Feast v. Auer

• Decision Date: 24 January 1906
• Citation: 90 S.W. 564
• Parties: FEAST v. AUER.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

90 S.W. 564

FEAST v. AUER.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

January 24, 1906

Appeal from Circuit Court, McCracken County.

"Not to be officially reported."

Action by Florence Feast against Charles Auer. From a judgment dismissing the petition, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

J. M Worten and A. L. Harper, for appellant.

PAYNTER J.

In this action the appellant charges the appellee with slander. It is averred in the petition that the appellee is a Catholic priest; that he has been in charge of St. John's Church as a priest for many years; that she and the appellee had a slight disagreement over a trivial matter; that the appellee became hostile towards her; that shortly thereafter, while the appellee was delivering a sermon to his congregation at St. John's Church, he said of and concerning her in the presence of the congregation that "she (meaning the appellant) is a dirty, vile woman," thereby meaning and intending to have his hearers understand that she "was an immoral woman, a woman without virtue, and a woman of general bad character for virtue, morals, and otherwise." The court sustained a demurrer to and dismissed the petition, and that action of the court is here for review.

At common law an action for slander will lie for the malicious publication of a false accusation, although made in general words, if it imports that the person accused is guilty of a felony or other crime for which an indictment would lie. McNamara v. Shannon, 8 Bush, 558. It was held in Watson v. Hampton, 2 Bibb, 319, that a charge that the plaintiff had sworn to a lie "was not actionable"; and in Martin v. Melton, 4 Bibb, 99, it was held that, where one said to another, "You have sworn a lie, and I can prove it," is not actionable unless laid with a colloquim concerning an oath in some judicial proceeding. It was held in Caldwell v. Abbey Hardin, 529, that it was not actionable to call a man "a damned rogue." It was held in Craig v Pyles, 39 S.W. 33, 18 Ky. Law Rep. 1043, that the charge, where a party spoke of and concerning another "she is a dirty bitch; she has no character, and is no account"--are not actionable words in themselves and did not 0import that the party accused "was a whore, common prostitute, or was guilty of fornication and adultery." The court reached this conclusion by the well-settled rule that an innuendo cannot extend the meaning of words beyond their natural import, it can only serve to...