Farmer v. Batts

• Decision Date: 30 June 1880
• Citation: 83 N.C. 387
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: W. D. FARMER v. JERE BATTS and others.

83 N.C. 387

W. D. FARMER

v.JERE BATTS and others.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June Term, 1880.

CIVIL ACTION for specific performance of a contract tried at March Special Term, 1880, of WILSON Superior Court, before Avery, J.

The plaintiff submitted to a nonsuit and appealed. The facts are stated in the opinion of this court.

Mr. George V. Strong, for plaintiff .

Messrs. Connor & Woodard, for defendants .

SMITH, C. J.

The plaintiff seeks to enforce against the defendants, as assignees with notice of his equity, the specific performance of an executory contract entered into by William Dixon in the words following:

“Received of W. D. Farmer fourteen hundred dollars in full payment of one tract of land containing one hundred and ninety-three acres, more or less, it being the interest in two shares, adjoining the lands of James Barnes, Eli Robbins and others. This 25th day of January 1864.

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                ¦(Signed)¦WM. DIXON.” ¦
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On the trial of the issues and with a view to locate and identify the land described, the plaintiff proposed to show that a tract of land, adjoining the lands of James Barnes, Eli Robbins and others was known as one in which William Dixon claimed two shares, and there was only one tract answering to this description and estimated to contain one hundred and ninety-three acres. The evidence, being objected to, was excluded on the ground that the words of description in the contract were too indefinite to authorize the introduction of testimony for the purpose of identification. In deference to this ruling the plaintiff submitted to a non-suit and appealed.

Many cases have been before the court where it has been necessary to decide upon the sufficiency of a description contained in a written instrument to admit of extrinsic evidence to locate the land, a brief reference to which may aid us in determining the validity of the present instrument. The following words of description have been held too indefinite to admit the specific enforcement of the contract or to allow the operation of a deed of conveyance:

“One house and lot in the town of Hillsboro.” Murdock v. Anderson, 4 Jones Eq., 77. “A certain tract of land lying on Flat river, including Taylor Lewis' spring house and lot, &c., and adjoining the lands of Lewis Daniel, Womack and others.” Allen v. Chambers, 4 Ired. Eq., 125. “A tract of land lying on the north side of the Watery branch in the county of Johnston and state of North Carolina, containing one hundred and fifty acres.” Capps v. Holt, 5 Jones Eq., 153. “A certain piece of land in the county and state aforesaid, adjoining the lands of S. J. Suggs and M. H. Rhyne and others, supposed to contain thirty or thirty-five acres.” Grier v. Rhyne, 69 N. C., 346. “One tract of land lying and being in the county aforesaid, adjoining the lands of John J. Phelps and Norfleet Pender, containing twenty acres, more or less.” Dickens v. Barnes, 79 N. C., 490. “The defendant's lots at Nahunta depot.” Edmundson v. Hooks, 11 Ired., 373. “Also seven hundred and fifty-two acres of land including the land I now live on and adjoining the same,” held to be inoperative except as to that whereon he resided. Robeson v. Lewis, 64 N. C., 734.

The following have been deemed sufficient: “Three tracts of land, the House place, the Lynn place and the Leonard place, containing four hundred acres, more or less.” Smith v. Low, 2 Ired., 457. “Levied on the land of Noah Blanchard joining the lands of J. H. Blackmore, Reuben Blanchard and others.” Blanchard v. Blanchard, 3 Ired., 105. “Levied on land supposed to be upwards of one hundred acres where Richard Heath lives on.” Morrisey v. Love, 4 Ired., 38. “Levied on the lands and tenements of Isham Doby adjoining the lands of Allen Newsom, Clairborn Newsom, and others.” Ward v. Saunders, 6 Ired., 382. “My house and lot in the town of Jefferson in Ashe county North Carolina,” the grantor having but one such in the place. Carson v. Ray, 7 Jones, 609.

Looking to adjudications in other states we find the following descriptions of the subject matter of the contract, with the aid of extrinsic evidence, to have been held sufficient: An agreement to “furnish water out of the mill dam sufficient to carry the fulling-mill and carding machine at all times except in drought in summer and the usual times of freezing in winter, and at all times to have such a share as is sufficient to carry one wheel when either of the wheels of the grist mill and saw mill are running,” was supported in Fish v. Hubbard, 21 Wend., 651. Delivering the opinion COWEN, J., remarks: “If it were in proof that the donor or grantor owned one mill dam, one carding machine and one fulling-mill and no other property of that description at the date of his will or deed, ought we to hesitate in saying that he intended to pass such property? or should we say that possibly he intended some property of his neighbor or neighbors answering a similar description.” So a receipt of “fifty dollars in part payment of a house and lot of land situated in Amity street, Lynn, Mass; the full amount is seventeen hundred dollars;” the defendant being shown to own no other real estate on that street, except the lot, was declared to be binding and a specific performance enforced in Hurley v. Brown, 98 Mass., 545, and the court say: “The presumption is strong that a description which actually corresponds with an estate owned by the contracting party is intended to apply to that particular estate although couched in such general terms as to agree equally well with another estate which he does not own.” In the subsequent case of Mead v. Parker, 115 Mass., 413,...