Myers v. Yamato Kogyo Co.

• Citation: 2020 Ark. 135,597 S.W.3d 613
• Decision Date: 09 April 2020
• Docket Number: No. CV-18-607,CV-18-607
• Parties: Mary Katherine MYERS, Widow of [Michael Earl Myers] and Administratrix of the Estate of Michael Earl Myers, Deceased, Appellant v. YAMATO KOGYO COMPANY, LTD. ; Sumitomo Corporation; Arkansas Steel Associates; Sumitomo Corporation of Americas d/b/a Sumitomo Corporation of America; SC Steel Investment, Inc. ; SC Steel Investment, LLC ; Yamato Kogyo (U.S.A.) Corporation; and Yamato Kogyo America, Inc., Appellees
• Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas

2020 Ark. 135

597 S.W.3d 613

Mary Katherine MYERS, Widow of [Michael Earl Myers] and Administratrix of the Estate of Michael Earl Myers, Deceased, Appellant

v.YAMATO KOGYO COMPANY, LTD. ; Sumitomo Corporation; Arkansas Steel Associates; Sumitomo Corporation of Americas d/b/a Sumitomo Corporation of America; SC Steel Investment, Inc. ; SC Steel Investment, LLC ; Yamato Kogyo (U.S.A.) Corporation; and Yamato Kogyo America, Inc., Appellees

No. CV-18-607

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Opinion Delivered: April 9, 2020

Paul Byrd Law Firm, PLLC, by: Paul Byrd ; John Patterson, P.A., by: John Patterson ; Anchorage, Brian G. Brooks, Attorney at Law, PLLC, by: Brian G. Brooks ; Saltz, Mongeluzzi, Barrett & Bendesky, P.C., by: David L. Kwass, Pro Hac Vice, and David Langsam, Pro Hac Vice, for appellant.

Wright Lindsey & Jennings LLP, Little Rock, by: John D. Davis, Scott A. Irby, Baxter D. Drennon, and Michael A. Thompson, for appellees.

SHAWN A. WOMACK, Associate Justice

Mary Myers asks us to set aside an order of the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission concluding that parent companies of a direct employer are immune from tort liability under the exclusive remedy statute. She contends that the statute shields only "actual" employers having a direct employment relationship with the claimant. Because the parent corporations were merely "principals" and "stockholders" without a direct employment relationship with her deceased husband, Myers argues they may not be granted immunity under Section 11-9-105(a) or article 5, section 32 of the Arkansas Constitution. We disagree. The Commission’s order is affirmed.

I.

In February 2014, Michael Myers was employed as a steel plant ladleman by Arkansas Steel Associates, LLC, in Newport, Arkansas. While he was working in the plant’s melt shop, a ladle of molten steel spilled from a hot metal crane and engulfed his body. He died from the resulting injuries. Arkansas Steel Associates did not dispute that Michael Myers’s death was work related and paid workers’ compensation benefits to his widow, Mary Myers.

Myers subsequently filed a wrongful death suit against, as relevant here, Arkansas Steel Associates’ parent companies. The parent companies—Appellees in this case—are seven corporations that own, either directly or indirectly, Arkansas Steel Associates.¹ The circuit court, in part, transferred jurisdiction to the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission to determine whether the parent companies were entitled to immunity under the exclusive remedy provision of the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Act. See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-105(a) (Supp. 2017).

The parties stipulated to several facts below, including the corporate structure of Arkansas Steel Associates. In short, the parties stipulated that the appellee parent companies were principals or stockholders of Arkansas Steel Associates. Additionally, undisputed evidence showed that the parent companies were separate and distinct entities from Arkansas Steel Associates. They were not involved in employment decisions at Arkansas Steel Associates, such as hiring or firing employees, paying wages, training, providing workers’ compensation or other benefits, or establishing work schedules. At the time of the accident, there were no direct employees of the parent corporations present at the jobsite. Moreover, there was no evidence that any direct employee ever met Michael Myers.

Myers argued that Arkansas Steel Associates was the sole "actual" employer and, therefore, the only entity entitled to immunity under the exclusive remedy provision. According to the parent companies, Myers’s "actual" employer analysis was not relevant to the immunity determination. Rather, they argued the decisive question was simply whether they were principals or stockholders of an immune employer. The Commission agreed. It concluded that the parent companies were "party-employers acting within the employer-shareholder role" and entitled to immunity as principals and stockholders of Arkansas Steel Associates under Arkansas Code Annotated § 11-9-105(a). Given this employer-employee relationship, the Commission further held that the parent companies’ statutory entitlement to immunity was consistent with article 5, section 32 of the Arkansas Constitution.

The court of appeals affirmed the Commission’s decision. See Myers v. Yamato Kogyo Co., Ltd. , 2019 Ark. App. 306, 578 S.W.3d 296. We granted Myers’s petition for review and now consider this case as though it had been originally filed in this Court. See Woodall v. Hunnicutt Const. , 340 Ark. 377, 379, 12 S.W.3d 630, 631 (2000).

II.

The outcome of this case turns on the interpretation of Section 11-9-105(a). We acknowledge confusion in prior cases regarding the standard of review for agency interpretations of a statute and believe that clarification is warranted to address the level of deference due. In cases involving the Commission’s interpretation of statutes, we have conducted a de novo review. See, e.g. , Miller v. Enders , 2013 Ark. 23, at 4, 425 S.W.3d 723, 726 ; Ark. Game and Fish Comm'n v. Gerard , 2018 Ark. 97, at 4–5, 541 S.W.3d 422, 425–26. Recognizing that it is for this Court to determine what a constitutional or statutory provision means, we did not afford deference to the Commission’s interpretation. Id. "[W]here the statute is not ambiguous, we will not interpret it to mean anything other than what it says." Second Injury Fund v. Osborn , 2011 Ark. 232, at 4, 2011 WL 2062277 ; Kildow v. Baldwin Piano & Organ , 333 Ark. 335, 339, 969 S.W.2d 190, 192 (1998).

The court of appeals has articulated a different standard encompassing both de novo and deferential review: Though the "correct interpretation and application of an Arkansas statute is a question of law, which [the court] decides de novo," the Commission’s statutory interpretation is "highly persuasive and, while not binding on [the court], will not be overturned unless it is clearly wrong." St. Edward Mercy Med. Ctr. v. Howard , 2012 Ark. App. 673, at 4, 424 S.W.3d 881, 885–86 ; see also Harrison v. Ark. Public Employees’ Retirement System , 2019 Ark. App. 179, at 6–7, 574 S.W.3d 705, 709 (agency interpretation given "great deference"). We have in some cases adopted a de novo but deferential "clearly wrong" review for an agency’s statutory interpretation. See, e.g. , Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Pierce , 2014 Ark. 251, at 7, 435 S.W.3d 469, 473 ("We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo; however, the interpretation placed on a statute or regulation by an agency or department charged with its administration is entitled to great deference and should not be overturned unless clearly wrong."); McLane Southern, Inc. v. Ark. Tobacco Control Bd. , 2010 Ark. 498, at 16, 375 S.W.3d 628, 640 (same). Yet, in other cases, we omitted the de novo standard and announced only the deferential "clearly wrong" review. See, e.g. , Brookshire v. Adcock , 2009 Ark. 207, at 11, 307 S.W.3d 22, 29.

Even more concerning is the risk of giving core judicial powers to executive agencies in violation of the constitutional separation of powers. See Ark. Const., art. 4, §§ 1 – 2. Indeed, the separation of powers doctrine is "a basic principle upon which our government is founded and should not be violated or abridged." Protect Fayetteville v. City of Fayetteville , 2019 Ark. 28, at 7, 566 S.W.3d 105, 109–110 (internal quotation omitted). The judicial branch has the "power and responsibility to interpret the legislative enactments." Id. And the executive branch has the "power and responsibility to enforce the laws as enacted and interpreted by the other two branches." Id. By giving deference to agencies’ interpretations of statutes, the court effectively transfers the job of interpreting the law from the judiciary to the executive. This we cannot do.

Accordingly, we clarify today that agency interpretations of statutes will be reviewed de novo. After all, it is the province and duty of this Court to determine what a statute means. See Farris v. Express Servs., Inc. , 2019 Ark. 141, at 3, 572 S.W.3d 863, 866. In considering the meaning and effect of a statute, we construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Id. An unambiguous statute will be interpreted based solely on the clear meaning of the text. But where ambiguity exists, the agency’s interpretation will be one of our many tools used to provide guidance. Workers’ compensation statutes must be strictly construed. See Hendrix v. Alcoa, Inc. , 2016 Ark. 453, at 4, 506 S.W.3d 230, 233 ; Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-704(c)(3). The doctrine of strict construction requires this Court to use the plain meaning of the language employed. Id. Strict construction is narrow construction and requires that nothing be taken as intended that is not clearly expressed. See Lawhon Farm Servs. v. Brown , 335 Ark. 272, 279, 984 S.W.2d 1, 4 (1998).

We do not disturb the general standard of review for Commission decisions. The Commission has original exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a tort action is barred by the exclusive remedy statute. See VanWagoner v. Beverly Enters. , 334 Ark. 12, 13, 970 S.W.2d 810, 811 (1998). The existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties is a factual issue solely within the Commission’s jurisdiction. See Honeysuckle v. Curtis H. Stout, Inc. , 2010 Ark. 328, at 7, 368 S.W.3d 64, 69. On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission’s decision and affirm that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. See Brookshire Grocery Co. v. Morgan , 2018 Ark. 62, at 5, 539 S.W.3d 574, 578. Substantial evidence exists if reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion as the Commission. Id. Moreover, because the exclusive benefits statute favors both the employer and the employee, we take a narrow view of any attempt to seek damages beyond the exclusive remedy. See Honeysuckle , 2010 Ark. 328,...