Fegley v. Lycoming Rubber Co.
| Decision Date | 24 April 1911 |
| Docket Number | 304 |
| Parties | Fegley v. Lycoming Rubber Company, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued February 13, 1911
Appeal, No. 304, Jan. T., 1910, by defendant, from judgment of C.P. Lycoming Co., Sept. T., 1909, No. 269, on verdict for plaintiff in case of Samuel Fegley v. Lycoming Rubber Company. Affirmed.
Trespass to recover damages for personal injuries. Before HART, P.J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court.
Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $2,500. Defendant appealed.
Error assigned was refusal of binding instructions for defendant.
The assignments of error are overruled, and the judgment is affirmed.
Edgar Munson, of Candor & Munson, for appellant. -- The unguarded condition of the cogwheel was not the proximate cause of the accident: Herr v. Lebanon, 149 Pa. 222; Nichols v. Pittsfield Twp., 209 Pa. 240; Willis v. Armstrong County, 183 Pa. 184; Heister v. Fawn Twp., 189 Pa. 253; P.H. & F.M. Roots Co. v. Meeker, 165 Ind 132 (73 N.E. Repr. 253; 17 Am. Neg. Repr. 484); Crawford & McCrimmon Co. v. Gose, 43 Ind.App. 373 (87 N.E. Repr 709); Brown v. Steel & Wire Co., 43 Ind.App. 560 (88 N.E. Repr. 80); Fulwider v. Trenton Gas Light & Power Co., 216 Mo. 582 (116 S.W. Repr. 508); Elliott v. Allegheny County L. Co., 204 Pa. 568.
Plaintiff assumed the risk: Stehle v. Jaeger Automatic Machine Co., 220 Pa. 617; Jones v. American Caramel Co., 225 Pa. 644; Valjago v. Carnegie Steel Co., 226 Pa. 514.
N. M. Edwards, with him W. H. Spencer, for appellee, cited as to the assumption of the risk: Jones v. Caramel Co., 225 Pa. 644; Valjago v. Steel Co., 226 Pa. 514; Narramore v. Ry. Co., 96 Fed. Repr. 298; Marino v. Lehmaier, 173 N.Y. 530 (66 N.E. Repr. 572); Stewart v. Ferguson, 164 N.Y. 553 (58 N.E. Repr. 662); Am. Car & Foundry Co. v. Armentraut, 214 Ill. 509 (73 N.E. Repr. 766); Newlin Twp. v. Davis, 77 Pa. 317; Hey v. Philadelphia, 81 Pa. 44; Yoders v. Amwell Twp., 172 Pa. 447; Boone v. East Norwegian Twp., 192 Pa. 206; Burrell Township v. Uncapher, 117 Pa. 353; Plymouth Township v. Graver, 125 Pa. 24; Closser v. Washington Twp., 11 Pa.Super. 112; Curry v. Luzerne Borough, 24 Pa.Super. 514; Bitting v. Maxatawny Twp., 180 Pa. 357; Heister v. Fawn Twp., 189 Pa. 253; Nichols v. Pittsfield Twp., 209 Pa. 240; Menner v. Canal Co., 7 Pa. Superior Ct. 135; Confer v. R.R. Co., 146 Pa. 31; Ewing v. North Versailles Twp., 146 Pa. 309.
Before FELL, C.J., MESTREZAT, POTTER, ELKIN and MOSCHZISKER, JJ.
That the defendant in this case was negligent in failing to cover certain cogwheels, as required by the statute; that this negligence caused the injury to plaintiff, and that the latter was free from contributory negligence, are matters of fact which have all been established by the verdict of the jury. Counsel for appellant make no complaint of the manner in which the case was submitted to the jury, but they contend that the act of defendant in maintaining the open cogwheels, was not the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff. It seems that at the time of the accident, the plaintiff was standing upon a small platform at the side of the machine attending to his duties, when another workman accidentally pushed a loaded wheelbarrow against the platform with such force as to cause plaintiff to lose his balance. In the effort to recover, one hand was thrown out, and went into the uncovered cogs, and was crushed. Counsel seek to approximate the facts of this case, and the principle as to liability involved, to those in Elliott v. Light Co., 204 Pa. 568. But their argument is not convincing. In that case it was held that the slipping of a ladder was the originating cause of the plaintiff's fall, and that the fact that he fell against an electric light wire was a mere incident to that fall. It was shown that the light wire was fastened high upon the side of the house, and was so situated that no injurious consequences were reasonably to have been anticipated from anyone falling against it. And as a person is not expected to anticipate and guard against that which no reasonable man would expect to occur, it might for that reason, equally with that which was emphasized in the opinion, have been held in that case that there was no liability upon the part of the defendant. But it is equally true that a person is properly expected to anticipate and guard against the reasonable consequences of his action. In the present case the open cogwheels were so situated that an accidental slip might bring a workman or an attendant of the machine into dangerous contract with them. The common experience of mankind has shown the danger to be apprehended from unguarded machinery, and especially that from uncovered, revolving cogwheels, and has made clear the duty of protecting from that danger, those...
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