State v. Becker, C4-83-887

• Decision Date: 13 July 1984
• Docket Number: No. C4-83-887,C4-83-887
• Citation: 351 N.W.2d 923
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Joyce M. BECKER, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 923

351 N.W.2d 923

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Joyce M. BECKER, Appellant.

No. C4-83-887.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 13, 1984.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The provision of the intrafamilial sexual abuse statute allowing prosecution for multiple acts occurring over an extended period of time, Minn. Stat. Sec. 609.3641, subd. 1(2)(e) (1982), is not unconstitutionally vague.

2. A complaint charging a defendant with multiple acts of intrafamilial sexual abuse over an extended period of time must allege that the crime occurred during a reasonably specific time period not exceeding the statute of limitations. It is not sufficient to merely restate the statutory language without setting forth a time frame.

3. A Spreigl notice of prior offenses is not necessary in charging a defendant with multiple offenses occurring over an extended period of time.

C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, Mark F. Anderson, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Hubert H. Humphrey III, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Thomas L. Johnson, Henn. County Atty., Vernon E. Bergstrom, Richard Osborne, J. Michael Richardson, Beverly J. Wolfe, Asst. County Attys., Minneapolis, for respondent.

Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument.

TODD, Justice.

Joyce M. Becker was convicted of intrafamilial sexual abuse in Hennepin County. She challenges the constitutionality of the statutory provisions under which she was charged and convicted. She also raises issues of the admissibility of rebuttal testimony and the propriety of joinder of charges involving two different victims. We affirm.

We need not detail the facts since they are not in dispute, there being no challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. The principal legal issue involves the application and interpretation of certain provisions of the incest statute, revamped by the legislature in 1981.

Minn. Stat. Sec. 609.3641, subd. 1(1) (1982) provides: "A person is guilty of intrafamilial sexual abuse in the first degree if: (1) He has a familial relationship to and engages in sexual penetration with a child."

Minn. Stat. Sec. 609.3641, subd. 1(2)(e) (1982) provides: "A person is guilty of intrafamilial sexual abuse in the first degree if: * * * (2) He has a familial relationship to and engages in sexual penetration with a child and: * * * (e) the intrafamilial sexual abuse involved multiple acts committed over an extended period of time."

The original complaint in this matter charged Mrs. Becker had engaged in acts of sexual penetration or sexual contact with two of her children. Count I of the complaint alleged that she committed sexual acts with her daughter "on or about the 17th day of April, 1982" and "over an extended period of time." The second count alleged that sexual acts were committed with her son "on or about December of 1980" and "over an extended period of time." These charges were issued pursuant to section 609.3641, subd. 1(2)(e).

After the omnibus hearing the complaint was amended to charge two additional counts pursuant to section 609.3641, subd. 1(1) which requires only a single act of sexual penetration. The new counts alleged sexual penetration had occurred on the same two dates as in the original complaint and omitted reference to multiple acts over an extended period of time. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all four counts. Defendant was sentenced on the originally charged counts. The other two were merged pursuant to Minn. Stat. Sec. 609.04 (1982).

The issues presented are:

1. Whether section 609.3641, subd. 1(2)(e) is unconstitutionally vague;

2. Whether, if the statute is constitutional, a Spreigl notice must be given as to all offenses included in the complaint;

3. Whether the testimony of a rebuttal witness was properly received;

4. Whether there was proper joinder of offenses.

1. The challenged portion of the statute allowed the State to allege in a general statement that the sexual abuse occurred many times over an indefinite period. Defendant argues that the generality of the statute violates the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. Minn. Const. art. I, Sec. 7; U.S. Const. amend. V. However, this section of the statute does not define the criminal conduct itself. It addresses only the frequency of that conduct. This sets it apart from the laws generally held to be void under due process. As the United States Supreme Court recently explained, the void-for-vagueness doctrine "requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Kolender v. Lawson, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (emphasis added).

The twin evils of vague laws are that they trap the innocent by not providing adequate warning of unlawful conduct and unleash the potential for unfair and uneven law enforcement by not establishing minimal guidelines. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). It is well-settled that vagueness challenges that do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the facts at hand. United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92, 96 S.Ct. 316, 319, 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975). Unless the statute proscribes no comprehensible course of conduct at all, it will be upheld. Id.

The intrafamilial sexual abuse statute does not pose the dangers inherent in vague laws. It is unquestionably clear in its definition of the type of conduct prohibited. It details the kind of sexual contact made criminal and specifies the persons with whom such contact is prohibited. See Minn. Stat. Sec. 609.364-.3644. ¹ The statute gave defendant adequate warning that sexual abuse of her children is a criminal offense.

The statute also provides standards to guide police and prosecutor because the prohibited conduct is well-defined. Law enforcement is not left entirely to its own discretion in deciding who has committed the criminal conduct. The police could have arrested Mrs. Becker for one proscribed act with her children (pursuant to section 609.3641, subd. 1(1) or multiple acts over an extended period of time (pursuant to section 609.3641, subd. 1(2)(e)). The standard of conduct is specific. This distinguishes the case from Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971), for example, where the court held unconstitutional an ordinance making it criminal for persons to assemble "in a manner annoying to persons passing by * * *." 402 U.S. at 611, 91 S.Ct. at 1686. The ordinance specified no standard of conduct at all. 402 U.S. at 614, 91 S.Ct. at 1688. Such a statute is unconstitutional because it leaves judges and jurors free to decide what is prohibited in each particular case. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03, 86 S.Ct. 518, 520-21, 15 L.Ed.2d 447 (1966).

Defendant's second major contention is that the statute violates her right to be informed of the specific charges against her as guaranteed by article I, section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution and the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution. Essentially, she argues that the lack of specificity of the complaint with respect to the frequency and dates of the sexual acts deprived her of the ability to adequately defend herself.

The constitutional test is set forth in Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 34, 16 S.Ct. 434, 435, 40 L.Ed. 606 (1896) as follows:

A defendant is informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him if the indictment contains such descriptions of the offense charged as will enable him to make his defense and to plead the judgment in bar of any further prosecution for the same crime.

The complaint must state the essential facts constituting the offense charged. State v. Oman, 265 Minn. 277, 282, 121 N.W.2d 616, 620 (1963). Regarding the specificity of the time element of the offense, this court stated in State v. Waukazo, 269 N.W.2d 373 (Minn.1978):

We also think it is clear that, as a general proposition, an indictment or complaint should be as specific as possible with respect to time. However, it is not always possible to know with certainty when an offense or offenses occurred. This is especially true in cases like this where there is a minor victim who does not complain to the authorities immediately. Thus, the rule has evolved that in the prosecution of crimes in which a particular day...