim because his injury was due in part to a pre-existing cor......
  • Reynolds v. Continental Can Co.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Delaware
    • February 14, 1968
    ...within the meaning of 19 Del.C. § 2304. * * *.' The Superior Court concluded that the case is ruled by Faline v. Guido and Francis De-Ascanis & Sons, Del., 192 A.2d 921 (1963). From the reversal by the Superior Court of the Board's award, the widow appeals to this We are committed to the un......
  • Air Mod Corp. v. Newton
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Delaware
    • November 29, 1965
    ...Workmen's Compensation Act may not be construed so as to be transformed into a health insurance statute. Faline v. Guido and Francis DeAscanis & Sons, Del., 192 A.2d 921 (1963). The same admonition has been raised regarding federal compensation acts. E. g., Grain Handling Co., Inc. v. Sween......
  • Milowicki v. Post & Paddock, Inc.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Delaware
    • November 19, 1969
    ...ordinary and usual exertion of the employee is bending down to pick up the envelopes. We think not. In Faline v. Guido and Francis DeAscanis & Sons, Del.Sup., 192 A.2d 921 (1963), this Court held that unusual exertion was required for compensability in a heart case in which a pre-existing h......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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