Faller v. Two Bridges Reg'l Jail

• Decision Date: 29 July 2022
• Docket Number: 2:21-cv-00063-GZS
• Parties: CANDACE FALLER, Plaintiff, v. TWO BRIDGES REGIONAL JAIL, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

CANDACE FALLER, Plaintiff,
v.
TWO BRIDGES REGIONAL JAIL, Defendant.

No. 2:21-cv-00063-GZS

United States District Court, D. Maine

July 29, 2022

ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

GEORGE Z. SINGAL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant Two Bridges Regional Jail (ECF No. 36). Having considered the Motion and the related filings (ECF Nos. 2631, 33-34, 37 & 40-44), the Court DENIES the Motion (ECF No. 36) for the reasons stated herein.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Generally, a party is entitled to summary judgment if, on the record before the Court, it appears “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A dispute is ‘genuine' if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving party, and a fact is ‘material' if it has the potential of affecting the outcome of the case.” Taite v. Bridgewater State Univ., Bd. of Trs., 999 F.3d 86, 93 (1st Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

Once the moving party has made this preliminary showing, the nonmoving party must “produce specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form, to establish the presence of a trialworthy

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issue.” Triangle Trading Co. v. Robroy Indus., Inc., 200 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1999) (cleaned up); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). “That evidence, however, cannot ‘rely on improbable inferences, conclusory allegations, or rank speculation.'” Snell v. Neville, 998 F.3d 474, 486 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Enica v. Principi, 544 F.3d 328, 336 (1st Cir. 2008) (cleaned up)). “As to any essential factual element of its claim on which the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial, its failure to come forward with sufficient evidence to generate a trialworthy issue warrants summary judgment for the moving party.” In re Ralar Distribs., Inc., 4 F.3d 62, 67 (1st Cir. 1993). “However, summary judgment is improper when the record is sufficiently open-ended to permit a rational factfinder to resolve a material factual dispute in favor of either side.” Morales-Melecio v. United States (Dep't of Health and Hum. Servs.), 890 F.3d 361, 368 (1st Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). “When determining if a genuine dispute of material fact exists, [courts] look to all of the record materials on file, including the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits without evaluating the credibility of witnesses or weighing the evidence.” Taite, 999 F.3d at 93 (cleaned up).

District of Maine Local Rule 56 prescribes a detailed process by which the parties are to place before the Court the “material facts . . . as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue.” D. Me. Loc. R. 56(b). This local rule further requires each statement of material fact to be “followed by a citation to the specific page or paragraph of identified record material supporting the assertion.” D. Me. Loc. R. 56(f). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must then file an opposing statement in which it admits, denies, or qualifies the moving party's statements, with citations to supporting evidence, and in which it may set forth additional facts, again with citations to supporting evidence. D. Me. Loc. R. 56(c). Ultimately, in constructing the narrative of undisputed facts for purposes of summary judgment, the Court “may disregard any statement of fact not supported by a specific citation to record material properly considered on

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summary judgment.” D. Me. Loc. R. 56(f). In accordance with these standards, the Court recounts the relevant facts in the following section.

II. BACKGROUND^[1]

On April 28, 2016, at approximately 8:00 AM, Plaintiff Candace Faller^[2] was pulled over by a Wiscasset police officer who witnessed her driving erratically. (See Joint Statement of Material Facts (ECF No. 26) (“JSMF”), PageID #s 99 & 104.) After failing to pass field sobriety tests, Faller was placed in handcuffs and taken to Two Bridges Regional Jail (“TBRJ”), a correctional facility operated by the Sagadahoc Multicounty Jail Authority (“SMJA”). (See id.) She was charged with operating under the influence.

A. Pat Searches at Two Bridges Regional Jail

At the time of Faller's admission in April 2016, TBRJ policy required each new admittee to undergo a pat search of her person, which required the admittee to stand with her hands against the wall and her feet shoulder width apart. (See id., PageID #s 100 & 104; Joint Ex. 6 (ECF No. 27-6), PageID #s 145 & 146.) The pat search ensured that the admittee did not retain any item that might pose a threat to the admittee herself or to others present in the facility, including staff, and was typically performed by an officer of the same sex as the admittee. (Rubashkin Aff. (ECF No. 37-1), PageID #s 874-75; Bonang Dep. (ECF No. 29), PageID #s 341-42; JSMF, PageID # 100.) A pat search of each new admittee was a prerequisite to the individual being left alone in any area of the jail. (Rubashkin Aff., PageID # 874; Bonang Dep., PageID # 352.)

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Ordinarily, TBRJ officers would begin the booking process, commencing with a pat search, when the arresting officer completed her required paperwork. (Rubashkin Dep. (ECF No. 30), PageID # 489; see Joint Ex. 6, PageID #s 145 & 146.) In some unspecified circumstances, an admittee would be permitted to wait with the arresting officer until the officer assigned to conduct the pat search was available. (See Bonang Dep., PageID #s 435-36; Pl. Statement of Material Facts (ECF No. 41) (“Pl. SMF”), PageID # 920; Def. Reply Statement of Material Facts (ECF No. 44) (“Def. Reply SMF”), PageID # 1037.)

Under TBRJ policy then in force, both cooperative and uncooperative admittees would generally undergo the required pat search in the sallyport adjacent to the intoxilyzer room. (Joint Ex. 6, PageID #s 145 & 146; Pl. SMF, PageID # 907.) Then, uncooperative admittees would sometimes be escorted to a secure holding cell. (Bonang Dep., PageID # 340; Pl. SMF, PageID # 915.) TBRJ policy also allowed for uncooperative inmates to be searched in a location other than the sallyport, including a secure holding cell. (See Bonang Dep., PageID # 340; Rubashkin Dep., PageID # 499.) A cooperative inmate could proceed through the booking process without being touched by an officer of the opposite sex. (Rubashkin Dep., PageID # 552; Bonang Dep., PageID # 378.)

B. Candace Faller's April 2016 Experience at Two Bridges Regional Jail

The officer who arrested Faller and brought her to TBRJ in April 2016 was female. (Faller Dep. (ECF No. 28), PageID # 231; Pl. SMF, PageID # 916; Def. Reply SMF, PageID # 1033.) Upon arrival at TBRJ, the arresting officer took Faller to the facility's intoxilyzer room prior to beginning the booking process. (Faller Dep., PageID # 236.) While in the intoxilyzer room, Faller informed TBRJ Officer Paul Rubashkin that she “suffered from posttraumatic stress from a rape” and that she “[could] not handle an aggressive man touching” her. (Id., PageID #s 238-39; see

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JSMF, PageID # 100.) Officer Rubashkin considered a person with posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) to be disabled, just as he would consider a person in a wheelchair to be disabled. (Rubashkin Dep., PageID # 508.) Officer Rubashkin asked the arresting officer whether she would like him to remove Faller from the intoxilyzer room. (Rubashkin Dep., PageID # 489; Def. Statement of Material Facts (“Def. SMF,” ECF No. 37), PagelD # 867; Pl. SMF, PagelD #s 90708.)

Officer Rubashkin instructed Faller to enter the sallyport with him to begin the booking process. (Faller Dep., PageID # 246.) Faller refused. (Id.) At that point, Officer Rubashkin grabbed her by the arm and escorted her from the intoxilyzer room into the sallyport. (Id., PageID #s 246-47; JSMF, PageID # 100; Rubashkin Dep., PageID # 511.) This was the first time Officer Rubashkin touched Faller. (Faller Dep., PageID # 254; JSMF, PageID # 101.) Two additional male officers accompanied Faller and Officer Rubashkin into the sallyport. (Video Ex. 1, 00:36; JSMF, PageID # 101.) In the sallyport, Faller yelled that she suffered from PTSD and preferred not to be touched by men, and struggled against Officer Rubashkin's grip. (Faller Dep., PageID # 253; Video Ex. 1, 00:34-00:37; Pl. SMF, PageID # 908; Rubashkin Dep., PageID # 512.) Officer Rubashkin decided to take her directly to the secure holding cell for a pat search “due to her level of cooperation.” (Rubashkin Dep., PageID # 501.) Officer Rubashkin could have instead elected to wait in the sallyport^[3] for a female officer to complete the pat search, but followed normal TBRJ practice in proceeding directly to a secure holding cell. (See id., PageID # 508; Def. SMF, PageID # 869; Pl. SMF, PageID # 910.) For approximately 25 seconds, Officer Rubashkin held

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Faller against a padded wall, with her arms restrained behind her back. (Video Ex. 1, 00:38-1:03; JSMF, PageID # 101.)

While holding Faller's arms behind her back,^[4] Officer Rubashkin, still accompanied by the other two officers, walked Faller to a secure holding cell. (Video Ex. 2, 00:09-00:14; Video Ex. 3, 00:11-00:20.) A fourth male officer joined Officer Rubashkin and his two fellow officers as they entered the holding cell with Faller. (Video Ex. 4, 01:17.) Officer Rubashkin then positioned Faller to face a padded mattress adjacent to a wall. (Id., 01:18-01:21.) As Officer Rubashkin released his grasp on Faller's arms, she spun around, pointed her finger at Officer Rubashkin's face, and told him not to touch her. (Faller Dep., PageID # 260; JSMF, PageID # 102.) Faller moved backward, away from Officer Rubashkin, and flailed her arms. (Video Ex. 4, 01:21-01:25.) Officer Rubashkin pushed Faller to a seated position on the...