Farrell v. State
| Decision Date | 23 November 2021 |
| Docket Number | 20-1037 |
| Citation | 973 N.W.2d 870 (Table) |
| Parties | The ESTATE OF Susan FARRELL, BY its administrator, Jesse FARRELL, and as Representative for the claims of Jesse Farrell, individually, Jesse Farrell, as next friend of R.F., a minor, Peggy Maschke, individually, and Stephen Michalski, individually, Plaintiff-Appellees, v. STATE of Iowa; City of Waukee; City of West Des Moines, Iowa ; Peterson Contractors, Inc. ; RoadSafe Traffic Systems, Inc. ; Voltmer Electric, Inc.; PAR Electrical Contractors, Inc., MidAmerican Energy Company ; and, Kirkham, Michael & Associates, Inc., Defendant-Appellants. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Robert M. Livingston and Kristopher K. Madsen of Stuart Tinley Law Firm, LLP, Council Bluffs, for appellants State of Iowa and West Des Moines, Iowa.
Apryl M. DeLange, Alex E. Grasso, and Jessica A. Eglseder of Hopkins & Huebner, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant City of Waukee, Iowa.
Stephen D. Marso, Zachary J. Hermsen, Bryn E. Hazelwonder, and James E. Andersen of Whitfield & Eddy, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., Greer, J., and Doyle, S.J.*
Pointing to established precedent over the public-duty doctrine,1 the State of Iowa and the cities of West Des Moines and Waukee (the Governmental Parties) theorize that the result of this case is exactly what happens when "creative plaintiffs characterize nonfeasance as misfeasance ... to create a false duty that otherwise would be precluded by the public-duty doctrine." They ask that we take that "gray area" and make it clear by dismissing the suit against them. In this interlocutory appeal we must determine if the Governmental Parties’ motion for a judgment on the pleadings should have been granted. Taking the facts alleged as true, the district court denied the motions finding that at this stage , the Farrell family2 is entitled to develop if the Governmental Parties engaged in affirmative acts of negligence or if the egregious conduct exception to the public-duty doctrine applies.3
A motor vehicle collision occurred in the early morning hours of March 26, 2016. Tragically, an intoxicated driver, Benjamin Beary, drove on the wrong side of Interstate 80 (I-80) head-on into a vehicle in which Des Moines police officer Susan Farrell was riding.4 Both Beary and Farrell perished in the collision.5 After an extensive investigation, law enforcement experts determined that Beary entered I-80 at the Grand Prairie Parkway Interchange.6 In their petition filed against the State of Iowa and cities of West Des Moines and Waukee,7 the Farrell family alleged that the Grand Prairie Parkway Interchange was unsafely designed and constructed. They allege that in 2005 the cities contracted with the Iowa Department of Transportation (DOT) to design this Interchange. The design employed a diverging-diamond interchange that requires drivers to drive on the left side of oncoming traffic for some distance. The Farrell family contend that this design creates a confusing experience for drivers unfamiliar with the area. According to the petition, complaints were voiced and several improvements and changes occurred over the years, but the Interchange remained open to motorists. It was after this Interchange and on I-80 where Beary and Farrell collided. The specific claims asserted against the Governmental Parties involve common law negligence, nuisance, and premises liability.
To address the allegations, the Governmental Parties answered but then moved for judgment on the pleadings under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.954,8 arguing the public-duty doctrine bars all of the Farrell family's claims. The district court denied the motion "at this stage" noting the petition alleged the Governmental Parties committed affirmative acts of negligence, including egregious conduct. Because of these allegations, the district court concluded it could not find the Governmental Parties were entitled to a judgment in their favor. The Governmental Parties appeal from that ruling.
We review a district court's ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings for correction of errors at law. See Hussemann ex rel. Ritter v. Hussemann , 847 N.W.2d 219, 222 (Iowa 2014). To start, we assume the truth of the facts found in the pleadings. See Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co. , 914 N.W.2d 273, 280 (Iowa 2018). Then, the "district court should only grant the motion if the pleadings, taken alone, entitle a party to judgment." Meinders v. Dunkerton Cmty. Sch. Dist. , 645 N.W.2d 632, 633 (Iowa 2002). The focus is on whether there is a right to recovery under the state of facts as presented. Stanton , 420 N.W.2d at 482. "The proper function of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is simply to test the sufficiency of the pleadings to present an appropriate issue for trial." Id.
The progress of this case turns on whether the public-duty doctrine applies. We have a playbook for that inquiry. In several recent cases, our supreme court tackled the doctrine and refined the steps for our analysis. See Fulps , 956 N.W.2d at 469 ; Breese , 945 N.W.2d at 12 ; Johnson v. Humboldt Cnty. , 913 N.W.2d 256 (Iowa 2018).9 Similar to the Fulps case, we address the arguments at this preliminary stage of the proceedings but look to the allegations of the petition and assume they are true.10 956 N.W.2d at 470. With that being said, we are asked to apply the public-duty doctrine to address the challenge that the doctrine precludes tort claims by these individuals against the government. See Johnson , 913 N.W.2d at 258–62 (). In Johnson , the county was sued for failure to cause the removal of the embankment from the right of way. Id. at 259–60. Thus, the public-duty doctrine has applied in cases involving a duty the state owes to maintain safe public roadways because it is a duty the state "owes to the public at large." Id. at 261.
Does the public-duty doctrine apply here?
There is a fundamental difference of opinion between these parties about the approach required to answer this question. The Governmental Parties argue that the public-duty doctrine bars all of the Farrell family's claims after we answer the preliminary question—what instrumentality caused the injury ("instrumentality test")? Because Farrell was injured because of the government owned and designed "diverging-diamond interchange" while in the line of duty transporting a prisoner, the Farrell family asserts the public-duty doctrine cannot apply. They advocate the first step requires a "misfeasance/nonfeasance" analysis.
As Fulps confirmed, the public-duty doctrine "comes into play only when there is a confluence of two factors." 956 N.W.2d at 473.
First, the injury to the plaintiff was directly caused or inflicted by a third party or other independent force. Second, the plaintiff alleges a governmental entity or actor breached a uniquely governmental duty, usually, but not always, imposed by statute, rule, or ordinance to protect the plaintiff from the third party or other independent force.
Id. at 473–74. If the answers to these questions are yes, then the public-duty doctrine applies. But, even so, if there exists a special relationship between the governmental entity and the injured party, the public-duty doctrine is negated. See id. at 474.
Here the instrumentality starts and ends with an intoxicated Beary driving on the wrong side of the road into Farrell's vehicle, ultimately killing her. Unlike Breese , where a party was injured on the city bike path with no other instrumentality involved apart from the city's negligence with respect to its bike path, third-party Beary's behavior caused the death of Farrell. 945 N.W.2d at 21. Likewise, in Fulps , the plaintiff was injured due to the condition of the city-owned sidewalk. 956 N.W.2d at 470–71.
Then, as to the second question, is the construction of safe roadways a "uniquely governmental duty ... to protect [Farrell] from the third party or other independent force," we again look to our case law precedent. In instances involving the public roadways, the state's safety-related duties are owed to the general public. See Johnson , 913 N.W.2d at 261 (); see also Estate of McFarlin v. State , 881 N.W.2d 51, 58–63 (Iowa 2016) ().
Yet, the Farrell family argues the roadway design directly caused the accident. They contend the Governmental Parties should have protected Farrell from Beary's actions by designing and constructing a safe Interchange, which they allege did not happen here. Fulps did not discard the public-duty doctrine, but instead narrowed the situations where it still would apply.
The public-duty doctrine is properly understood as a limit on suing a governmental entity for not protecting the public from harm caused by the activities of a third party. Those third parties have included the visually impaired driver in Kolbe [v. State , 625 N.W.2d 721 (Iowa 2001) ], the inmates after they got away from the prison in Raas , the dredge operator in Estate of McFarlin , the private property owner who put up the concrete embankment in Johnson , and the shooter in Sankey [v. Richenberger , 456 N.W.2d 206 (Iowa 1990) ]. See Breese , 945 N.W.2d at 21 (...
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