Farris v. Express Servs., Inc.

• Decision Date: 09 May 2019
• Docket Number: No. CV-18-259,CV-18-259
• Citation: 2019 Ark. 141,572 S.W.3d 863
• Parties: Walter FARRIS, Appellant v. EXPRESS SERVICES, INC., and New Hampshire Insurance Company, Appellees
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

2019 Ark. 141

572 S.W.3d 863

Walter FARRIS, Appellant

v.EXPRESS SERVICES, INC., and New Hampshire Insurance Company, Appellees

No. CV-18-259

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Opinion Delivered: May 9, 2019

Rehearing Denied August 1, 2019

Goldberg & Dohan, by: Andy L. Caldwell, for appellant.

Worley, Wood & Parrish, P.A., by: Melissa Wood, for appellee.

JOHN DAN KEMP, Chief Justice

Appellant Walter Farris appeals an Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission's decision adopting the finding of the administrative law judge (ALJ) that his additional-benefits claim was barred by the statute of limitations. For reversal, Farris argues that the Commission's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm the Commission's finding and vacate the opinion of the court of appeals.

I. Facts

On May 12, 2014, Farris was injured on the job when a crane fell on him. He sustained injuries to his head, neck, and left shoulder. Appellee Express Services, Inc., a temporary employment agency that employed Farris, paid benefits for his injury claim.¹ Farris received medical treatment from Dr. Ron Schechter until he was released to full duty on April 28, 2015. Express Services paid the fee associated with the April 28 visit.

On May 5, 2016, approximately two years after he was injured, Farris submitted a Form AR-C for additional benefits. On the form, he incorrectly named Great Dane Trailers as his employer. Express Services had assigned Farris to a Great Dane location, but he worked for the temporary agency. Farris later realized his mistake, and on May 13, he filed an amended Form AR-C, dated May 12, and correctly named Express Services as his employer.

The ALJ conducted a hearing on Farris's entitlement to additional workers'-compensation benefits and found that his claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The Commission affirmed and adopted the ALJ's findings. Farris appealed to the Arkansas Court of Appeals. Relying on Dillard v. Benton County Sheriff's Office , 87 Ark. App. 379, 192 S.W.3d 287 (2004), the court of appeals held that Farris's mistake on his claim form for additional benefits was "a mistake as to form and not as to substance." Farris v. Express Servs., Inc. , 2018 Ark. App. 189, at 4, 546 S.W.3d 530, 532. The court of appeals concluded that the statute of limitations had tolled and reversed and remanded to the Commission. Id. , 546 S.W.3d at 532. Express Services petitioned this court for review, and we granted the petition. When we grant a petition for review, we consider the appeal as though it had originally been filed in this court. Lawson v. Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc. , 2019 Ark. 84, 569 S.W.3d 865.

II. Law and Analysis

For his sole point on appeal, Farris argues that substantial evidence does not support the Commission's decision. Specifically, Farris contends that he timely filed his first additional-benefits form on May 5, 2016, and that his mistake of naming the wrong employer should not bar his claim.

When reviewing a decision of the Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission and affirm that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence.

Crudup v. Regal Ware, Inc. , 341 Ark. 804, 20 S.W.3d 900 (2000). Substantial evidence exists if fair-minded persons could reach the same conclusion when considering the same facts. Id. , 20 S.W.3d 900. The issue is not whether the appellate court might have reached a different result from the Commission, but rather whether reasonable minds could reach the result found by the Commission. Wallace v. W. Fraser South, Inc. , 365 Ark. 68, 225 S.W.3d 361 (2006). If so, the appellate court must affirm the Commission's decision. Id. , 225 S.W.3d 361.

Further, we review issues of statutory construction de novo because it is this court's duty to decide what a statute means. Johnson v. Bonds Fertilizer, Inc. , 365 Ark. 133, 226 S.W.3d 753 (2006). The first rule in considering the meaning and effect of a statute is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary meaning and usually accepted meaning in common language. Id. , 226 S.W.3d 753. We construe the statute so that no word is left void, superfluous, or insignificant; and meaning and effect are given to every word in the statute if possible. Id. , 226 S.W.3d 753. When the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to rules of statutory construction. Id. , 226 S.W.3d 753. When the meaning is not clear, we look to the language of the statute, the subject matter, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, the remedy provided, the legislative history, and other appropriate means that shed light on the subject. Id. , 226 S.W.3d 753.

Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-702 (Repl. 2012) governs the statute of limitations for additional benefits and states in relevant part,

(b) Time for filing additional compensation.

(1) In cases in which any compensation, including disability or medical, has been paid on account of injury, a claim for additional compensation shall be barred unless filed with the commission within one (1) year from the date of the last payment of compensation or two (2) years from the date of the injury, whichever is greater.

Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-702(b)(1). This court has stated that a claimant must prove that he or she acted within the time allowed for filing a claim for additional compensation. Stewart v. Ark. Glass Container , 2010 Ark. 198, 366 S.W.3d 358. Additionally, this court has stated that the running of the statute of limitations is largely a question of fact. Houston Contracting Co. v. Young , 267 Ark. 322, 590 S.W.2d 653 (1979).

According to the plain language of the section 11-9-702(b)(1), Farris's claim for additional compensation "shall be barred" unless he filed it "within one (1) year from the date of the last payment of compensation or two (2) years from the date of the injury, whichever is greater." Thus, under the statute, Farris was required to file his claim by April 28, 2016, which is one year from April 28, 2015, the "date of the last payment of compensation;"² or by May 12, 2016, which is two years from May 12, 2014, the "date of the injury." Id. Because the two-year date "is greater" under section 11-9-702(b), Farris should have filed his form by May 12, 2016. He filed his corrected amended form, dated May 12, 2016, on May 13, 2016—one day late.

Farris cites Dillard , 87 Ark. App. 379, 192 S.W.3d 287, for the proposition that the determinative factor for the statute of limitations is the timeliness of the filing and contends that he timely filed his form on May 5 even though it contained a mistake. In Dillard , the claimant sought additional benefit for permanent total disability, rehabilitation, attorney fees, and medical expenses. On the claim form, Dillard's attorney checked the boxes located under the initial-benefits section instead of checking the boxes under the additional-benefits section. After failing to timely request a hearing, Dillard's employer moved for a dismissal. The ALJ granted the dismissal, and the Commission accepted the ALJ's findings. The court of appeals reversed and remanded and held that a mistake—incorrect checkmarks—on the Form AR-C should not time-bar a timely claim. The court of appeals stated that "Dillard's failure to technically comply with the ‘call’ of the form" should not be fatal to his claim. Id. at 384–85, 192 S.W.3d at 291. The court of appeals concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support the Commission's finding that Dillard's claim had been properly dismissed, stating that to hold otherwise "[was] a classic example of [putting] form over substance." Id. at 384, 192 S.W.3d at 291.

Dillard is distinguishable from the present case. In Dillard , the claimant filed one timely claim form, but he mistakenly checked the wrong boxes. Here, Farris filed two claim forms. On his May 5 form, Farris did not merely check the wrong box but appeared to have sought additional benefits from Great Dane. On his May 13 form, he corrected his error by adding Express Services as his employer, but he filed it after the two-year period set forth in section 11-9-702(b)(1). Thus, Farris failed to meet his burden of timely filing his additional-benefits claim within the statutory time frame. We hold that the Commission did not err in finding that Farris's claim for additional benefits was barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we affirm the Commission's decision and vacate the court of appeals opinion.

Affirmed; court of appeals opinion vacated.

Hart, J., dissents.

Josephine Linker Hart, Justice, dissenting.

I dissent. The majority vacates the Court of Appeals' decision without affording its analysis appropriate consideration, simply ignores this court's long-established "relates back" doctrine, and purports to distinguish this matter from existing caselaw that is actually directly on point. This decision amounts to a plain windfall for Appellees.

It is not unusual for this court to simply "vacate the opinion of the court of appeals" when it decides a case after having granted a petition for review of a Court of Appeals' decision, but in the context of a workers' compensation case, this practice cuts against our state constitution and statutory law. True, the Arkansas Constitution provides that the Supreme Court of Arkansas has "statewide appellate jurisdiction" and "general superintending control over all courts of the state[,]" and "shall prescribe the rules of pleading, practice, and procedure for all courts[.]" Ark. Const. Amend. 80 §§ 2, 4, 3. However, Farris has not appealed the decision of a "court," but that of a commission, specifically the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission (AWCC).

This matters, as our Constitution treats workers' compensation claims differently from traditional claims that are brought and decided entirely in a court of law, i.e., within the...