Faust v. State
Decision Date | 12 January 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 50300,50300 |
Citation | 354 So.2d 866 |
Parties | Ernest FAUST, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Jack O. Johnson, Public Defender, and Paul J. Martin, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Mary Jo M. Gallay, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.
This cause is before us on direct appeal from a final judgment of the trial court inherently passing on the constitutional validity of Section 827.03, Florida Statutes (1975), thereby vesting jurisdiction in this Court pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution. Harrell's Candy Kitchen, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority, 111 So.2d 439 (Fla.1959); Demko's Gold Coast Trailer Park, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 218 So.2d 745 (Fla.1969).
Appellant was charged by information with two counts of aggravated child abuse contrary to Section 827.03, Florida Statutes (1975). He filed a motion to dismiss the information alleging inter alia that the statute under which he was charged is violative of his due process rights. In the hearing on the motion to dismiss, he argued that his due process rights were being violated because the statute is unconstitutionally vague. Inherently upholding the constitutional validity of the statute, the trial judge denied the motion to dismiss.
Upon denial of his motion by the trial judge, appellant changed his plea of not guilty to nolo contendere and reserved his right to appeal the constitutionality of the statute. 1 He was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to eight years imprisonment.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the information since Section 827.03, Florida Statutes (1975), is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
Section 827.03, Florida Statutes (1975), provides:
"827.03 Aggravated child abuse. Whoever:
(1) Commits aggravated battery on a child;
(2) Willfully tortures a child;
(3) Maliciously punishes a child; or
(4) Willfully and unlawfully cages a child shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084."
Appellant concedes that the language in subsection (1) is sufficiently definite.
We find that Section 827.03, Florida Statutes, is not unconstitutionally vague and indefinite since it conveys a sufficiently definite warning to those subject to its provisions what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties. Cf. State v. Gale Distributors, Inc., 349 So.2d 150 (Fla.1977); Zachary v. State, 269 So.2d 669 (Fla.1972); Brock v. Hardie, 114 Fla. 670, 154 So. 690 (1934).
In Jordan v. State, 334 So.2d 589 (Fla.1976), this Court held that the predecessor to the statute under consideration, which was Section 828.04(1), Florida Statutes (1973), was not unconstitutionally vague. Section 828.041(1), Florida Statutes (1973), identical to the statute in question insofar as the conduct proscribed thereby is concerned, provided:
"Whoever unlawfully or willfully tortures, cages, or mutilates, or whoever cruelly, wantonly, or with malice, torments or punishes, any child under the age of sixteen years or whoever, in committing a battery upon any child under the age of sixteen years, intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to such child is guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084."
Responding to the constitutional attack on this statute based on vagueness, this Court opined in Jordan v. State, supra:
Both the instant statute and its predecessor utilize substantially the same language to proscribe substantially identical conduct, although the current statute takes an outline form.
Furthermore, the term "torture," as employed in the present statute, is now defined by Section...
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...or permanent disfigurement"; Campbell v. State, 240 So.2d 298 (Fla.1970), "unnecessarily and excessively chastises"; Faust v. State, 354 So.2d 866 (Fla.1978), "willfully tortures", "maliciously punishes", "willfully and unlawfully cages". In each of these cases the court found the particula......
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...fails because sections 838.015(1) and 838.016(1) convey a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct, see Faust v. State, 354 So.2d 866 (Fla. 1978); Zachary v. State, 269 So.2d 669 (Fla. 1972), and his assertion of overbreadth is unavailing because he has failed to show that......
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