Father v. DEPT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
Decision Date | 10 March 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 25603.,25603. |
Citation | 578 S.E.2d 11,353 S.C. 254 |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | The FATHER, Petitioner, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Respondent. |
Debbie Sue Mollycheck; and Connie F. Payne, of Burnette & Payne, P.A., both of Rock Hill, for Petitioner.
Susan Lynn Anderson, of South Carolina Department of Social Services and W. Allen Nickles, III, of Gergel, Nickles & Solomon, P.A., both of Columbia, for Respondent.
Tony Miller Jones, of Elrod Jones Leader & Benson, of Rock Hill, for Guardian ad Litem.
We granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing a family court order awarding petitioner (Father) $22,000 in attorney's fees under the South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanction Act (the FCPSA).1 The Father v. South Carolina Dep't of Soc. Serv., 345 S.C. 57, 545 S.E.2d 523 (Ct.App.2001). We affirm.
Respondent Department of Social Services (DSS) determined a child abuse complaint against Father was "indicated." Father initiated an administrative appeal of this finding;2 DSS responded by preparing to take the matter before the family court. Before DSS commenced any action, Father brought this action to have the "indicated" finding purged from DSS' records.
Following a series of hearings and orders, the family court ordered the "indicated" finding of abuse be changed to "unfounded" and awarded Father $22,000 in attorney's fees as a sanction pursuant to the FCPSA.3 DSS appealed this award, and Father cross-appealed the denial of his request for sanctions under Rule 11, SCRCP.
The Court of Appeals held that while the family court could award sanctions under the FCPSA, the facts here did not warrant the $22,000 attorney's fee. The court reversed that award, and further held that Father was not entitled to any Rule 11 relief. The Father, supra.
This Court granted Father's petition for a writ of certiorari. We now affirm.
ANALYSIS
South Carolina Code Ann. § 15-77-300 (Supp.2002) permits a court to tax attorney's fees against a state agency if it concludes "that the agency acted without substantial justification in pressing its claim ..." § 15-77-300(1). This Attorney's Fee Act specifically exempts certain types of suits from its ambit, including child abuse and neglect actions. After the Attorney's Fee Act became effective on July 1, 1985, the General Assembly amended the Family Court's general jurisdiction statute to provide "suit money including attorney's fees, may be assessed for or against a party to an action brought in or subject to the jurisdiction of the family court." S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-420(38) (Supp.2002). In Spartanburg County Dep't of Soc. Services v. Little, supra,
this Court held that the Attorney's Fee Act in Title 15, specifically prohibiting an award of attorney's fees against DSS in a child abuse action even where DSS acted without substantial justification, prevailed over the general jurisdiction statute in Title 20.
DSS complains that the effect of the Court of Appeals' decision in this case, holding that attorney's fees and court costs may be assessed against DSS in a child abuse and neglect action under the FCPSA, effectively overrules Little. We disagree. The Attorney's Fee Act bars an award of attorney's fees in a child abuse and neglect case even where DSS has acted without "substantial justification." § 15-77-300. On the other hand, in order to receive attorney's fees and/or court costs as a sanction under the FCPSA, the aggrieved party must show that the party sought to be sanctioned acted `frivolously.' See, e.g., Hanahan v. Simpson, 326 S.C. 140, 485 S.E.2d 903 (1997)
(. ) A party who makes a `frivolous' claim or raises a `frivolous' defense has committed a more egregious act than one who merely acts `without substantial justification.' See Heath v. Aiken County, 302 S.C. 178, 394 S.E.2d 709 (1990) ().
The General Assembly specifically exempted DSS from liability for attorney's fees when it acts without substantial justification in a child abuse and neglect action. § 15-77-300. When the legislature enacted the FCPSA, and authorized the award of sanctions in the form of attorney's fees and costs against any party, including governmental entities,4 found to have pursued frivolous litigation, it included no such exception. We are required to interpret these statutes as written. By their plain terms, the statutes exempt DSS from the payment of attorney's fees where its pursuit of a child abuse and neglect action was merely without substantial justification, but do not exempt the agency from the possibility of sanctions in the form of attorney's fees and/or court costs where its actions rise to the level of frivolity. See, e.g., Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 533 S.E.2d 578 (2000)
(. ) It is not for this Court to second-guess the wisdom of these decisions made by the General Assembly. E.g., Keyserling v. Beasley, 322 S.C. 83, 86, 470 S.E.2d 100, 101 (1996).
We agree with the Court of Appeals that attorney's fees and/or court costs may be awarded against DSS in an abuse and neglect case pursuant to the FCPSA. Nothing in this decision undermines or conflicts with our decision in Little that attorney's fees are not awardable against DSS in a child abuse and neglect action pursuant to the Attorney's Fee Act.
We granted Father permission to argue against precedent which holds that the decision whether to award sanctions under the FCPSA is a matter in equity, entitling the appellate court to take its own view of the preponderance of the evidence. Kilcawley v. Kilcawley, 312 S.C. 425, 440 S.E.2d 892 (Ct.App.1994) cited with approval in Hanahan v. Simpson, supra. Father argues we should substitute an "abuse of discretion" standard. We adhere to precedent.
The decision to impose a sanction under the FCPSA is to "be determined by the trial judge at the conclusion of a trial...." S.C.Code Ann. § 15-36-30 (Supp.2002). Since the decision whether to impose sanctions under the FCPSA is a decision for the judge, not the jury, it sounds in equity rather than at law. Cf. Flagstar Corp. v. Royal Surplus Lines, 341 S.C. 68, 533 S.E.2d 331 (2000)
(. ) Pursuant to the South Carolina Constitution, an appellate court reviews findings of fact in an equity matter taking its own view of the evidence. S.C. Const. art. V, § 5; see also S.C.Code Ann. § 14-3-320 (Supp.2002).
Father argues that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990), setting forth the federal appellate standard of reviewing a sanction award pursuant to Rule 11, FRCP, applies by analogy and requires this Court to alter our scope of review. We disagree.
In Cooter and Gell, the Supreme Court explained:
If the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder's choice cannot be clearly erroneous....
The fact that the federal courts employ a more deferential standard of review is not mandated by the federal constitution, and thus our constitutional standard applies. So long as sanctions are decided by a judge and not a jury, the South Carolina Constitution mandates an appellate court take its own view of the facts. S.C. Const art. V, § 5.
The "abuse of discretion" standard urged by Father does, however, play a role in the appellate review of a sanctions award. An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is controlled by an error of law or is based on unsupported factual conclusions. See, e.g., Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assoc., 346 S.C. 580, 553 S.E.2d 110 (2001)
(emphasis supplied). For example, where the appellate court agrees with the trial court's findings of fact, it reviews the decision to award sanctions, as well as the terms of those sanctions, under an abuse of discretion standard. Cf, McDowell v. South Carolina Dep't of Soc. Serv., 304 S.C. 539, 405 S.E.2d 830 (1991) ( ).
We adhere to our constitutionally mandated scope of review.
We have reviewed the record in this matter, the family court's order, and the opinion of the Court of Appeals. We find that while DSS's conduct in this matter was flawed in some respects, Father did not meet his burden...
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