Farnsworth v. Cote

• Decision Date: 01 February 1962
• Citation: 199 Cal.App.2d 762,19 Cal.Rptr. 45
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Roy Ransom FARNSWORTH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ida M. COTE, Nellie Lynn, as Individuals, Donald W. Dyer, Raymond L. Cohee, Clifford M. Lamont, Charles F. Workman, Robert S. Carabine, Ernest S. Bieri, Michael C. Hill, Winston A. Haynes, and James R. Higgins, as Police Officers, Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 25349.

Page 45

19 Cal.Rptr. 45

199 Cal.App.2d 762

Roy Ransom FARNSWORTH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ida M. COTE, Nellie Lynn, as Individuals, Donald W. Dyer, Raymond L. Cohee, Clifford M. Lamont, Charles F. Workman, Robert S. Carabine, Ernest S. Bieri, Michael C. Hill, Winston A. Haynes, and James R. Higgins, as Police Officers, Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 25349.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

Feb. 1, 1962.

Roy Ransom Farnsworth, appellant, in pro. per.

Ramsey & Emlein, Long Beach, for respondent Ida M. Cote.

Madden & McCarry, Long Beach, for respondent Nellie Lynn.

Gerald Desmond, City Atty. and Leonard Putnam, Deputy City Atty., Long Beach, for respondents Raymond L. Cohee, Charles F. Workman, Robert S. Carabine, Ernest S. Bieri, Michael C. Hill and James R. Higgins.

Reed, Callaway, Kirtland & Packard, and Wallace C. Reed, Los Angeles, for respondents Donald W. Dyer, Clifford M. Lamont and Winston A. Haynes.

JEFFERSON, Justice.

This is an appeal by plaintiff from a judgment in favor of defendants in an action brought by plaintiff for trespass, false arrest, false imprisonment, 'kidnapping', malicious prosecution and conspiracy to commit such torts.

Evidence introduced at the trial disclosed the following facts: For several years appellant Roy Ransom Farnsworth and respondent Ida M. Cote were adjoining neighbors in Long Beach, California. Shortly after 9:00 p. m. on December 20, 1956, as respondent Cote was on her porch about to enter her home, she looked across the porch into an open window with a partially raised venetian blind at the side of appellant's house and saw him seated beneath a light masturbating his erect penis. Miss Cote went across the street to the home of a friend, respondent Nellie Lynn, and asked her to go to Miss Cote's porch to witness appellant's actions while she stayed at Mrs. Lynn's home. Mrs. Lynn ran across the street to Miss Cote's porch and viewed Mr. Farnsworth as previously described. As she was returning home she met a neighbor, Mr. Davis, deceased at the time of the trial, and asked him to go to Miss Cote's porch. He went to the porch and thereafter accompanied Mrs. Lynn to her home from where he telephoned the police.

Respondents Raymond L. Cohee and Clifford M. Lamont, Long Beach police officers who were on duty in a police patrol car, received a radio dispatch concerning an indecent exposure. Upon arriving at the given address they were met by Mr. Davis who told the officers that he, Miss Cote and Mrs. Lynn, had seen the appellant exposing and playing with himself.

The officers then went to Miss Cote's porch where they observed Mr. Farnsworth masturbating. Officer Lamont then went from Miss Cote's porch to Mr. Farnsworth's property from where he made a closer observation. He saw Mr. Farnsworth sitting in his living room facing the west window of the house and the window and porch of Miss Cote. He was wearing a tee-shirt and a bath robe. A small table lamp was lighted and titled to throw all the light on Mr. Farnsworth. Mr. Farnsworth was masturbating at the time. Officer Cohee proceeded to the front door and knocked. Officer Lamont, who remained on Miss Cote's porch, observed Mr. Farnsworth who rose, straightened the lampshade and lowered the venetian blinds through which he had been viewed. He went to the front door and talked to the officers who accused him of committing a crime. The officers stated that appellant first denied exposing himself or of committing any crime; that appellant then stated that his wife was too tired, because of her work, to give him sexual gratification; that he had done this only once before and that if the officers would give him a break he would never do it again. They did not then arrest him because they had not completed their investigation. The officers told appellant that they would check with the witnesses and that appellant should hold himself in readiness for their return, for thereupon they would probably effect an arrest.

The officers then returned to Mrs. Lynn's house where they talked to Mrs. Lynn, Miss Cote and Mr. Davis and took down their statements. The officers were told that Miss Cote had seen appellant exposing himself on a former occasion. After completing their investigation they sought advice from respondent Sergeant Workman who had arrived at the scene. He advised them the arrest would be legal. $The officers then contacted Mrs. Farnsworth, who was about to enter her home, and asked her to tell her husband they would like to talk to him. They accompanied her into the house and waited while she awakened her husband. They instructed him to dress and come with them. Mr. Farnsworth was arrested without a warrant approximately forty-five minutes after he was first interviewed. He was taken to the police station where he was booked and incarcerated until approximately 10:30 a. m. the following day. Respondent police officers Carabine, Bieri, Hill and Higgins were charged with detaining prisoners at the jail during this time.

The following morning a typed copy of the police report of officers Cohee and Lamont came to the desk of respondents Donald W. Dyer in his capacity as head of the felony morals detail. He presented the report to a deputy city prosecutor of the City of Long Beach who issued a criminal complaint charging appellant with violations of sections 311, subd. 1 and 647, subd. (5) of the Penal Code, for indecent exposure and being a lewd and dissolute person. Officer Dyer signed this complaint.

Appellant was subsequently arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. At the trial the jury was unable to agree upon a verdict, and the court declared a mistrial. After the matter was set for retrial the complaint was dismissed in the interests of justice on the motion of the deputy city prosecutor.

Appellant Farnsworth then brought a civil action against the respondents herein. This appeal involves questions arising from the trial of issues joined under the fifth amended complaint as modified by the pretrial order. Appellant's first cause of action was against respondents Cote, Lynn (neighbors), Cohee and Lamont (arresting officers) for trespass. His second and third causes of action were for false imprisonment and 'kidnapping' against all respondents excepting officer Dyer (booking officer). His fourth cause of action for malicious prosecution was against all respondents.

At the commencement of the non-jury trial the judge dismissed the action against respondents Workman, Carabine, Hill, Bieri, Haynes and Higgins. The trial concluded in a judgment being rendered for the remaining defendants and appellant appeals with his principal contentions being in effect:

1. The evidence is insufficient to support the judgment in fact and in law;

2. Actions against certain respondents were erroneously dismissed.

With respect to appellant's first contention that the evidence is insufficient to support the findings of fact and the judgment, the power of the appellate court is limited to a determination as to whether there is substantial evidence which will support the conclusion reached by the trier of fact. The word 'substantial' implies that the evidence must be of ponderable legal significance, reasonable in nature, credible, and rationally related to the essentials which the law requires in a particular case. (Estate of Teed, 112 Cal.App.2d 638, 644, 247 P.2d 54.) If there is substantial evidence supporting respondents, after resolving all conflicts in their favor, and indulging in all reasonable and legitimate inferences to uphold the findings, this court is bound by the decision of the trial court. (Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co., 3 Cal.2d 427, 429, 45 P.2d 183; Ogulin v. Jeffries, 121 Cal.App.2d 211, 214, 263 P.2d 75.)

Viewing the evidence favorably to respondent (McCarthy v. Tally, 46 Cal.2d 577, at 581, 297 P.2d 981), the court holds it to be substantial and clearly sufficient to support the findings and the judgment.

A peace officer may arrest with out a warrant for a misdemeanor committed or attempted in his presence. (Pen.Code, § 836; Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal.2d 315, 320, 239 P.2d 876.) A reasonable person confronted by the scene which the officers viewed from Miss Cote's porch could have an honest and strong suspicion of appellant's guilt of a violation of Penal Code, § 311, subdivision 1, which states: 'Every person who wilfully and lewdly, either * * * (1) exposes his person or the private parts thereof, in any public place, or in any place where there are * * * persons to be offended or annoyed thereby * * * is guilty of a misdemeanor.' (Italics added.) Mr. Farnsworth's protestations that he was merely rubbing ointment on an inflamed prostate, if believed, are nevertheless consistent with the officer's justifiable belief that appellant was violating Penal Code, § 311, subdivision 1.

Despite conflicting evidence the court apparently believed the arresting officers who testified the arrest occurred approximately forty-five minutes after they arrived at the scene. The evidence shows that during the time between the interview and the arrest and before transacting...