Farrell v. City of Minneapolis
| Decision Date | 08 May 2006 |
| Docket Number | File No. 27-CV-03-3297. |
| Parties | Stephen D. Farrell, d/b/a Farrell Properties, Plaintiff, v. City of Minneapolis, Defendant. |
| Court | Minnesota District Court |
Gary K. Wood, Esq., appeared for the plaintiff.
Timothy S. Skarda, Esq., Assistant City Attorney, appeared for the defendant.
This matter came before the Court on remand from the Minnesota Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled that the district court erred in determining that it did not have jurisdiction to decide plaintiff Stephen Farrell's ("Farrell") declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of Minneapolis Code of Ordinances ("M.C.O.") Section 244.2020 (2001). Farrell v. City of Minneapolis, 2004 WL 885692 at *3 (Minn. App. 2004) (Apr. 27, 2004). The Court of Appeals also ruled that Farrell could not challenge in district court the decision of the Rental Dwelling License Board of Appeals ("Board") and the Minneapolis City Council to revoke his rental dwelling license. Id. Such a "quasi-judicial decision" could only be challenged through a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals. Id. Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Farrell's damages claim is not separate and distinct from the decision to revoke his license, and therefore the district court lacks jurisdiction to decide the issue of damages. Id. at *2.
Farrell alleges five causes of action. First, Farrell alleges that M.C.O. § 244.2020 is unconstitutional as written, being overbroad and containing vague and ambiguous language ("First Cause of Action"). Specifically, Farrell challenges the language which imposes upon an owner of a licensed rental dwelling the responsibility to take "appropriate action" following disorderly conduct by tenants and/or their guests on the licensed premises. Second, Farrell alleges that M.C.O. § 244.2020 is unconstitutional in violation of procedural due process, because the licensee is not allowed to challenge the facts of the underlying incident until after the decision to revoke the rental dwelling license has been determined ("Second Cause of Action"). Third, Farrell alleges that the City of Minneapolis ("City") acted arbitrarily and capriciously in enforcing M.C.O. § 244.2020 and revoking his rental dwelling license ("Third Cause of Action"). Fourth, Farrell alleges unequal enforcement of rental licensing ordinances against him, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Article 4, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution ("Fourth Cause of Action"). Fifth, Farrell alleges a regulatory taking without compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment ("Fifth Cause of Action").
Pursuant to the Court of Appeals decision discussed above, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Farrell's Third, Fourth,2 and Fifth3 Causes of Action, because they challenge the quasi-judicial actions taken by the Board which led to the revocation of Farrell's rental license. Therefore, this Court will only consider Farrell's First and Second Causes of Action, which challenge the constitutionality of M.C.O. § 244.2020.
The constitutionality of an ordinance is a question of law.4 State v. Botsford, 630 N.W.2d 11, 15 (Minn. App. 2001). Ordinances, like statutes, are presumed to be valid, and should not be found unconstitutional unless they are clearly invalid or are shown to violate the constitution. State v. Ellis, 441 N.W.2d 134, 136-37 (Minn. App. 1989) (citation omitted). The burden lies on the challenging party to prove an ordinance's invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 137.
A statute is facially overbroad if, while prohibiting certain activity, it prohibits activity that is constitutionally protected. State v. Machholz, 574 N.W.2d 415, 419 (Minn. 1998) (citations omitted). Since it has the potential to void an entire statute, the overbreadth doctrine should be applied only if the statute is substantially overbroad and is not subject to a limiting construction—in short, only as a last resort. Id. The overbreadth doctrine is usually applied in the First Amendment Context. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-15 (1973).
An ordinance is void for vagueness if it fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited, or if it fails to provide adequate enforcement standards. In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct Against N.P., 361 N.W.2d 386, 394 (Minn. 1985); see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) ().5 An ordinance may use broad, flexible standards requiring the exercise of judgment. State v. Enyeart, 676 N.W.2d 311, 319 (Minn. App. 2004) (citation omitted). An ordinance is only invalid "when those subject to it cannot determine with reasonable certainty whether a particular act is forbidden or permitted." Id. In fact, "[u]nless the statute proscribes no comprehensible course of conduct at all, it will be upheld." State v. Becker, 351 N.W.2d 923, 925 (Minn. 1984) (citation omitted).
Farrell challenges the following language in M.C.O. § 244.2020, "Conduct on licensed premises":
It shall be the responsibility of the licensee to take appropriate action, with the assistance if the community crime prevention/SAFE unit and other units of the Minneapolis Police Department, following conduct by tenants and/or their guests on the licensed premises which is determined to be disorderly, in violation of any of the following statutes or ordinances, to prevent further violations.
M.C.O. § 244.2020(a) (2001). M.C.O. § 244.1800 defines appropriate action as "action which a reasonable license holder would take based upon the facts and circumstances of each case so as to prevent a reoccurrence of a disorderly use."
Farrell alleges that the definition of "appropriate action" imposes an absolute duty of prevention upon the license holder, which no person is able to fulfill. Plaintiff's Brief in Lieu of Final Argument ("Plaintiff's Brief"), Feb. 28, 2006, at 5-7.6 Farrell claims that the ordinance fails to set a standard for what constitutes "appropriate action" to avoid license revocation. Id. at 7. He points out that regardless of any action taken by a license holder, three qualifying incidents of disorderly conduct on the licensed premises are grounds for a revocation. Id. at 6 (quoting Assistant City Attorney Joe Fussy). Therefore, Farrell concludes that the ordinance is overbroad, vague, and ambiguous, leading to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Id. at 6-7.
The Court of Appeals addressed Farrell's claim in its decision. It conducted the following analysis:
[T]he "reasonable person" standard is a standard that is applied by courts in many different areas of law. See, e.g., State v. Thunberg, 492 N.W.2d 534 (Minn. 1992) (). Moreover, in considering this same statute in Zeman v. City of Minneapolis, this court held that "appropriate measures" was not vague because the actions necessary to avoid future disorderly use may vary depending on the condition and problems associated with a given property. 540 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Minn. App. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 552 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1996). Therefore, we conclude that "appropriate action" is a prescribed standard that was properly applied by the Board.
Farrell, 2004 WL 885692 at *1. Farrell argues that the Court of Appeals failed to note that the ordinance's definition creates an absolute duty, rather than one based on reasonable care, to prevent further violations. Plaintiff's Brief at 5-6. He claims that the Court of Appeals misconstrued the effect of the ordinance's language. Plaintiff's Brief at 6. Furthermore, he asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in Zeman v. City of Minneapolis by holding that "appropriate measures" was not vague because varying actions may be appropriate depending on the circumstances at a property. Id. at 7. Farrell maintains that the language "appropriate action" is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to specifically define which actions will avoid a license revocation. Id.
The Court finds that M.C.O. § 244.2020 is not overbroad or void for vagueness. Although "appropriate action" is not specifically defined in the ordinance, the term creates an acceptably broad, flexible standard which requires the exercise of judgment. See State v. Enyeart, 676 N.W.2d 311, 319 (Minn. App. 2004). This Court is bound by the decisions of the Court of Appeals in Zeman and Farrell that the definition of "appropriate action" is properly vested in the city council's discretion, because actions that will prevent further disorderly use may vary among properties. Zeman v. City of Minneapolis, 540 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Minn. App. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 552 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1996); Farrell, 2004 WL 885692 at *1. Moreover, the ordinance specifically provides that a license holder will obtain information about what constitutes "appropriate action" to prevent further disorderly use in his or her case. M.C.O. § 244.2020(c) provides that:
Upon determination by the community crime prevention/SAFE unit utilizing established procedures, that a licensed premises was used in a disorderly manner, as described in subsection (a), the responsible SAFE team shall notify the licensee by mail of the violation and direct the licensee to take appropriate action with the assistance of the community crime prevention/SAFE unit and other units of the Minneapolis Police Department to prevent further violations.
The Court concludes that the ordinance does not lead to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. A license holder is given guidance on how to prevent future violations, and...
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