Kolbe v. State

Decision Date25 April 2001
Docket NumberNo. 99-0876.,99-0876.
Citation625 N.W.2d 721
PartiesCharles Leon KOLBE and Karen Sue Kolbe, Husband and Wife, Appellants, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Wythe Willey of Wythe Willey Law Office, Cedar Rapids, for appellants.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Robin G. Formaker and Richard E. Mull, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. Considered en banc.

LAVORATO, Chief Justice.

The issue here is whether the State is liable to an injured party for the State's negligence in issuing a driver's license to the person who caused the injury with his vehicle. The district court sustained the State's motion for summary judgment, concluding the State owed no duty to the injured party. We agree and affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On June 28, 1997, Justin Allen Schulte, while driving a motor vehicle, struck Charles Leon Kolbe, who was riding a bicycle at the time. The accident occurred on Sac County road D-54 in Sac County, Iowa. As a result of the accident, Kolbe suffered severe injuries.

Schulte was driving with a restricted license, which required him to wear corrective lenses. Additionally, he was not to operate a motor vehicle in excess of forty-five miles per hour.

Schulte has a vision condition known as Stargardt's disease. Stargardt's disease results in loss of central vision and decrease in sharpness of peripheral vision. The disease is inherited and begins between the ages of 8 to 20. 2 J.E. Schmidt, M.D., Attorney's Dictionary of Medicine and Word Finder S-198 (1991). At the time of the accident, Schulte was eighteen.

One of Schulte's physicians, Dr. Alan Kimura, reported to the Iowa Department of Transportation (IDOT) that Schulte had Stargardt's disease and that the disease caused difficulty with central vision. At the time of this report, Dr. Kimura was an associate professor in the Department of Ophthalmology at University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics. Dr. Kimura had diagnosed Schulte as having Stargardt's disease while Schulte was in the sixth grade.

The Stargardt's disease did not prevent Schulte from leading an active life. For example, he participated in high school athletics, did family farm chores, and worked for a construction company as a skid loader operator. He also completed a driver's education course in high school and received a "B plus" grade.

The IDOT first issued Schulte a driver's license in 1995. To receive the license, Schulte underwent a process that permitted the IDOT to issue him a license on a "discretionary basis." As part of this process, Schulte obtained recommendations from eye specialists, who performed eye examinations before recommending he receive a driver's license. The IDOT forwarded information from the eye specialists to a medical advisory board. The board is a group of doctors selected by the Iowa Medical Society to serve anonymously as an independent source of medical review for the IDOT. The doctors all recommended issuance of a driver's license to Schulte.

As part of the process, the IDOT subjected Schulte to testing. One test consisted of an oral knowledge exam. The other was a driver's test in which Schulte had to ride with an IDOT officer in town and in the country. During that ride, Schulte had to identify road signs and vehicles on the road.

The IDOT tested Schulte again in June 1996 and on June 23, 1997—five days before the accident in question. In both instances, Schulte successfully completed a driving test with an IDOT officer. Each time Schulte had to drive during daylight, dusk, and at night in rural areas upon the highway and in the city.

In May 1998, Charles Kolbe and his wife Karen Sue filed suit against the State of Iowa and the IDOT. They alleged, among other things, that the defendants "negligently and without adequate investigation issued driving privileges" to Schulte, which negligence was a proximate cause of the accident and injuries. Karen Sue asked for loss of spousal consortium. The Kolbes later dropped the IDOT as a defendant.

Later, the district court sustained the State's motion for summary judgment. The court ruled that the State was immune from suit under the discretionary function exception of the State Tort Claims Act, see Iowa Code § 669.14(1) (1997). The court also ruled that the State owed no duty to the Kolbes.

On appeal, the Kolbes contend that the State has no such statutory immunity. They also contend that the State has a statutory and regulatory duty not to issue a driver's license to a person it knows or should know is, by reason of mental or physical disability, incapable of operating a motor vehicle safely. They further contend that the State breached this duty. In the alternative, the Kolbes contend the State has a common law duty to exercise ordinary care when it issues a driver's license. In this case, they contend the State breached that duty. Because we conclude there was no such duty, we need not address the immunity issue. See Engstrom v. State, 461 N.W.2d 309, 314 (Iowa 1990)

(holding that State Tort Claims Act creates no new cause of action but merely recognizes and provides remedy for those already existing).

II. Scope of Review.

We review a ruling granting a motion for summary judgment for correction of errors at law. See Knudson v. City of Decorah, 622 N.W.2d 42, 48 (Iowa 2000)

. Summary judgment is appropriate when

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Iowa R.Civ.P. 237(c).

When we review a summary judgment ruling, "we examine the record before the district court to decide whether any material fact is in dispute and whether the district court correctly applied the law." Knudson, 622 N.W.2d at 48. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party—in this case, the Kolbles—and they are "entitled to every legitimate inference that can be reasonably deduced from the evidence." Id.

Additionally, this case involves issues of statutory construction. "Such issues raise legal questions and are properly resolvable by summary judgment." Id.

Furthermore, "because the existence of a duty is a question of law for the court, it may appropriately be adjudicated on a motion for summary judgment." Van Essen v. McCormick Enters. Co., 599 N.W.2d 716, 718 (Iowa 1999).

III. Duty.

To prove their negligence claim, the Kolbes must establish (1) the State owed them a duty; (2) the State breached or violated that duty; (3) this breach or violation was a proximate cause of their injuries; and (4) damages. See Sanford v. Manternach, 601 N.W.2d 360, 370 (Iowa 1999)

; Marcus v. Young, 538 N.W.2d 285, 288 (Iowa 1995). When determining the existence of a duty, we are guided by "legislative enactments, prior judicial decisions, and general legal principles." Sanford, 601 N.W.2d at 370.

In their petition, the Kolbes raised a variety of allegations that essentially accuse the State of (1) failing to suspend or revoke Schulte's driving privileges, (2) failing to require additional testing, (3) issuing a license when Schulte allegedly could not complete minimum testing requirements, (4) relying upon the advice of "unqualified" persons in determining whether to issue a license, and (5) issuing a license to Schulte when the State knew or should have known that Schulte could not safely operate an automobile.

These allegations involve a combination of asserted claims of negligence by the State in failing to perform statutory duties and performing such duties with lack of due care.

The Kolbes first assert the State has a statutory and regulatory duty not to issue a driver's license to an applicant who, by reason of mental or physical disability, is incapable of operating a vehicle safely. They contend the State breached this duty, which they assert is derived from Iowa Code section 321.177(7) (1995) and Iowa Administrative Code rule 761-600.4(2).

In the alternative, the Kolbes contend that common law imposes on the State a duty to exercise ordinary care when it issues a driver's license, and that in this case the State failed to exercise such care.

We begin with the Kolbes' contention that the State had a statutory and regulatory duty which it breached, and which breach gave rise to an actionable claim of negligence.

A. Statutory and regulatory duty.

As mentioned, the Kolbes rely on Iowa Code section 321.177(7) and Iowa Administrative Code rule 761—600.4(2). Iowa Code section 321.177(7) provides that the IDOT "shall not issue a motor vehicle license ... [t]o any person when the director [of the IDOT] has good cause to believe the person by reason of physical or mental disability would not be able to operate a motor vehicle safely." Iowa Code § 321.177(7).

Iowa Administrative Code rule 761—600.4(2) similarly provides:

The [IDOT] shall not knowingly license any person who is unable to operate a motor vehicle safely because of physical or mental disability until that person has submitted a medical report stating that the person is physically and mentally capable of operating a motor vehicle.

Iowa Admin. Code r. 761—600.4(2). This rule appears intended to implement Iowa Code section 321.177(7). See Iowa Admin. Code r. 761—600.4.

Without conceding it breached the duty imposed under Iowa Code section 321.177(7) as implemented by Iowa Administrative Code rule 761—600.4(2), the State argues that even if it had, such breach does not necessarily give rise to a cause of action. We agree. See Seeman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 322 N.W.2d 35, 37-38 (Iowa 1982)

(holding that a private cause of action does not arise solely from the violation of a statutory duty).

A "violation of a statutory duty gives rise to a tort claim only when the statute, explicitly or implicitly, provides for such a cause of action." Sanford, 601 N.W.2d at 371. Absent such a provision, the violation...

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