Fayetteville-Manlius Central School Dist. v. Fayetteville-Manlius Teachers Ass'n

• Decision Date: 24 February 1976
• Docket Number: FAYETTEVILLE-MANLIUS
• Parties: , 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2237 In the Matter of the Arbitration ofCENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Respondent-Appellant, andTEACHERS ASSOCIATION, on Grievance of Karen O'Neil, Appellant-Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 376

380 N.Y.S.2d 376

51 A.D.2d 91, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2237

In the Matter of the Arbitration of FAYETTEVILLE-MANLIUS CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Respondent-Appellant and FAYETTEVILLE-MANLIUS TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, on Grievance of Karen O'Neil, Appellant-Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.

Feb. 24, 1976.

Bernard F. Ashe, Albany (Richard Heffern, Albany, of counsel), for appellant-respondent.

MacKenzie, Smith, Lewis, Michell & Hughes, Syracuse (John F. Lawton, Syracuse, of counsel), for respondent-appellant.

Before MOULE, J.P., and CARDAMONE, SIMONS, MAHONEY and GOLDMAN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM:

Special Term properly confirmed that portion of the arbitrator's determination which awarded teacher-grievant lost salary for the 1974--1975 school year and properly modified the award by vacating the provision for reinstatement for the 1975--1976 school year, pursuant to CPLR 7511(c)(2) (see, Alberti v. County of Erie, 46 A.D.2d 725, 360 N.Y.S.2d 343). An award may be vacated under CPLR 7511(b)(1)(iii) if the arbitrator acted outside the limits authorized by the arbitration agreement, which is the foundation of his authority and jurisdiction, or, where the arbitrator's construction of the agreement is completely irrational and, in effect, makes a new contract for the parties (Lentine v. Fundaro, 29 N.Y.2d 382, 385, 328 N.Y.S.2d 418, 421, 278 N.E.2d 633, 634; Mtr. of Granite Worsted Mills (Cowan), 25 N.Y.2d 451, 456--457, 306 N.Y.S.2d 934, 938, 255 N.E.2d 168, 170; Mtr. of Nat. Cash Register Co. (Wilson), 8 N.Y.2d 377, 383, 208 N.Y.S.2d 951, 955, 171 N.E.2d 302, 305). Considering the contractual provision concerning timely notice of denial of tenure and termination of services to be accorded grievant found breached by the school district there being no deprivation of any other substantive right, the award of loss of salary for the 1974--1975 school year completely satisfies any damage sustained by grievant. However, the award of reinstatement for the 1975--1976 school year, bearing no rational connection to the contractual provision found breached by the school district, constitutes a determination beyond the submission and in excess of arbitrator's power.

Order affirmed without costs, in a Memorandum in which all concur except CARDAMONE, J., who concurs in part in a separate Memorandum and GOLDMAN, J., who dissents and votes to confirm the arbitrator's award in all respects, in an Opinion.

CARDAMONE, Justice (concurring in part).

I concur with the majority that the arbitrator's award was correctly modified by Special Term. I would add, however, that petitioner must be accorded her statutory rights pursuant to section 3031 of the Education Law and her contractual right under section D of Article IX of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Petitioner is entitled under the statute to notice of the recommendation denying her tenure and may request a written statement of the reasons for the said recommendation, and she is entitled to file a written response to such statement (Education Law, § 3031). The Collective Bargaining Agreement, which is binding upon the respondent School Board, expands petitioner's statutory rights by granting to a teacher who has completed at least two and one-half years employment in the district, the right to demand a hearing (Collective Bargaining Agreement, Article IX, section D(1)). Since petitioner was denied these statutory and contractual rights, merely granting her back pay for 1974--75 does not make her whole. While the arbitrator acted in excess of his power in reinstating petitioner for the full 1975--76 school year, nonetheless, petitioner must be placed in the status she occupied immediately prior to her dismissal in order to be accorded the full panoply of statutory and contractual rights to which she is entitled.

GOLDMAN, Justice (dissenting).

The majority properly concludes, as did Special Term, that the School District did not give timely notification to the grievant teacher, Mr. O'Neil, of denial of tenure and consequent dismissal. I cannot agree that the arbitration award should not be confirmed in every respect. I depart from the majority's determination that payment to the teacher for the year for which she was unemployed made her whole, that the arbitrator's grant of an additional probationary year was tantamount to an alteration of the collective bargaining agreement and exceeded the arbitrator's powers and should, therefore, be vacated under CPLR 7511.

The underlying facts are essentially undisputed. On May 30, 1974 Ms. O'Neil, who was first appointed a probationary teacher in September, 1971, received her tentative teaching schedule for the year 1974--1975. On June 7, 1974 the Governor signed the legislation which revised the Tenure Law by reducing the maximum term of probationary status from five years to three years, effective October 1, 1974 (L.1974, ch. 735, § 3; L.1974, ch. 736, § 2). On June 21, 1974 Ms. O'Neil received a formal notice of salary, as did all the teachers who were to teach during the 1974--1975 school year. Thereafter, the Superintendent of the School District received a formal opinion from the District's counsel advising him that all probationary teachers who would complete three or more years of probationary service by October 1, 1974 must be granted tenure, unless prior to that date their services were terminated. The Superintendent then notified Ms. O'Neil that her services as a probationary teacher would be terminated on October 1, 1974. The Teachers' Association, of which Ms. O'Neil is a member, thereupon filed a grievance for Ms. O'Neil, pursuant to the collecti bargaining agreement, and the matter proceeded to arbitration upon the following stipulated controversy:

'Did the District give timely notification to Mrs. Karen O' Neil of denial of tenure and consequent dismissal under Article IX, Sections C and D of the 1972--1974 and 1974--1976 agreements between the parties?'

The arbitrator determined that the School District violated Article IX, Sections C and D of the agreement by failing to give Ms. O'Neil timely notification of denial of her tenure and by its dismissal of her. The award for these violations, the arbitrator determined, was payment for lost time during the 1974--1975 school year and reinstatement for an additional year with probationary status. The School District then commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR 7511 (subd. (b), par. (1), cl. (iii)) to vacate the award on the grounds that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority and powers. The School District is appealing from the award of back pay and the Teachers' Association is appealing from the vacating of the award ordering reinstatement of Ms. O'Neil for an additional year of probationary service.

The School District urges that the arbitrator exceeded his powers because his award invaded the province of the School Board in the area of tenure by reversing the School Board's decision not to grant tenure (Legislative Conference of the City University of New York v. Bd. of Higher Educ. of the City of New York, 38 A.D.2d 478, 327 N.Y.S.2d 1, affd., 31 N.Y.2d 926, 340 N.Y.S.2d 924, 293 N.E.2d 92). I find no merit in this contention. The language of the award negates any intention to grant tenure, for the arbitrator specifically directed that grievant be 'reinstated for one additional year in Probationary status * * *' (emphasis supplied). Had the arbitrator attempted to confer tenure, he would clearly have exceeded his power, for 'the power to grant tenure is vested exclusively within the province of the Board of Higher Education' (Legislative Conference of the City University of New York v. Bd. of Higher Educ. of the City of New York, p. 479, 327 N.Y.S.2d p. 1, Supra), and in the case at bar in the province of the School District. Absent provision to the contrary in the agreement providing for arbitration, and there is no such contrary provision in the instant agreement, arbitrators are not bound by principles of substantive law or rules of evidence (Matter of Raisler (N.Y. City Housing Auth.), 32 N.Y.2d 274, 282, 344 N.Y.S.2d 917, 922, 298 N.E.2d 91, 95; Lentine v. Fundaro, 29 N.Y.2d 382, 385, 328 N.Y.S.2d 418, 421, 278 N.E.2d 633, 635). The arbitrator's 'duly is to reach a just result regardless of the...