Farragut v. City of Tampa

• Decision Date: 26 June 1945
• Parties: FARRAGUT v. CITY OF TAMPA.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

22 So.2d 645

156 Fla. 107

FARRAGUT v. CITY OF TAMPA.

Florida Supreme Court

June 26, 1945

Charles C. Corces, of Tampa, for petitioner.

Karl E Whitaker and Forrest O. Hobbs, both of Tampa, for respondent.

BROWN, Justice.

This case is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review and quash the judgment of affirmance by the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County of the judgment of conviction of the petitioner by the municipal court of the City of Tampa for the violation of a City ordinance. Evidence procured pursuant to a search warrant which had been issued by the Judge of the municipal court of Tampa was admitted in evidence on the trial in the municipal court over defendant's objection. The affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself appear to be in due form. The point upon which the petitioner here relies, as shown by her petition and upon which petitioner, as defendant below, mainly relied on her appeal to the Circuit Court was and is that the municipal court, acting through its Judge had no legal authority to issue a search warrant. Incidentaly we might mention that, contrary to petitioner's contention in the trial court, the Circuit Court found that the record nowhere showed that the premises had been occupied or used as a dwelling house; that on the contrary it was referred to in the bill of exceptions as a rooming house and that the record further shows that it was described as a building at a certain street address 'used for the purposed of prostitution,' etc. Aside from that, as above stated, the question raised on this petition for certiorari is the authority of the municipal court of Tampa to issue a search warrant in aid of a prosecution for the violation of a municipal ordinance.

The real question here simmers down to this: May the Legislature of Florida authorize a municipal court, or the Judge of such Court acting as such Judge, to issue search warrants in aid of the enforcement of municipal ordinances, where such search warrant and the affidavit upon which it was based are otherwise legally sufficient?

Petitioner for certiorari relies upon the rather recent case of State ex rel. Wilson v. Quigg, 154 Fla. 348, 17 So.2d 697, but in that case we were dealing with a search warrant issued by a Circuit Judge and made returnable before the Judge of the Municipal Court of Miami, upon whom the Legislature had not attempted to confer the authority to issue a search warrant. In the opinion in that case it was stated, perhaps too broadly, that a Judge of a Municipal Court is wothout authority to issue a search warrant; citing Hart v. State, 89 Fla. 202, 103 So. 633. But in the Quigg case and also in the Hart case no showing was made, or indeed could have been made, that the Legislature had ever conferred the authority or power upon the municipal courts and judges involved in those cases to issue search warrants. In the absence of such legislative action, the general rule is that the Judge of a Municipal Court has no authority to issue a search warrant. It was also held in State v. Quigg, supra, that the violation of a city ordinance is not tantamount to a violation of the 'laws of the State.' At the time this writer wrote that opinion he had no knowledge that the Legislature of Florida had ever attempted to confer authority to issue search warrants upon a Municipal Court or Judge.

But in this case it appears that in 1923 our Legislature passed a statute, Chapter 9922, Special Acts of 1923, entitled:

'An Act to Authorize and Empower the Judge of the Municipal Court of Tampa to Issue Search Warrants in Aid of the Enforcement of Ordinances of Said City to be Executed within the Limits of Said City; to Regulate their Issuance, Service and Return.'

This Act is quite full and complete, apparently carefully drawn. The only question is, on this record, the power of the Legislature to adopt such a statute.

We are all familiar with the legal doctrine that the Legislature can pass any act which legislative wisdom dictates so long as such act is not in conflict, either expressly or impliedly, with any provision of our State or Federal Constitutions.

This Act is not in conflict with Section 22 of the Declaration of Rights contained in our Constitution which reads as follows:

'§ 22. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches, shall not be violated and no warrants issued, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place or places to be searched and the person or persons, and thing or things to be seized.'

Nor was the passage of this special act in conflict with Section 20 of Article III of our Constitution, which Section prohibits the passage of special or local laws in certain enumerated cases, 'that is to say, regulating the jurisdiction and duties of any class of officers, except municipal officers, or for the punishment of crime or misdemeanor; regulating the practice of courts of justice, except municipal courts;' etc. So, this section of the Constitution permits the Legislature to pass special or local laws regulating the jurisdiction and duties of municipal officers, and also regulating the practice of municipal courts; thus reinforcing the broad general powers which Section 8 of Article VIII of our Constitution gives to the Legislature with reference to the governments of municipalities.

And Section 34 of Article V of the Constitution ...