Federal Way School Dist. 210 v. Vinson

Decision Date25 January 2010
Docket NumberNo. 61752-4-I.,61752-4-I.
Citation225 P.3d 379,154 Wn. App. 220
PartiesFEDERAL WAY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 210, Appellant, v. David VINSON, Respondent.
CourtWashington Court of Appeals
225 P.3d 379
154 Wn. App. 220
FEDERAL WAY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 210, Appellant,
v.
David VINSON, Respondent.
No. 61752-4-I.
Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.
January 25, 2010.

[225 P.3d 382]

Jeffrey Ganson, Rachel Edmonds Miller, Dionne & Rorick, Seattle, WA, for Appellant.

Tyler K. Firkins, Van Siclen Stocks & Firkins, Auburn, WA, for Respondent.

APPELWICK, J.


¶ 1 This case arises from a notice of probable cause for discharge issued to Vinson, a teacher, by the Federal Way School District. The notice was based on alleged harassment of and retaliation against a former student, and dishonesty during the investigation of those allegations. Vinson filed an administrative appeal, during which he admitted he lied in the course of the investigation. A hearing officer found that Vinson's misconduct, while improper, was not sufficient cause for termination. The District then sought review via a statutory writ of review, pursuant to RCW 7.16.040. The superior court denied the writ and affirmed the hearing officer. The District filed a notice of appeal of the court's decision.

¶ 2 Dishonesty by a certified teacher during the course of an official school district investigation lacks any professional purpose as a matter of law, and is sufficient cause for termination. The superior court abused its discretion in denying the writ. We reverse the trial court's denial of the writ and vacate the order affirming the hearing officer and awarding attorney fees. We remand with direction to the superior court to enter an order reversing the decision of the hearing officer.

FACTS1

¶ 3 On May 1, 2007, David Vinson, a teacher at Federal Way High School, encountered Rebecca Nistrian, a former student, at Taco Time in Federal Way.2 Nistrian and Vinson's accounts of the Taco Time encounter differ. Vinson claims that Nistrian approached him asking "[h]ey, Mr. V., why aren't you at TJ [Thomas Jefferson High School] anymore?" to which Vinson responded, "[d]on't talk to me ever again, you fucking bitch." Nistrian then told him to "fuck off," and Vinson responded by calling her a "bitch" and a "whore."

¶ 4 Nistrian claims that she said "[h]i" to Vinson, at which point he called her names including "slut," "tramp," "whore," "bitch," and "hussy." Nistrian also alleges that Vinson threatened to come to her place of business, The Red Lobster, and be a difficult customer. Nistrian had previously called Vinson, who is openly gay, a "faggot."

¶ 5 Nistrian reported the Taco Time incident to the executive director of human resources for the Federal Way School District (District), who assigned investigation of the claim to Courtney Wood. Wood had been the investigator on Kraght's harassment complaint against Vinson in 2005, as well as on Vinson's harassment complaint against Ilgenfritz and Kraght. On May 22, 2007, Wood began interviewing Vinson, whereupon Vinson told Wood that he did not feel the investigation could be impartial, and that he felt bullied by Wood. The investigation continued nevertheless. Both Vinson and Nistrian ultimately admitted to lying during the course of the investigation by Wood.

¶ 6 On July 5, 2007, the District issued to Vinson a letter of probable cause for discharge

225 P.3d 383

from employment pursuant to RCW 28A.405.300.3 In the letter, the District stated that its investigation provided probable cause for termination, based on (1) retaliation and harassment against Nistrian for participation in the 2005 harassment claim investigation, and (2) dishonesty during the course of investigation into the Taco Time incident.4

¶ 7 Vinson requested a hearing pursuant to RCW 28A.405.310 to contest his termination. The hearing took place before Hearing Officer John Cooper on November 27 and November 28, 2007.

¶ 8 The hearing officer found that Vinson had lied in his initial responses to Wood's questions about the incident, which Wood had framed as events occurring on May 2, 2007, when Vinson knew they had taken place on May 1. Instead of correcting Wood on the date, Vinson answered "no" to these questions. The hearing officer also found that Vinson had continued to deny knowledge even when Wood's changed the questions such that they required a "frank admission." The hearing officer entered a specific finding that "Mr. Vinson admits that he had lied in response to certain questions posed to him by Mr. Wood during the course of the investigation." However, the hearing officer found that Vinson presented plausible reasons for his lack of candor, not least of which was his perception that the investigation by Wood was not impartial.

¶ 9 The hearing officer found Nistrian's testimony "to be lacking in credibility," as several witnesses testified that she is a known liar, and she admitted during the investigation that she had lied about seeking an anti-harassment order against Vinson.

¶ 10 Although the hearing officer commented on the impropriety of Vinson's conduct — that it was "troubling and should never have occurred" — the hearing officer concluded that the District had failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that probable cause existed for termination of Vinson's employment. The hearing officer also found that the conduct cited in the termination letter did not and would not have an adverse impact upon his teaching effectiveness or performance. Therefore the conduct did not violate RCW 28A.405.300.

¶ 11 The District sought a writ of review pursuant to RCW 7.16.040 in King County Superior Court.5 The court found that that the District had failed to meet the requirements for a grant of statutory certiorari and denied the writ, affirming the decision of the hearing officer. It ordered the District to pay Vinson's attorney fees, incurred in the underlying hearing, in the amount of $38,773.67.

¶ 12 The District appealed the trial court's order and judgment denying the writ and affirming the decision of the hearing officer. After submitting his briefing, Vinson withdrew his request for reinstatement, waived the award of attorney fees, and asked this court to dismiss the appeal as moot. A commissioner ruled that the issue of mootness was to be argued at the hearing on the merits.

¶ 13 Following oral argument, we issued an opinion stating that because the parties had settled the case was moot, so the court no longer had jurisdiction. However, the District's motion for reconsideration correctly noted that the parties had not settled. Rather, Vinson had unilaterally withdrawn his request for reinstatement and waived his right to attorney fees. We granted the motion for reconsideration and withdrew our original opinion.

225 P.3d 384
DISCUSSION

¶ 14 The basis for granting the statutory writ is established in RCW 7.16.040:

A writ of review shall be granted by any court, except a municipal or district court, when an inferior tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicial functions, has exceeded the jurisdiction of such tribunal, board or officer, or one acting illegally, or to correct any erroneous or void proceeding, or a proceeding not according to the course of the common law, and there is no appeal, nor in the judgment of the court, any plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law.

Commanda v. Cary, 143 Wash.2d 651, 655, 23 P.3d 1086 (2001). The superior court's decision to issue a writ is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See, id. at 654-57, 23 P.3d 1086. Issues of law are reviewed de novo to determine whether the decision below was contrary to law. RCW 7.16.120(3); Sunderland Family Treatment Servs. v. City of Pasco, 127 Wash.2d 782, 788, 903 P.2d 986 (1995). Issues of fact are reviewed to determine whether they are supported by competent and substantial evidence. RCW 7.16.120(4); Sunderland, 127 Wash.2d at 788, 903 P.2d 986.

¶ 15 The District asked the court to determine whether, under RCW 7.16.120(3),6 the hearing officer had erred as a matter of law on the issue of sufficient cause, prejudicing the District. If the District succeeded on the merits, the trial court could have provided relief by reversing the hearing officer's decisions on sufficient cause and reinstatement. However, the trial court denied the writ, finding that the District had failed to meet the requirements of the writ. The trial court affirmed the decision of the hearing officer and awarded attorney fees to Vinson.7

I. Sufficient Cause

¶ 16 The District asserts that the hearing officer erred as a matter of law by concluding that Vinson's dishonesty during investigation did not constitute sufficient cause for discharge. The petition alleged, inter alia, that Vinson lied in the course of the investigation of the alleged misconduct; that lying provided sufficient cause to terminate under RCW 28A.405.300 and Clarke v. Shoreline Sch. Dist. No. 412, 106 Wash.2d 102, 113-14, 720 P.2d 793 (1986); that the hearing officer acted unlawfully in holding that Vinson's dishonesty did not establish sufficient cause; and that it had no right to appeal under RCW 28A.405 and Coupeville Sch. Dis. 204 v. Vivian, 36 Wash.App. 728, 730, 677 P.2d 192 (1984).

¶ 17 Vinson does not dispute the District lacked a right of appeal under the statute. Hence, the sole question in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the writ is whether the hearing officer erred as a matter of law on sufficient cause.8 Sunderland, 127 Wash.2d at 788, 903 P.2d 986.

¶ 18 In determining whether sufficient cause for discharge exists, the inquiry centers on whether the teacher has materially breached his promise to teach so as to excuse the school district in its promise to employ. Barnes v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 88 Wash.2d 483, 487, 563 P.2d 199 (1977). Specifically, sufficient cause for a teacher's discharge exists as a matter of law where the teacher's deficiency is unremediable and materially and substantially affects the teacher's performance, or lacks any positive educational

225 P.3d 385

aspect or legitimate...

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3 cases
  • Fed. Way Sch. Dist. No. 210 v. Vinson
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 29 Septiembre 2011
    ...its original opinion, holding that it had jurisdiction pursuant to RCW 7.16.350 and RAP 2.2(a)(1). Fed. Way Sch. Dist. No. 210 v. Vinson, 154 Wash.App. 220, 228 n. 7, 225 P.3d 379 (2010). Two judges found there was sufficient cause for termination over a vigorous dissent.6 The two- judge ma......
  • Grisby v. Herzog, 71904–1–I.
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • 26 Octubre 2015
    ...previous rule is incorrect and harmful), affirmed, 182 Wash.2d 794, 346 P.3d 708 (2015) ; Fed. Way Sch. Dist. 210 v. Vinson, 154 Wash.App. 220, 235, 225 P.3d 379 (2010) (Dwyer, J., dissenting), reversed, 172 Wash.2d 756, 261 P.3d 145 (2011) ; State v. Stalker, 152 Wash.App. 805, 811–12, 219......
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    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • 25 Enero 2010
    ... ... hand, plaintiffs have cited this recent Bellevue School District case where the Washington Supreme Court held that ... Bellevue Sch. Dist. No. 405, 164 Wash.2d 199, 189 P.3d 139 (2008)). Trial ... Morgan v. City of Federal" Way, 166 Wash.2d 747, 756-7, 213 P.3d 596 (2009) ...  \xC2" ... ...

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