Feingold, In re

• Decision Date: 27 October 1972
• Citation: 296 A.2d 492
• Parties: In re Application of Alfred FEINGOLD For Admission to the Bar of the State of Maine.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 492

296 A.2d 492

In re Application of Alfred FEINGOLD For Admission to the

Bar of the State of Maine.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Oct. 27, 1972.

Charles W. Allen, Portland, for applicant.

Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and WEBBER, POMEROY, WERNICK and ARCHIBALD, JJ.

DUFRESNE, Chief Justice.

On May 15, 1969 the Board of Examiners for the Examination of Applicants for Admission to the Bar (Board of Bar Examiners), after investigation, found and certified under 4 M.R.S.A., §§ 802, 803 that Alfred Feingold is a person of good moral character and that he is fit to practice law within the State of Maine without examination as to learning in the law. This certificate was issued for presentation to the Supreme Judicial Court as a part of the documentary proof required to be furnished in said Court under Section 802 in support of a motion for admission to practice law within the State of Maine. The written motion for that purpose was formally filed with the Court by a member of its bar on April 21, 1970. After hearing, a single Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court denied the motion on the ground that the applicant's qualifications of 'good moral character' were not satisfactory. From this adverse decision, Feingold appealed to the Law Court.

Although the point has not been raised, the matter of the jurisdiction of the Law Court to entertain this appeal suggests itself as an initial barrier to relief. Aware that the Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, is of limited jurisdiction and can hear and determine only those matters authorized by statute and brought to it through the particular course of procedure prescribed by the statute or that outlined by court rule implementing enabling legislation (Collett v. Bither, 1970, Me., 262 A.2d 353), we will, as we must, consider and decide whether this Court, under 4 M.R.S.A., § 57, has the legal power to entertain the instant appeal. This jurisdictional legislative enactment reads as follows:

'The following cases only come before the court as a court of law: Cases on appeal from the Superior Court or a single Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court; questions of law arising on reports of cases, including interlocutory orders or rulings of such importance as to require, in the opinion of the justice, review by the law court before any further proceedings in the action; agreed statement of facts; cases presenting a question of law; * * *' (Emphasis supplied.)

The admission of attorneys to practice law in this State has been the subject of rules and regulations promulgated by the Supreme Judicial Court from early statehood ¹ to the time of adoption of the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure effective December 1, 1959. Rule 87, M.R.C.P. provides that

'(a)pplications for admission to the bar shall be heard by a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court in open court and at such time and place as he may designate.' (Emphasis added.)

The corresponding statute on admission of attorneys from another state or the District of Columbia, 4 M.R.S.A., § 802, states, among other things 'said Supreme Judicial Court may in its discretion, if satisfied as to his qualifications, admit such person to practice on motion made by some member of the bar of said court.'

Statutory provisions purporting to confer authority upon the Supreme Judicial Court respecting the admission or reinstatement of attorneys to, and suspension or disbarment from, the practice of law are not exclusive. Such provisions are in aid of the authority and power inherent in the court. The same is true as to the particular procedure which the Legislature may have fashioned to obtain the legislative objectives. But, in this area, the judicial branch of the government, acting through the courts, has exclusive jurisdiction and the legislative branch, acting through the Legislature, can in no way limit this inherent power and authority of the court. Courts, however, may and frequently do honor implementing legislation, but clearly are not bound to do so. See, Barnes v. Walsh, 1950, 145 Me. 107, 72 A.2d 813; Feldman v. State Board of Law Examiners, 1971, 8 Cir., 438 F.2d 699; People v. Buckles, 1968, 167 Colo. 64, 453 P.2d 404; Ex parte Alabama State Bar, 1970, 285 Ala. 191, 230 So.2d 519. Hence, the rule of court which requires hearings on applications for admission to the practice of law before a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court would prevail over the statute, notwithstanding any potential inconsistency between them. Even though the ultimate responsibility is with the Supreme Judicial Court under its inherent power independently of any rule of court regulating the procedure, the Court will honor its own rule respecting the same, absent exceptional circumstances.

The Rules of the Supreme Judicial Court do not provide any appellate review by the full Bench of the denial of admission by a single justice of the Court. Did the Legislature provide such review by the Supreme Judicial Court sitting as a Law Court under 4 M.R.S.A., § 57? We answer in the affirmative. An order and judgment of the single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court denying application for admission to practice law is a final order and judgment of the Court, albeit the Supreme Judicial Court. It represents a judicial conclusion upon the several issues that may arise concerning the right of an applicant to be admitted to the practice of law in this State, such as residency, the required active practice in another state, the good moral character of the applicant, etc. It is a 'case presenting a question of law' within the meaning of 4 M.R.S.A., § 57 as amended by Public Laws, 1965, Chapter 356, § 1. It is a 'case on appeal from * * * a single Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court' within the meaning of 4 M.R.S.A., § 57 as amended by Public Laws, 1959, Chapter 317, § 69. As stated in Dow v. State, 1971, Me., 275 A.2d 815, we view these statutory amendments following the adoption of our new rules of civil procedure as establishing a most comprehensive appellate review in all procedings, whether civil, criminal or sui generis as in the instant case, since

"(w)hen applied to legal proceedings it (the word 'case') imports a state of facts which furnish an occasion for the exercise of the jurisdiction of a court of justice. In this, its generic sense, the word includes all cases, special or otherwise." Mather v. Cunningham, 1910, 107 Me. 242, 78 A. 102.

The applicant in these proceedings may raise the issue, whether the finding of the single Justice that Feingold's qualifications of 'good moral character' were not satisfactory, was made in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion from the evidence before him or otherwise, or whether, as contended by the appellant, the hearing before the Justice below was violative of his rights of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. In the absence of any rule of the Supreme Judicial Court to the contrary, we hold that the Supreme Judicial Court sitting as the Law Court has been given the power by the Legislature under 4 M.R.S.A., § 57, as amended, to entertain and decide the instant appeal and we approve this type of appellate review from denials by a single justice of applications for admission to the practice of law. We note that the Legislature has specifically provided for similar appellate review in cases of disbarment and reinstatement. See, 4 M.R.S.A., §§ 854 and 858. No sound reason appears why a similar appellate procedure should not exist to test the propriety of the denial of admission to practice law made by a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court.

We take this occasion to describe briefly the practice which has been uniformly followed in applications for admission to the bar of this State by members of the bar of another state or the District of Columbia. One of the justices of the Supreme Judicial Court is designated to act in a liaison capacity between the Court and the Board of Bar Examiners in all cases of admissions. The Board forwards the information in the file, including the National Board of Bar Examiners Confidential File, to the supervising justice for his inspection. If the file discloses matters requiring further inquiry or explanation, the supervising justice may refer the case back to the Board for additional investigation; ultimately, he would assign the case to a justice of the Supreme Judicial Court geographically located nearest to the residence of the applicant, for routine admission to the bar in the ordinary case, but, in cases where further investigation is indicated, for disposition of the application with suggested areas of inquiry. This, the assigned justice usually clears up with the candidate himself at one or more interviews. The matter may be expeditiously handled between the assigned justice and the candidate's sponsor of the motion for admission.

In the instant case, the Justice below had several interviews with Mr. Feingold, initially to inquire about certain disturbing information contained in the file and, later, to evaluate certain disclosures made by Mr. Feingold himself or received ex parte in the course of the investigation. When it became apparent to the Justice below that serious doubts had arisen in his mind respecting Mr. Feingold's admission to the practice of law in this State, he informed the applicant that a hearing would be held concerning the issues which they had been discussing back and forth. A record was made of the proceeding and the Justice below indicated for the record the particulars of the total conversation which he had with the applicant with the suggestion that he may be cross-examined in regard to any part thereof. Mr. Feingold was granted complete freedom of action in presenting evidence to support his entitlement to admission to the Bar of Maine. We do commend the Justice below for his constant fairness towards the applicant, for the way in which he handled the...