Farrell v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 27 July 1978
• Docket Number: No. 51825,51825
• Citation: 361 So.2d 408
• Parties: Edmond J. FARRELL, III, Petitioner, v. AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and American Mutual Liability Company and Industrial Relations Commission, Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 408

361 So.2d 408

Edmond J. FARRELL, III, Petitioner, v. AMICA MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and American Mutual Liability Company and Industrial Relations Commission, Respondents.

No. 51825.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 27, 1978.

Julian L. Miller of Miller & Anderson, St. Petersburg, for petitioner.

No appearance, for respondents.

SUNDBERG, Justice.

We are here presented with the question whether the Industrial Relations Commission has the authority to vacate an otherwise final order of the Commission entered some five months before, where the motion for relief from the original order is made approximately four months from the date the order became final. We hold that the Commission has no such authority. Jurisdiction vests in this Court pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, and Section 440.27, Florida Statutes (1975).

The cause arrives at this Court via a rather tortuous and extraordinary route. Hearing on petitioner's claim for compensation was held before the Judge of Industrial Claims on April 2, 1976. On April 20, 1976, the Judge of Industrial Claims directed a letter to counsel for the employer/carrier requesting that counsel submit a proposed draft for the Judge's consideration wherein he would recite certain findings and deny compensability on the claim. The only response to the letter of direction from the Judge of Industrial Claims appearing in the record is a letter from the attorney for the employer/carrier dated July 30, 1976, wherein that counsel advised that he had not been able to draft a proposed order due to the press of other business. After five months without any other response and in preparation for drafting the necessary order without the aid of counsel, the Judge of Industrial Claims reviewed, in detail, the materials which composed the record of the cause. Upon that review the Judge concluded that the claim was compensable and, accordingly, entered an order on November 18, 1976, awarding benefits to the claimant.

The record reflects that counsel for the employer/carrier under date of December 7, 1976, mailed to the Industrial Relations Commission in Tallahassee, Florida, an original and two copies of an Application for Review. The Application for Review was not received by the Industrial Relations Commission in Tallahassee, Florida, until December 10, 1976, a date beyond the time period prescribed by Section 440.25(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1975). Consequently, by order entered December 15, 1976, the Application for Review was dismissed by the Industrial Relations Commission. It should be noted that a carbon copy of the transmittal letter to the Industrial Relations Commission dated December 7, 1976, together with a copy of the Application for Review, was directed to the office of the Judge of Industrial Claims. On a date prior to May 11, 1977, counsel for the employer/carrier ascertained that, in fact, the copy of the Application for Review directed to the office of the Judge of Industrial Claims had been received by that office on December 8, 1976, which constituted a timely and appropriate filing under Section 440.25(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1975). Thereupon counsel for the employer/carrier filed with the Industrial Relations Commission on May 13, 1977, a motion for relief from the Commission's order of December 15, 1976, alleging the timely filing of Application for Review with the office of the Judge of Industrial Claims and asserting that the error, inadvertence and oversight had not been discovered until immediately prior to the filing of the motion for relief. After its search of the record which confirmed the timely filing with the office of the Judge of Industrial Claims, the Industrial Relations Commission on May 25, 1977, entered its order vacating the order of December 15, 1976.

Petitioner has timely filed a petition for certiorari in this Court to review the action taken by the Industrial Relations Commission in its order of May 25, 1977. We have had the benefit of neither a brief nor oral argument from counsel for the employer/carrier. However, counsel for the claimant/petitioner has both briefed and orally argued the cause in this Court.

The Industrial Relations Commission derives its very existence and authority from the legislature. Sections 440.25 and 440.45, Florida Statutes (1975). The Industrial Relations Commission is an administrative body possessing quasi-judicial power but it is not a court. Article V, Section 1, Florida Constitution. However, the Commission possesses certain procedural authority pursuant to Rules of Practice and Procedure adopted by this Court. See In re Florida Workmen's Compensation Rules of Procedure, 343 So.2d 1273 (Fla.1977).

We have carefully scrutinized Chapter 440, Florida Statutes (1975), as well as Workmen's Compensation Rules of Procedure, and find no authority in the Commission by statute or rule to vacate an order rendered by it which has become final. An order of the Commission becomes final upon expiration of thirty days from its rendition unless an interested party files a petition for writ of certiorari in this Court in accordance with Section 440.27, Florida Statutes (1975). Section 440.25(4)(e), Florida Statutes (1975); Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.110(b).

It is suggested that the Industrial Relations Commission is vested with inherent authority to correct...