Fausto v. Sanchez-Flores

• Decision Date: 11 March 2021
• Docket Number: No. 80074,80074
• Citation: 482 P.3d 677
• Parties: Jaqueline FAUSTO, an individual, Appellant, v. Ricardo SANCHEZ-FLORES, an individual; and Verenice Ruth Flores, an individual, Respondents.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

482 P.3d 677

Jaqueline FAUSTO, an individual, Appellant,

v.Ricardo SANCHEZ-FLORES, an individual; and Verenice Ruth Flores, an individual, Respondents.

No. 80074

Supreme Court of Nevada.

FILED MARCH 11, 2021

Hutchison & Steffen, LLC, and Jason D. Guinasso, Joseph R. Ganley, and Alexander R. Velto, Reno, for Appellant.

The Wright Law Group and John Henry Wright, Las Vegas, for Respondents.

BEFORE HARDESTY, C.J., PARRAGUIRRE and CADISH, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, HARDESTY, C.J.:

In this appeal, we consider whether the two-year limitations period of NRS 11.190(4)(e) for commencing actions to recover for personal injuries or wrongful death is subject to equitable tolling. We conclude that it is, and thus, equitable tolling may apply in such cases when the plaintiff demonstrates reasonable diligence in pursuing his or her claims and extraordinary circumstances that prevented him or her from timely filing the complaint. Under this standard, we further conclude that appellant Jaqueline Fausto failed to demonstrate that her circumstances warrant equitable tolling of NRS 11.190(4)(e), and we thus affirm the district court's dismissal of her complaint.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 2, 2019, Fausto filed a civil torts complaint alleging that on December 30, 2016, after an evening out with respondents Ricardo Sanchez-Flores and his then-wife Verenice Ruth Flores (collectively, Sanchez-Flores) to celebrate a professional accomplishment, Ricardo took advantage of Fausto's intoxicated state to sexually assault her. Fausto further alleged that Verenice was aware of the sexual assault but drove her home without revealing her knowledge. Fausto stated that the day after the assault occurred, she went to the doctor to complete a rape kit and, days later, she reported the crime to the police. Four months after she reported the assault, the police collected the unwashed clothes that she had been wearing on the night of the alleged assault. Fausto asserted it was not until February 2, 2019, that she was notified that the rape kit and unwashed clothing had been processed by the lab and that Ricardo's DNA was found on her clothing. A criminal complaint was filed against Ricardo thereafter.

Because Fausto's civil complaint was filed two and a half years after the alleged sexual assault occurred, Sanchez-Flores filed an NRCP 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss based on NRS 11.190(4)(e), which imposes a two-year limitations period for personal injury and wrongful death claims. In opposition, Fausto argued that the two-year statute of limitations should be tolled because she could not have brought her claims before she received the rape kit results.

The district court granted Sanchez-Flores's motion, finding that Fausto's complaint was time-barred because she filed it over six months after the two-year statute of limitations had expired. The district court further found that equitable tolling of the statute of limitations did not apply because Fausto knew of the underlying facts of her tort claims during the limitations period and was not prevented from obtaining other information necessary to her claims despite the delayed processing of her rape kit. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Fausto argues that the district court erred in finding that equitable tolling was not warranted. She asks this court to clarify that NRS 11.190(4)(e) is subject to equitable tolling and to adopt the federal standard for determining when equitable tolling applies. Fausto asserts that the federal standard would provide Nevada district courts with a standard more generally workable than the one we applied in Copeland v . Desert Inn Hotel, 99 Nev. 823, 826, 673 P.2d 490, 492 (1983) (adopting equitable tolling in the employment discrimination context), but regardless, the limitations period for her tort claims should have been tolled under either standard.

We generally review a dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5) de novo, treating all alleged facts in the complaint as true and drawing all inferences in favor of the complainant. Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 227-28, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008). However, when the district court is presented with and does not exclude matters outside the pleadings in making its decision, "the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment." NRCP 12(d). Because the parties submitted exhibits containing matters outside the pleadings and the district court did not exclude those exhibits, we treat the dismissal order as an order granting summary judgment, which we also review de novo. Winn v. Sunrise Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 128 Nev. 246, 252, 277 P.3d 458, 462 (2012). Summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings and other evidence on file demonstrate that no genuine issue as to any material fact [remains] and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). All evidence "must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. Neither party disputes the facts in the record, nor does either party maintain that there are genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment.¹ Instead, each party presents legal arguments on the basis of the facts in the record as to whether Fausto's tort claims are entitled to equitable tolling.

NRS 11.190(4)(e) is subject to equitable tolling

NRS 11.190(4)(e) provides a two-year limitations period for "an action to recover damages for injuries to a person or for the death of a person caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another." The two-year period for filing suit under NRS 11.190(4)(e) begins to run "when the wrong occurs and a party sustains injuries for which relief could be sought." Petersen v. Bruen, 106 Nev. 271, 274, 792 P.2d 18, 20 (1990). Fausto does not dispute on appeal that she filed her complaint after the limitations period expired. Rather, she contends that the limitations period should be equitably tolled because she was unable to obtain evidence necessary to her claims during the limitations period.

We have not previously determined whether NRS 11.190(4)(e) may be equitably tolled. The doctrine of equitable tolling is a nonstatutory remedy that permits a court to suspend a limitations period and allow an otherwise untimely action to proceed when justice requires it. See 51 Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 153 (2021 update). A statute of limitations such as NRS 11.190(4)(e) is primarily intended "to ‘[prevent] surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared." ’ Petersen, 106 Nev. at 273, 792 P.2d at 19 (alteration in original) (quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v . Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49, 64 S.Ct. 582, 88 L.Ed. 788 (1944) ). Because the main purpose of a statute of limitations "is to encourage the plaintiff to pursu[e] his rights diligently, ... when an extraordinary circumstance prevents him from bringing a timely action, the restriction imposed by the statute of limitations does not further the statute's purpose." CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 10, 134 S.Ct. 2175, 189 L.Ed.2d 62 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, it is "presume[d] that equitable tolling applies if the period in question is a statute of limitations and if tolling is consistent with the statute." Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 11, 134 S.Ct. 1224, 188 L.Ed.2d 200 (2014) ; see also United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 407, 135 S.Ct. 1625, 191 L.Ed.2d 533 (2015) ("[W]e recognize[ ] that time bars in suits between private parties are presumptively subject to equitable tolling."); see also 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 132 (2021 update) ("Limitations periods are customarily subject to equitable tolling unless tolling would be inconsistent with the text of the relevant statute.").

When determining whether a statute is subject to equitable tolling, "the inquiry begins with the understanding that [the Legislature] legislate[s] against a background of common-law adjudicatory principles." Lozano, 572 U.S. at 10, 134 S.Ct. 1224 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). We first adopted the doctrine of equitable tolling in the context of employment discrimination claims in Copeland . 99 Nev. at 826, 673 P.2d at 492. Notably, we left open the possibility of applying equitable tolling in other contexts. Id. Since Copeland , this court has applied the equitable tolling doctrine to other statutes of limitations. For example, in State, Department of Taxation v. Masco Builder Cabinet Group , this court affirmed a district court's decision to equitably toll the deadline under NRS 372.635 for a taxpayer refund claim. 127 Nev. 730, 738-40, 265 P.3d 666, 671-73 (2011). Similarly, in City of North Las Vegas v . State, Local Government Employee-Management Relations Board, this court affirmed a district court's decision to equitably toll NRS 288.110(4) ’s six-month deadline for filing a complaint asserting prohibited labor practices against a local government agency. 127 Nev. 631, 641, 261 P.3d 1071, 1077 (2011). And in O'Lane v. Spinney, we recognized that the doctrine of equitable tolling could pertain to the deadline for enforcing judgments under NRS 11.190(1). 110 Nev. 496, 501, 874 P.2d 754, 757 (1994).

Based on our evolving expansion of the equitable tolling doctrine to other similar statutes of limitations and the presumption that the Legislature legislates with common law principles like equitable tolling in mind, we see no reason to reject its application to NRS 11.190(4)(e). See Saint Francis Mem'l Hosp. v. State Dep't of Pub. Health, 9 Cal.5th 710, 265 Cal.Rptr.3d 121, 467 P.3d 1033, 1037 (2020) ("Courts draw authority to toll a filing deadline from their inherent equitable powers—not from what the Legislature has...