Farmer v. Administrative Director of Court

• Decision Date: 18 October 2000
• Docket Number: No. 22849.,22849.
• Citation: 11 P.3d 457,94 Haw. 232
• Parties: Robert D. FARMER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR OF the COURT, STATE OF HAWAI`I, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

11 P.3d 457

94 Haw. 232

Robert D. FARMER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR OF the COURT, STATE OF HAWAI`I, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 22849.

Supreme Court of Hawaii.

October 18, 2000.

Jonathan E. Burge, Craig T. Kimsel, and R. Patrick McPherson, Honolulu, (of Jonathan Burge & Associates), on the briefs, for petitioner-appellant.

Wayne A. Matsuura, Deputy Attorney General, for respondent-appellee.

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, RAMIL, and ACOBA, JJ.

Opinion of the Court by MOON, C.J.

Arrestee¹-petitioner-appellant Robert D. Farmer appeals from the judgment and order of the district court affirming the revocation of his driver's license by the Administrative Driver's License Revocation Office (ADLRO) pursuant to the License Revocation Act, HRS ch. 286, part XIV (1993 & Supp.1999). In accordance with HRS § 286-261 (1993 & Supp.1999),² ADLRO sustained the automatic administrative revocation of Farmer's driver's license for life. The lifetime revocation was predicated upon three prior convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) within the past ten years. Farmer filed a petition for judicial review in the district court, and, on August 18, 1999, the district court affirmed the administrative revocation. On appeal, Farmer argues that the district court erred in affirming the lifetime revocation of his license because (1) ADLRO had abused its discretion by denying Farmer's motion for continuance where Farmer presented evidence that a motion to set aside his guilty plea challenging the validity of one of his prior DUI convictions was pending in the district court and (2) he had submitted evidence that one of his prior convictions was set aside subsequent to ADLRO's decision, and, thus, the evidence no longer supported his lifetime revocation.

For the reasons set forth below, we vacate the judgment affirming Farmer's lifetime revocation and remand this case to the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

Following Farmer's April 16, 1999 arrest for DUI, in violation of HRS § 291-4 (1993 & Supp.1999),³ the administrative director of the courts (the Director) automatically revoked Farmer's license for life pursuant to HRS § 286-261(b)(4). Farmer requested an administrative hearing to review the automatic revocation. On May 26, 1999, less than two hours before the administrative hearing took place, Farmer filed a motion in the district court to set aside a 1989 DUI conviction on the grounds that the conviction was based on an unconstitutionally accepted guilty plea. At the ADLRO hearing, Farmer requested a continuance of the proceedings until the district court ruled on Farmer's motion to set aside his 1989 conviction. Farmer argued that the continuance should be granted because: (1) if Farmer succeeded in setting aside his 1989 conviction, he would be subject to a shorter period of revocation; (2) Farmer would be unable to drive beyond the current term of his temporary license, regardless of when the district court issued a ruling, insofar as a continuance would not extend Farmer's temporary driving permit; and (3) the State would suffer no prejudice by awaiting a ruling on the pending motion. ADLRO denied the continuance.

On June 1, 1999, ADLRO entered its decision sustaining Farmer's lifetime revocation, which included the following finding of fact:

7. The Arrestee's prior driving record in the State of Hawaii shows three prior alcohol enforcement contacts, as defined by HRS § 286-251 [ (1993 & Supp.1999)⁴ ], from the State of Hawaii traffic violator database, TRAVIS, in the ten years preceding the date of this arrest, April 16, 1999. The three contacts are HRS § 291-4 DUI driver's license suspensions.

In a footnote, ADLRO suggested that Farmer's revocation period could be adjusted if one of his convictions was set aside:

Counsel believes that the first prior alcohol enforcement contact of 07-28-1989 will be set aside by the District Court. If that happens then the Arrestee will have two prior alcohol enforcement contacts within seven years of the date of the current arrest and the appropriate period of revocation would be two years. The instant period of revocation is based on the record (with three prior alcohol enforcement contacts) as it stands at the Hearing, see Van Gundy v. ADC, JR 98-0050, decided 10-19-1998, amended 11-23-1998.⁵

(Emphasis added.)

On June 15, 1999, Farmer's motion to set aside his 1989 guilty plea was granted, and, on that same day, Farmer filed a petition for judicial review of the ADLRO decision in the district court. ADLRO received notice of the district court's order setting aside the guilty plea from Farmer's counsel on June 17, 1999, but refused to amend the lifetime revocation, citing strict compliance with HRS § 286-261 because Farmer's DUI record contained three prior DUI convictions at the time of the revocation. ADLRO also claimed divesture of jurisdiction following Farmer's appeal.

On appeal to the district court, Farmer argued that (1) ADLRO abused its discretion in denying his request for a continuance because (a) the request was based on "good cause" and (b) the denial of a continuance deprived Farmer of due process; and (2) the lifetime revocation order must be reversed or amended because one of Farmer's prior convictions was set aside.⁶ The district court affirmed ADLRO's revocation order on August 18, 1999. Farmer timely appealed.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Administrative Agency Decision

Judicial review of a decision of the Director regarding the revocation of a driver's license is governed by HRS § 286-260, and is limited to the record of the administrative hearing and the questions whether the Director exceeded constitutional or statutory authority, erroneously interpreted the law, acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner, committed an abuse of discretion, or made a determination that was unsupported by the evidence in the record. Kernan v. Tanaka, 75 Haw. 1, 20, 856 P.2d 1207, 1217 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1119, 114 S.Ct. 1070, 127 L.Ed.2d 389 (1994).

"Review of a decision made by [a] court upon its review of an [administrative] decision is a secondary appeal. The standard of review is one in which this court must determine whether the court [under review] was right or wrong in its decision[.]" University of Hawai`i Professional Assembly v. Tomasu, 79 Hawaii 154, 157, 900 P.2d 161, 164 (1995) (citations and quotation signals omitted).

Gray v. Administrative Director of the Court, 84 Hawaii 138, 144, 931 P.2d 580, 586, (1997) (footnote omitted).

B. Statutory Interpretation

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. Konno v. County of Hawai`i, 85 Hawai`i 61, 71, 937 P.2d 397, 407 (1997).

Moreover, where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, our only duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning. When construing a statute, our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself. And we must read statutory language in the context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose.

When there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an ambiguity exists. Put differently, a statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed people in two or more different senses.

In construing an ambiguous statute, the meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by examining the context, with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning. Moreover, the courts may resort to extrinsic aids in determining the legislative intent. One avenue is the use of legislative history as an interpretive tool.

Id. (citing State v. Toyomura, 80 Hawaii 8, 18-19, 904 P.2d 893, 903-04 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

C. Constitutional Law

"We answer questions of constitutional law by exercising our own independent judgment based on the facts of the case. Thus, we review questions of constitutional law under the right/wrong standard." Gardens at West Maui Vacation Club v. County of Maui, 90 Hawaii 334, 339, 978 P.2d 772, 777 (1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Denial of Continuance

Farmer contends that the district court erred in affirming his lifetime revocation because: (1) ADLRO had abused its discretion by denying Farmer's request for a continuance pending the district court's ruling on his challenge to a prior DUI conviction; and (2) ADLRO's denial of his request for a continuance deprived Farmer of his constitutional right to due process. The Director argues that ADLRO properly exercised its discretion in denying Farmer's motion for continuance because Farmer failed to show good cause and did not timely file his motion to set aside his prior conviction. This court has recognized that an ADLRO hearing officer has discretionary authority to grant or deny a continuance of a driver's license revocation hearing. Norton v. Administrative Director of the Court, 80 Hawai`i 197, 201, 908 P.2d 545, 549 (1995). Generally, to constitute an abuse of discretion, a tribunal must have clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant. Id. (citing Amfac, Inc. v. Waikiki Beachcomber Inv. Co., 74 Haw. 85, 114, 839 P.2d 10, 26 (1992)).

HRS § 286-259(j) (Supp.1999) provides that, "[f]or good cause shown, [ADLRO] may grant a continuance[.]" As a general rule, "good cause" is defined as "a substantial reason amounting in law to a legal excuse for failing to perform an act required by law." Robison v. Administrative Director of the Court, 93 Hawaii 337, 342, 3 P.3d 503, 508 (App.2000) (quoting Miller v. Tanaka, 80 Hawaii 358, 363, 910 P.2d 129, 134 (App.1995), ...