Federal Express Corp. v. U.S.
Decision Date | 17 September 2002 |
Docket Number | No. CIV. 01-227 WJDJSACE.,CIV. 01-227 WJDJSACE. |
Citation | 228 F.Supp.2d 1267 |
Parties | FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, a New Mexico foreign corporation, and Sentry Insurance Company, Inc., a foreign corporation doing business in New Mexico, Plaintiffs, v. THE UNITED STATES of America, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
John Stiff, Stiff & Ford, PC, Albuquerque, NM, Robert R. Rothstein, Rothstein, Donatelli, Hughes, Dahlstrom, Schoenburg & Frye, LLP, Santa Fe, NM, for plaintiffs.
Phyllis Dow, U.S. Attorney's Office, Albuquerque, NM, for defendant.
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine Regarding Application of Tribal law, filed August 12, 2002 (Doc. 53). This action is a medical malpractice claim in which Plaintiffs are suing the United States for subrogation and indemnification for a sum paid out in settlement. Having considered the parties' briefs and the applicable law, I find that Plaintiffs' motion is not well-taken and will be denied.
Ms. Annie Morris was struck down by a Federal Express truck in a shopping center parking lot and died as a result. After the accident, Ms. Morris was taken to the Crownpoint Health Care Facility ("CHCF") where she was treated. Plaintiffs contend that employees at CHCF, which is operated by the Indian Health Service ("IHS"), should have been able to stabilize Ms. Morris to permit her transfer to another facility capable of caring for her injuries. Parties do not dispute that CHCF is located on Indian territory.1
Plaintiffs seek to have the Court apply Navajo Tribal law to its claim brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), instead of New Mexico state law, based on the wording in the statute:
... [T]he district courts, together with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for ... personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (emphasis added). In support of their position, Plaintiffs rely on their interpretation of the statutory language, and one published District of New Mexico opinion, Cheromiah v. U.S., which held that Acomo trial law applied under § 1346(b) as the "law of the place" where the act of omission occurred. 55 F.Supp.2d 1295 (D.N.M.1999). Plaintiff points out that Cheromiah was followed by the Fourth Circuit in Williams v. U.S., 1999 WL 33320440 (W.D.N.C.1999). However, although the Williams court found that Cherokee law governed the FTCA claim, on appeal it was noted that because there was no tribal law applicable to the provision of emergency medical treatment, any tribal resolution would look to "applicable federal and North Carolina law." The court, therefore, did not need to ultimately determine whether tribal law, and not state law, "constituted the applicable law of the place." Williams v. U.S., 242 F.3d 169, 175, n. 2 (4th Cir.2001) ("Williams II").2 At the same time, Williams II acknowledged that another District of New Mexico case had reached a conclusion opposite to the one reached in Cheromiah, citing Louis v. U.S., 54 F.Supp.2d 1207, 1210 (D.N.M.1999) ( ). See also Bryant v. U.S., 147 F.Supp.2d 953 (D.Ariz., 2000) ( ).
Plaintiffs ignore the overwhelming load of case law that has interpreted the term "law of the place" to refer to the substantive law of the state in which the tort occurred. See, e.g., Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 303-07, 112 S.Ct. 711, 714-15, 116 L.Ed.2d 731, (1992) ( )(emphasis supplied), appealed after remand on other grds., 6 F.3d 461 (7th Cir., Sept., 1993); Franklin v. U.S., 992 F.2d 1492, 1495 (10th Cir.1993) ( ); Flynn v. United States, 902 F.2d 1524, 1527 (10th Cir.1990) ( )(emphasis added); Brown v. U.S., 653 F.2d 196, 200 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 925, 102 S.Ct. 1970, 72 L.Ed.2d 440 (1982) ( ); Kruchten v. U.S., 914 F.2d 1106 (8th Cir.1990) ( ); Ochran v. U.S., 273 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir.2001) ( ); Delta Savings Bank et al. v. U.S., 265 F.3d 1017, 1024 (9th Cir.2001) ( )(citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475-79, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994)); accord, Fresquez v. U.S., 788 F.Supp. 469 (D.Colo.1992); O'Neal v. Department of Army, 852 F.Supp. 327 (M.D.Pa.1994); Rose v. U.S., 929 F.Supp. 305 (N.D.Ill.1996);Walton v. U.S., 770 F.Supp. 731 (D.Mass.1991).
Further, even if tribal jurisdiction concurrently extends to the claim at hand, the mere existence of jurisdiction is not determinative in deciding what "law of the place" applies. Rather, the inquiry ends where it is determined the negligence occurred. E.g., Hess v. U.S., 361 U.S. 314, 80 S.Ct. 341, 4 L.Ed.2d 305 (1960) ( ); Seyler v. U.S., 832 F.2d 120 (9th Cir.1987) ( ); Bryant v. U.S. 565 F.2d 650, 652-53 (10th Cir.1977) ( ); Brock v. U.S., 601 F.2d 976 (9th Cir.1979) ( ).
Plaintiff's analysis of the issue under Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981), which addresses a tribe's civil authority over non-Indians misses the big picture. It works only if one assumes the United States Government is a private person. Given the strict construction afforded sovereign immunity provisions, Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 161, 101 S.Ct. 2698, 69 L.Ed.2d 548 (1981), this Court declines to accept such an assumption. Therefore, Plaintiff's motion regarding the application of tribal law to this case will be denied.
Plaintiff argues in the alternative that if New Mexico law applies, then the liability cap set out in the New Mexico Medical Malpractice Act, N.M.S.A. § 41-5-6 ("Medical Malpractice Act") is unconstitutional. The Act limits certain types of monetary relief for medical malpractice claims. Plaintiff argues that the cap violates the New Mexico Constitution. In support of its position, Defendant relies on Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque et al., 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305 (1998) (Trujillo II), which I find to be instructive as well as dispositive in the guidance it provides on the issue.
Trujillo II held that the rational basis level of scrutiny should be applied to an equal protection challenge to the damages cap in the New Mexico Tort Claims Act ("TCA"). The critical part of this holding is that the New Mexico Supreme Court further held that the rational basis would be the "constitutional test applied to cap challenges of this nature from this point forward." 125 N.M. at 723, 965 P.2d 305.3 Plaintiff's constitutional challenge to the Medical Malpractice Act comes under this category of challenges, both in the sense of the type of challenge and the nature of the cap set forth in the Medical Malpractice Act.
Social and economic legislation is generally considered presumptively valid. Trujillo II, 125 N.M. at 726, 965 P.2d 305 (citation omitted). Under the rational basis test, a plaintiff is required to show that the statute's classification is not rationally related to the legislative goal.4 The cap in the Medical Malpractice Act does not include "punitive damages and medical care and related benefits." § 41-5-6(A) & (B). Victims of medical malpractice may still recover for acts of negligence egregious enough to warrant punitive damages or entail costly medical care. As noted in Cummings v. X-Ray Assoc. of N.M., P.C., 121 N.M. 821, 918 P.2d 1321 (1996),5 the Medical Malpractice Act achieves "the legislative purposes of assuring that health providers are adequately insured so that patients may be reasonably compensated for their malpractice injuries." 121 N.M. at 830, 918 P.2d 1321. The analysis in a recent New Mexico Court of Appeals case, Godwin et al. v. Memorial Med'l...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Quechan Indian Tribe v. U.S.
...Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) which does not involve Indian law issues.); Federal Express Cop. v. United States, 228 F.Supp.2d 1267 (D.N.M.2002) (Applied state law upon finding the "overwhelming load of case law" interprets "law of the place" as law of the ......
-
Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson
...Health Sys., Inc. (2003), 265 Neb. 918, 663 N.W.2d 43 [$1.25 million cap on all damages]); New Mexico (Fed. Express Corp. v. United States (D.N.M.2002), 228 F.Supp.2d 1267); Oregon (Greist v. Phillips (1995), 322 Ore. 281, 906 P.2d 789); South Carolina (Wright v. Colleton Cty. School Dist. ......
-
Macdonald v. City Hosp. Inc.
...defendants for medical malpractice wrongful death by Florida statute; equal protection and takings clause); Federal Express Corp. v. United States, 228 F.Supp.2d 1267 (D.N.M.2002) ($600,000 on damages except punitives and medical care and related expenses by New Mexico statute; equal protec......
-
Lafromboise v. Leavitt
...stands alone among the district courts to have considered the question of statutory interpretation. Cf. Fed. Express Corp. v. United States, 228 F.Supp.2d 1267, 1269 (D.N.M. 2002); Bryant v. United States, 147 F.Supp.2d 953, 957 (D.Ariz.2000); Louis v. United States, 54 F.Supp.2d 1207, 1210......