Faught v. Faught

• Decision Date: 27 February 1973
• Citation: 30 Cal.App.3d 875,106 Cal.Rptr. 751
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Agnes D. FAUGHT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ardon McGinnis FAUGHT, Defendant and Respondent. In re the MARRIAGE of Ardon McGinnis and Agnes D. FAUGHT. Civ. 39608, 40743.

Page 751

106 Cal.Rptr. 751

30 Cal.App.3d 875

Agnes D. FAUGHT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ardon McGinnis FAUGHT, Defendant and Respondent In re the MARRIAGE of Ardon McGinnis and Agnes D. FAUGHT.

Civ. 39608, 40743.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Feb. 27, 1973.

N. E. Youngblood, Beverly Hills, for appellant.

Anderson, Adams & Bacon, by Chester B. Anderson, Rosemead, for respondent.

FLEMING, Associate Justice.

In March 1969 Agnes Faught secured a decree of separate maintenance from her husband Ardon. The decree awarded her $100 monthly spousal support to run to July 1971, but did not reserve jurisdiction in the court to extend the period of support. In May 1971 Agnes sought an increase and extension of spousal support, a request the court dismissed in July 1971 for lack of jurisdiction. Meanwhile in June 1971 Ardon initiated a separate action for dissolution of the marriage, to which Agnes responded with another request for spousal support. In November 1971 the dissolution court denied spousal support to Agnes on the ground of former adjudication and entered an interlocutory judgment dissolving the marriage.

Agnes has appealed the denial of further spousal support in both the separate maintenance proceeding and in the dissolution action. She has also appealed the interlocutory judgment of dissolution, contending the court lacked jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage at a time her appeal in the separate maintenance proceeding was pending.

We find her contentions without merit.

1. In the separate maintenance proceeding the court properly denied Agnes' request to extend spousal support beyond July 1971. Former Civil Code section 139.7 (now Civil Code section 4801 (d)), in effect at the time the separate maintenance decree was entered, declared: 'An order for payment of an allowance for support . . . shall terminate at the end of the period specified in the order and shall not be extended unless the court in its original order retains jurisdiction.' The decree did not retain jurisdiction in the court to extend the period of spousal support, and under the statute the court lacked authority to grant Agnes' request. (See Dahlstet v. Dahlstet, 272 Cal.App.2d 174, 178--179, 77 Cal.Rptr. 45.)

2. The court in the dissolution action correctly rejected Agnes' request for spousal support, for that issue had been conclusively adjudicated in the prior separate maintenance proceeding. Separete maintenance (now legal separation) is essentially a device to determine and settle the spouses' financial responsibilities to one another and to their minor children. While the law may once have been to the contrary (cf. Monroe v. Superior Court (1946) 28 Cal.2d 427, 170 P.2d 473) a decree of separate maintenance now operates as a final adjudication of such financial aspects of the matrimonial relationship as spousal support, division of community property, and settlement of property rights, and to the extent the decree deals with such matters it is conclusive. (Civ.Code, §§ 4540, 4800, 4801.) At bench, the issue of spousal support had been resolved by the prior separate maintenance decree, and only the marital status of the parties remained to be determined in the dissolution action. Under the concept of divisible...