Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. Hanks

• Court: Texas Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Ramsey
• Citation: Farmers' & Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. Hanks, 137 S.W. 1120, 104 Tex. 320 (Tex. 1911)
• Decision Date: 31 May 1911
• Parties: FARMERS' & MECHANICS' NAT. BANK v. HANKS et al.

137 S.W. 1120

FARMERS' & MECHANICS' NAT. BANK v. HANKS et al.

Supreme Court of Texas.

May 31, 1911.

Error to Court of Civil Appeals of Sixth Supreme Judicial District.

Action by W. T. Hanks and another against the Farmers' & Mechanics' National Bank. There was a judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals (128 S. W. 147) affirming a judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant brings error. Reversed and rendered.

Lassiter & Harrison and Harris & Harris, for plaintiff in error. Carlock & McLean, B. D. Shropshire, and Capps, Cantey, Hanger & Short, for defendants in error.

RAMSEY, J.

The facts out of which this litigation arose are thus stated by the Court of Civil Appeals for the Sixth Supreme Judicial District:

"Between 10 and 11 o'clock of the morning of October 15, 1906, while S. B. Hanks, aged about 22 years and son of appellees Hanks, was engaged in the work of plastering in the elevator shaft, he was killed by the descending elevator car being operated by appellant's employé in charge and control thereof. The appellant was the owner of a six-story office building in the city of Ft. Worth, known as the `Hoxie Building,' and tenanted by a great many different people. Appellant constructed and owned and operated a passenger elevator therein to carry persons vertically from one story in the building to another, which was used for the transportation of passengers generally. All persons having business had the right and did commonly use the same. The building is one of the most public places in the city, and the elevator was used by hundreds of people daily. It was proved that it was advantageous to the owners of the building in renting the building, as it would not be possible to rent the upper stories advantageously without the use of an elevator. The elevator car was about 6 by 6 feet square and between 10 and 12 feet high, and accommodated several people, and weighed about a ton. The elevator car is run by electricity, and works inside a shaft about 6 by 6 feet square, extending from the lower floor of the building upward to the top floor of the building. The movement of the elevator car is controlled by means of a handle that comes out of the top of the controller box; and by turning it one way the car ascends, and by turning it another way the car descends. For the purpose of running the car, the appellant placed Willie Page in charge and control thereof, and he was charged with the duties of running and operating the elevator car, and had sole charge and control for such purposes from 7 o'clock in the morning until 7 o'clock in the evening except during the noon hour of the day, when the elevator was under the control of the electrician of the building. No other person but Page ran and operated the car during the day except at the noon hour. Appellant had entered into a written contract with John Bardon to make certain repairs on the building, and he had a subcontract with Kuhlman covering the plastering to be done. A part of the plastering in the elevator shaft had fallen out, and Kuhlman employed deceased to replaster the place where it had fallen out, and at the time of the injury in suit deceased was at the work of replastering in the shaft. In order to do this work, it was necessary for deceased to lean his body over inside the elevator shaft, and this would place him in the path and way of the elevator car if descending. The place where the work was to be done was about a foot below the line of the floor, and the work could have been finished in about 15 minutes by stopping the running of the elevator so as to be uninterrupted. The elevator car was not stopped from running, but continued to be operated at and during the time the work was being done by deceased. The appellant's servant in charge of the elevator and operating same testified that he knew that deceased was working in the shaft on the second floor, and, `before going to work there that day, Mr. Hanks either asked me to or I told him that I would—I cannot say which—but I agreed to call out to him as I went up and came down. I cannot state whether he asked me to or whether I told him I would. The purpose of my calling out to him was to let him know that I was near him in time to give him time to get out of the way. I just called out to him to let him know that I was coming.' Hanks, the deceased, in doing the work of plastering, was lying on his stomach, and had to reach over with one arm down in the shaft, and that threw his head and part of his shoulders inside the shaft. The employé operating the elevator testified: `After I made this arrangement with Mr. Hanks, by which I was to call out to him, I think I passed him about 12 times carrying passengers up and down, and on each of these occasions I called out to him in plenty of time for him to get out of the way. I knew he was working in there, and that, if I did not give him the signal and notify him, he was liable to be hurt.' He further testifies: `I am not sure where I had started from just before the accident occurred, but I think I left the top floor and came down without a stop. When I left the top floor, I had some passengers in the car; four if I am not mistaken. I did not give to Mr. Hanks any notification that I was coming down on the last trip that I made. I knew at the time that he was at work underneath the car. I don't know how it was that I came not to notify him.' He testified positively both on direct and cross-examination that, before descending with the elevator just before the injury to deceased, he gave no warning to deceased that he was about to descend with the elevator. That no warning was given by the operator of the elevator before deceased was struck is testified to by two of the passengers in the elevator at the time. The speed of the elevator is shown to be 325 feet a minute, and `it was running fast when it struck Mr. Hanks.' The elevator car struck deceased while it was descending, and caught his body between the floor of the building and the floor of the car, killing him.

"By the petition appellees claim that appellant desired to operate the elevator while the work of plastering was progressing, and Page, the operator, clothed with authority of appellant to do whatever was necessary in the operation of the elevator car, agreed and promised deceased that while he was performing the work of plastering the elevator shaft warning would be given deceased by Page before starting the elevator car either up or down the shaft, so as to give deceased an opportunity to withdraw from danger, and also to handle the elevator at a slow rate of speed and keep the same under perfect control so as to avoid injury to him while he was engaged in the work of plastering, and that this employé negligently failed to give him this warning, and thereby caused his death. The appellant answered by general denial, contributory negligence, and assumed risk. It also by cross-action against John Bardon upon contract to be responsible as an independent contractor for damages for injury incident to his work sought judgment for like amount awarded against it in favor of appellees. Bardon answered by denial, and specially a want of contractual liability. Judgment was entered in favor of appellees Hanks against appellant, and in favor of Bardon against the cross-action of appellant, in accordance with the verdict of a jury.

"All the issues of fact were decided by the jury against the contention of appellant, and they are supported by the evidence. We conclude that appellant, through its employé, was guilty of negligence as pleaded, proximately causing the death of deceased, and that deceased was not guilty of contributory negligence, and that appellees are not precluded from recovery on assumed risk by deceased, and that the amount recovered is sustained by the evidence."

There are a number of interesting questions for review, but it will, under our construction of our statute, as applied to the facts, be unnecessary to notice or discuss but one question. That question is, Is a private owner of a building liable for damages where death ensues caused by the negligence of its servant in the operation of a passenger elevator? If not, then under no view that can be taken of the case could a recovery be sustained. A decision of this question involves a construction of article 3017 of our Revised Statutes of 1895. That article, so far as it can affect this case, is as follows: "An action for actual damages on account of injuries causing the death of any person may be brought in the following cases: (1) Where the death of any person is caused by the negligence or carelessness of the proprietor, owner, charterer, hirer of any railroad, steamboat, stagecoach, or other vehicle for the conveyance of goods or passengers." So much of the statute as we have quoted above was enacted in this state in 1860, and in the later acts has been brought forward substantially unchanged.

In order to obtain a correct interpretation of this act, it may be well to recur to former holdings of this court, as well as to the just and settled rules of construction, which must and should guide us. It was long ago settled in this state that the right to recover, when death ensued, did not exist, in this character of case, at common law (Hendrick v. Walton, 69 Tex. 192, 6 S. W. 749), and that the right to recover in such case is wholly statutory (Nelson v. G., H. & S. A. Ry. Co., 78 Tex. 624, 14 S. W. 1021, 11 L. R. A. 391, 22 Am. St. Rep. 81; Yoakum v. Selph, 83 Tex. 607, 19 S. W. 145). In the case of G., H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Le Gierse, 51 Tex. 189, it was said: "The right to such an action in our courts being, then, given by express enactments, parties who seek to avail themselves of their benefits must be governed by their provisions." It has, too, been quite...